1. What is the situation in Mexico with respect to enforced disappearances?
For nearly two decades, and especially since the onset of the so-called "War on Drugs," Mexico has faced an acute and growing situation of violence—especially enforced disappearances—driven by the proliferation and fragmentation of organized crime groups. When the Committee conducted its visit to the country in 2021, it did so in the context of more than 95,000 people registered as missing. Of these cases, as the Committee has acknowledged, only between 2 and 6 per cent were heard by the courts, and only 36 judgements have been handed down at the national level.
These national figures are complemented by FIDH’s extensive documentation across multiple regions of Mexico. In its submission to the Committee requesting activation of the Article 34 procedure, FIDH highlighted the widespread character of enforced disappearances in Mexico and the existence of patterns that demonstrate their systematicity, in particular in cases of enforced disappearances in Coahuila (2009–2016), Nayarit (2011–2017), and Veracruz (2010–2016), as well as more recent cases, particularly in 2024 and 2025, in regions including Jalisco and Nayarit. In its reports, FIDH has also underlined the existence of collusion between organized crime groups and public officials, in particular through corruption. The request was further supported by public contributions confirming similar patterns in Coahuila, Nayarit, Veracruz, and Jalisco, as well as in Nuevo León, Guanajuato, Tabasco, Morelos, Baja California, and the State of Mexico. To date, the official State registry reports over 130,000 missing or disappeared persons.
2. What is Article 34 of the Convention on Enforced Disappearances?
The Article 34 procedure, outlined in the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (hereinafter referred to as the "Convention"), grants the Committee on Enforced Disappearances (referred to throughout this explainer as “CED” or “Committee”), when it "receives information which appears . . . to contain well-founded indications that enforced disappearance is being practised on a widespread or systematic basis in the territory under the jurisdiction of a State Party", the power to "urgently bring the matter to the attention of the General Assembly of the United Nations."
Article 34 represents the pinnacle of the enforcement and monitoring mechanisms available to the Committee under the Convention. These mechanisms include:
Article 30 – Urgent actions: Relatives of a disappeared person or their legal representatives may send a request to the Committee that the person be sought and found. In such cases, the Committee may transmit recommendations to the State Party concerned, including requests to take all necessary measures (such as interim measures) to locate and protect the individual and to inform the Committee, within a specified timeframe, of the steps taken, accounting for the urgency of the situation.
Article 31 – Individual complaints: A State Party may choose to allow the Committee to receive complaints from individuals alleging violations of the Convention. If such a communication is admissible, the Committee then forwards it to the State for a response and may request urgent interim measures. It ultimately communicates its conclusions to both the State and the complainant.
Article 32 – Inter-State communications: One State Party may claim that another is not fulfilling its obligations under the Convention, provided that the State Party concerned recognizes the Committee’s competence to receive and consider such communications.
Article 33 – Country visits: If the Committee receives reliable information indicating that a State Party is seriously violating the Convention, it may, after consulting the State concerned, request one or more of its members to undertake a visit and subsequently communicate its observations and recommendations to the State Party.
Taken together, the Convention establishes a graduated system of actions the Committee may take in response to enforced disappearances, with Article 34 representing the most far-reaching level of intervention. It is important to note that none of these efforts are sanctions; these procedures aim to promote cooperation and constructive dialogue between States Parties and the Committee. The Committee confirmed that this is the objective of its procedures in its recent decision.
3. What are enforced disappearances? When do they constitute crimes against humanity? Can non-State actors commit enforced disappearances as crimes against humanity?
(a) Article 2’s Definition of Enforced Disappearances
Article 2 of the Convention defines “enforced disappearance” as the “arrest, detention, abduction or any other form of deprivation of liberty by agents of the State or by persons or groups of persons acting with the authorization, support or acquiescence of the State, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared person, which place such a person outside the protection of the law.”
(b) Article 5 Crimes against Humanity and the Role of Non-State Actors
Under Article 5 of the Convention, enforced disappearances constitute “a crime against humanity as defined in applicable international law” when they are practiced on a widespread or systematic basis.
There is agreement between experts on the subject that applicable international law includes the Rome Statute, the foundational document codifying that crimes against humanity may be committed by individuals, and that enforced disappearances can be committed by a State or political organization. This formulation indicates that such crimes against humanity are not limited to State actors but may also be perpetrated by non-State actors.
In its 2023 Statement on non-State actors in the context of the [Convention], the Committee clarified that acts committed by non-State actors, even in the absence of the authorization, support or acquiescence of the State, may constitute “enforced disappearance” when they are committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population, in accordance with the definition of crimes against humanity under international law. In such circumstances, these acts engage the full range of State obligations under the Convention.
4. Does the CED have the authority to qualify enforced disappearances as crimes against humanity?
Yes. Article 5 of the Convention explicitly states that the “widespread or systematic practice of enforced disappearance constitutes a crime against humanity as defined in applicable international law.” Such applicable law includes customary international law, general principles of law, and treaties that are legally binding on the State concerned.
Therefore, the Committee on Enforced Disappearances, whose role it is to monitor the implementation of the Convention by its States Parties, can qualify acts as crimes against humanity under Article 5 based on the jurisprudence of other international bodies. The Committee is competent under the Convention to make such assessments.
5. Why are there discrepancies in the data on enforced disappearances?
While the official State registry reports over 130,000 missing or disappeared persons, the Mexican government has recently sought to reassess this figure by dividing cases into categories based on the availability of information. This review suggested that the total may be inflated, indicating that approximately 31% of listed individuals showed signs of activity in State records and may still be alive, while a further 36% lacked sufficient identifying information—such as names, dates, or places of disappearance—making verification difficult. As a result, only 43,128 cases were classified as complete records with no signs of life.
While FIDH recognizes the importance of reviewing the registry to improve search efforts, this initiative raises serious concerns. Rather than strengthening efforts to address enforced disappearances, it risks minimizing the scale of the crisis. Victims, civil society organizations, and human rights experts have expressed concern that these measures do little to locate missing persons and may contribute to the erasure of victims from official records. The assertion that tens of thousands of cases lack sufficient data further underscores systemic failures in documentation and investigation. Notably, fewer than 10% of the more than 43,000 confirmed missing identified through this review are reportedly under criminal investigation. Moreover, this review was conducted and published without involvement of the victims’ collectives who have undertaken the extensive work of documenting disappearances in the absence of effective State involvement. Victims were neither consulted during the review process nor briefed on the methodology used. They were also not given advance notice that the review had been conducted or that its findings would be published. Instead, victims were informed of the assessment at the same time as the general public.
Concerns about the deflation of disappearance figures are compounded by discrepancies in official data on clandestine graves. Between 2006 and 2024, state prosecutors’ offices reported 5,532 clandestine graves, whereas the Attorney General’s Office (FGR) reported only 630 for the same period, highlighting significant inconsistencies in the government’s accounting of the crisis. Moreover, Mexican authorities have not provided updates on clandestine graves found since 2023.
Importantly, search efforts for the disappeared are carried out primarily by relatives and victims’ collectives, who have uncovered most of the clandestine graves. State cooperation in these efforts remains limited, with authorities frequently informing victims that a lack of human and financial resources hinders the effective implementation of search and investigation activities.
6. Why does FIDH consider the disappearances to be widespread and systematic?
FIDH considers that the sheer number and geographical extent of cases indicates that there is a widespread pattern of enforced disappearances in Mexico. While enforced disappearances are more prevalent in some states than others, and some regions have experienced fluctuations in their frequency, they have occurred in high numbers in every one of Mexico’s 32 states since 2006.
For over a decade, FIDH has worked closely with Mexican civil society organizations and victims’ collectives to document crimes against humanity in the states of Coahuila, Nayarit and Veracruz, where findings indicate that enforced disappearances have also occurred systematically; i.e. in an organized, non-random and repetitive manner. In its reports, FIDH demonstrated that in each of these regions enforced disappearances were committed with distinct patterns, but having in common the profile of the victims—mainly poor people—whose bodies, if recovered, were found across more than 5,000 clandestine graves. These reports also showed that these disappearances occurred with collusion—frequently in contexts of corruption—between organized crime groups, state law enforcement groups, and even local governments who authorized, supported, or acquiesced to these disappearances, underscoring their systematic practice.
7. Why did FIDH request the initiation of the Article 34 procedure?
Mexico has long grappled with violence committed by organized crime groups, including enforced disappearances. Although the State has neither adopted nor endorsed enforced disappearances as a policy devised at the highest levels of the State, and has made fragmented efforts to address the issue, both the prevalence of such violence and high levels of impunity persist.
For this reason, on February 11, 2025, FIDH requested the implementation of the Article 34 procedure to address the serious situation of enforced disappearances in Mexico at the international level. It considers it crucial that the State recognize the widespread and systematic nature of these crimes and adjust its investigative and judicial policies accordingly.
Recognizing this systematic nature requires the use of new investigative approaches, including those grounded in international criminal law. Rather than treating each disappearance as an isolated incident, the justice system should aggregate and analyze information across similar cases, address patterns collectively, and conduct chain-of-command analyses to investigate and prosecute criminal networks and structures—not only direct perpetrators.
In addition, the degree of collusion between local actors, law enforcement, and government officials with organized crime groups demands deeper investigation into the role of corruption in enabling and perpetuating these crimes against humanity. This paradigm shift also requires examining the methods through which organized crime groups capture and influence public institutions, allowing them to commit such crimes with impunity.
FIDH believes that the Article 34 procedure provides an important opportunity to promote more effective and coordinated investigative strategies at the international level, commensurate with the widespread and systematic nature of enforced disappearances in Mexico.
8. What was the chronology of the procedure?
The procedure unfolded as follows:
On 11 February 2025, FIDH asked the Committee to refer the situation in Mexico to the United Nations General Assembly.
On 4 April 2025, based on the findings of the Committee’s own visit report to Mexico in 2022, as well as the receipt of numerous requests for urgent action and individual complaints, and FIDH’s own request for the procedure’s initiation, the Committee decided to activate the Article 34 procedure,confirming that it had indications that enforced disappearances are being systematically practiced in Mexico.
On 24 June 2025, the Committee requested further information from the Mexican State on the issue, acknowledging that the information presented by FIDH indicates that “enforced disappearances have been, and are being, committed in a systematic and widespread manner in the past and in the present."
In September of 2025, the Mexican State presented a report to the Committee, which the Committee refers to in its decision published on April 2, 2026. However, the State requested that its report remain confidential.
Between September 2025 and February 2026, civil society organizations and victims’ groups submitted information to the Committee and the Committee held meetings with representatives of civil society and the State.
On 2 April 2026, the Committee concluded that there are well-founded indications that enforced disappearances as crimes against humanity are being committed in Mexico.
Notably, since at least 2021, Mexican victims’ collectives and civil society organizations have been in contact with the Committee, submitting individual submissions, requesting country visits, and pushing for the initiation of the Article 34 procedure.
9. What did the CED say in its decision?
Under Article 34, the Committee is competent to assess whether, prima facie, enforced disappearances are being practiced on a widespread or systematic basis. In other words, the Committee must be satisfied that it has received detailed and reliable information from credible sources which, on its face, indicates that enforced disappearances are occurring in such a manner as to raise sufficient concern. As the Committee in these instances does not act as a commission of inquiry tasked with making definitive findings of fact, it is not required to apply strict evidentiary standards such as the “reasonable grounds” test used by judicial bodies.
Therefore, applying relevant evidentiary standards in its decision and the Rome Statute as applicable international law, the Committee concluded that enforced disappearances have been, and continue to be, committed in Mexico on a widespread and systematic basis, amounting to crimes against humanity. This threshold enables the Committee to bring the matter to the attention of the General Assembly, with a view to prompting action to establish the facts and address the situation.
Based on the information provided, the Committee found that the scale of the phenomenon—reflected in the number of registered disappeared persons and clandestine graves—demonstrates its widespread nature. For example, between January 1, 2023 and April 22, 2025, 28,880 disappearances were reported in Mexico. The Committee further determined, based on public sources including FIDH reports, that these acts are systematic, as they follow recurring patterns across different regions and time periods, indicating non-accidental and coordinated conduct.
The Committee also concluded that enforced disappearances in Mexico constitute “attacks” carried out by ‘organizations’ within the meaning of Article 7(2)(a) of the Rome Statute. Importantly, the Committee clarified that an “attack” need not be deployed throughout the territory of a State as part of a coordinated policy; “attacks” may take place in certain parts of the territory and may be limited in time and scope. Therefore, the information before the Committee demonstrated that “attacks” have occurred, and continue to occur, in different parts of Mexican territory. Some of these acts are attributable to State authorities, while others are the sole authorship of drug cartels and other criminal organizations. However, these geographic and political distinctions do not negate the conclusion that enforced disappearances amounting to crimes against humanity are occurring in Mexico. Even where patterns are regional or localized, they may still qualify as “widespread or systematic attacks.”
Therefore, on the basis of information submitted under Article 34, together with material gathered since its initial engagement with Mexico in 2012, the Committee determined that there are well-founded indications that enforced disappearances have been and continue to be perpetrated in Mexico as crimes against humanity.
Accordingly, the Committee took the exceptional step of bringing the situation in Mexico to the attention of the United Nations General Assembly. It called on the Assembly to consider measures to provide technical cooperation, financial support, and specialized assistance to strengthen search operations, forensic analysis, and the investigation of enforced disappearances, including their links to public officials and organized crime. It also recommended the establishment of an effective mechanism to establish the truth and to ensure protection and support for victims’ families, organizations, and those engaged in the search for the disappeared.
10. Why does the CED’s decision NOT suggest there is a policy of enforced disappearances at the highest levels of the Mexican government?
(a) Article 34 is preventive, not a mechanism for criminal adjudication
The Article 34 procedure is preventive in nature. Its purpose is to mobilize international attention and support, not to establish individual criminal responsibility. As emphasized by the Committee, Article 34 is part of the procedures provided for in the Convention to promote cooperation and constructive dialogue between States Parties and the Committee.
(b) Enforced disappearances, and crimes against humanity, do not require a policy devised at the highest-levels of the State.
In its decision, the Committee emphasized that it found no evidence of a federal policy to commit enforced disappearances within the meaning of the Rome Statute. However, it also clarified that neither the Convention nor the Rome Statute requires such crimes to originate at the highest levels of government or to be implemented nationwide in order to qualify as crimes against humanity.
The Convention provides that non-State actors can commit enforced disappearances (see question 3), including when such acts reach the threshold of crimes against humanity, even in the absence of State authorization, support, or acquiescence. The Committee has further affirmed that, under Article 5, enforced disappearances committed by non-State actors as part of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population constitute both enforced disappearances and crimes against humanity within the framework of the Convention, regardless of State policy or involvement.
(c) Mexico may still be considered internationally responsible for enforced disappearances, even in the absence of such a policy devised at the highest levels of the State.
Under international law, including the International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility, conduct by officials exercising governmental authority is attributable to the State, even when such actors exceed their authority or act contrary to instructions.
Evidence documented by FIDH and recognized by the Committee indicates that enforced disappearances in Mexico frequently involve collusion between organized crime groups and public officials at the federal, state, and municipal levels. In its2022 country visit report, the Committee confirmed that enforced disappearances continue to be committed directly by public officials, and that organized crime actors often operate with varying degrees of authorization, support, or acquiescence by authorities. The Committee also clarified that acquiescence exists where there is a known pattern of disappearances and the State fails to take effective measures to prevent, investigate, and punish them. Given the persistent patterns of enforced disappearances in Mexico and the high levels of impunity, these obligations have not been met. As a result, collusion and acquiescence by local officials can engage the responsibility of the Mexican State, even in the absence of a centralized policy.
While the Committee confirmed that disappearances are most often committed with the requisite involvement of Mexican public officials, cases without such involvement still invoke State obligations to investigate and respond. Where acts fall within the definition of Article 2 but are not committed with the authorization, support, or acquiescence of the State—that is, where they are committed solely by non-State actors—Article 3 of the Convention requires each State Party to take appropriate measures to investigate such acts and to bring those responsible to justice.
Where disappearances committed by non-State actors fall within the scope of Article 3 but are carried out on a widespread or systematic basis (meeting the threshold set out in Article 5) the Committee has concluded they constitute enforced disappearances and States Parties must apply all the provisions of the Convention.
In sum, neither the Committee nor FIDH alleges the existence of a federal policy of enforced disappearances. However, the documented involvement, tolerance, or failure of State authorities at various levels is sufficient to engage Mexico’s international responsibility and emphasizes the need for urgent and coordinated action.
11. Has the Article 34 procedure been used before in other contexts?
No, this is the first time that the CED has initiated the Art. 34 process against a State and, consequently, the first time that it sends a country’s situation before the UN General Assembly. The initiation of the procedure thus reflects the seriousness of the problem of enforced disappearances in Mexico.
12. What was the Mexican State’s response?
For now, the Mexican government has rejected the findings of the CED, accusing the Committee of bias and claiming that its decision overlooks progress made since 2018 addressing enforced disappearances. It also rejected the CED’s legal reasoning, particularly its linkage between crimes against humanity and the Rome Statute, despite the well-established relationship between these frameworks.
In rejecting the procedure, the Mexican government argued that the Committee failed to consider key issues and relied disproportionately on data from only four Mexican states between 2009 and 2017. The government further maintained that disappearances involving State collusion were limited to past governments and that the Committee did not adequately account for the current government’s recent efforts, including collaboration with victims’ collectives and broader initiatives aimed at eradicating the crime.
FIDH emphasizes that the CED’s analysis incorporates data and events from the past two years, indicating that enforced disappearances continue to occur on a widespread and systematic basis. One such example is the case of Rancho Izaguirre, where, in March 2025, a victims’ collective uncovered evidence of disappearances and related crimes, including the forced recruitment of young men by the Jalisco New Generation Cartel. Victims at the site were reportedly beaten, tortured, or killed if they resisted or failed to comply with the cartel’s demands. The collective discovered burned human remains, ovens allegedly used for cremation, and hundreds of personal items, including shoes, clothing, and identification documents. Notably, in 2024, police and the National Guard had entered the ranch, detaining ten individuals, rescuing two victims, and recovering one body. However, no further investigations were conducted by State authorities. The CED observed that the site remained effectively uninvestigated for years and that, even after its seizure by local authorities, investigative efforts failed to identify clandestine graves or perpetrators until the intervention of victims’ collectives.
Thus, even if current government policies represent progress in addressing enforced disappearances, a high degree of impunity persists, alongside credible evidence that such disappearances continue. Government efforts to combat the issue do not preclude the Committee from determining that disappearances are occurring on a widespread and systematic basis, nor do they limit its authority to refer the matter to the General Assembly.
Crucially, although the majority of disappearances occurred under the administration of former President Felipe Calderón, this does not absolve the Mexican State of international responsibility for acts carried out with State collusion—this is one of the core tenets of international law.
It should be noted that the Attorney General of the Republic has recently acknowledged the need to reform the country’s investigative approach. The Attorney General, Ernestina Godoy, announced a shift away from fragmented and insufficient investigations with the launch of a new “Strategic Plan for the Administration of Justice” on April 17, 2026. Over the next three years, the plan will prioritize combating extortion, enforced disappearances, and femicide.
Godoy admitted that past investigations were poorly coordinated—echoing concerns long raised by FIDH before both the Mexican government and the Committee. The plan seeks to improve justice outcomes by promoting inter-institutional coordination, strengthening investigative protocols, reallocating resources to prosecutorial work, and enhancing operational capacity. As part of this effort, state prosecutors have agreed to unify investigative criteria, improve information sharing, and reinforce specialized units addressing enforced disappearances.
This announcement was made mere days after the CED’s referral of Mexico’s situation to the UN General Assembly, suggesting increased international scrutiny has prompted this change. While FIDH greatly welcomes these reforms, it stresses that meaningful change will require sustained international support. Notably, Godoy has said that she does not consider that the enforced disappearances are widespread or systematic—an understandable position given the nature of her role to investigate such crimes and that she only assumed her position in December of 2025.
13. What are the next steps?
1. FIDH urges the UN Secretary General, Antonio Guterres, to schedule as a matter of urgency the presentation of the situation in Mexico to the General Assembly of the United Nations.
2. FIDH plans to convene meetings with victims’ collectives and civil society in Mexico to gather their demands and identify the principal requests that such groups would like to make before the General Assembly of the United Nations.
3. Once the issue is raised before the General Assembly, monitor (a) progress on compliance with the General Assembly’s recommendations such as technical cooperation, including the possible support of the International Criminal Court, along with (b) the success of the investigation policy reforms undertaken by Mexico’s Attorney General.
4. In the event that, despite technical cooperation from the United Nations and the reforms implemented, the same level of impunity persists, urge States Parties to the Convention, including Mexico, which have also ratified the Rome Statute, to refer Mexico’s case to the International Criminal Court.