The FIDH had mandated Françoise Mathe, lawyer and chargée de mission of the Executive Bureau of the FIDH as a ‘sachant" [2].
On 16th May 1998, at about 9:00 p.m., some fifty heavily armed men, most of them masked, suddenly boarded three small lorries in the working-class suburbs in the South-East of Barrancabermeja whose people had just joined in a party organised by the social welfare services.
On their grotesque journey they stopped many times to commit acts of ill-treatment and violence against the local residents who were forced to lie down, face to the ground, whilst they had to endure beating and insults by the armed men. 30 people (mainly very young people) were forced to board the lorries and one young man was killed while he was trying to escape and, before his family and the terrorised crowd, a second man who was refusing to get on the vehicles got his throat cut. The following day, five dead bodies were found a few miles from the town.
As soon as the attack was over, the relatives of the ‘raided’ people asked for assistance from the police and the armed forces. They were faced with indifference at best, but more often with cynicism and contempt.
A few weeks after the acts had been committed, a para-military group, the ‘United Self-defenders’ of Santerder and the South of Cesar (Ausac), were claiming, after a sinister performance (with photographs of those who disappeared submitted by their families for the purpose of ‘identification’), the execution of those 25 who had disappeared and whose bodies are said to have been thrown into the River Magdalena, after they had been ‘identified as guerilleros, questioned and handed over for trial’.
The failure to implement the recommendations of the Commission on ‘Truth and Justice’ and the blocking of judicial and didsciplinary procedures led unions, religious organisations and Human Rights NGOs, both local and national, to convene an international tribunal of opinion to expose the strategy of the massacre and its impunity.
The hearing of nine witnesses and three ‘experts’, a site visit and the reading of various documents in public led to a ‘judgment’ exposing the responsibility of the Colombian government on the grounds of the decisive role of its agents, whether active or passive, in committing the act.
Para-militarism or the ‘privatisation of human rights violations’
Sadly, the massacre of 16th May 1998 is not the only one, since another 235 cases were counted by the ‘People’s Defender’ in 1998 [3].
In the same neighbourhoods of Barrancabermeja two more massacres took place on 14th July 1998 (where 10 people were assassinated), and another one on 28th February 1999 (where 9 people were assassinated and 2 disappeared), according to a scenario absolutely identical to that of 16th May 1998.
Out of some 30,000 murders committed in the country each year, 10 - 15 per cent have a political motivation, with some 70 per cent of them attributable to the para-military forces, 5 per cent to the armed forces and 25 per cent to the guerillas [4].
The purpose of this terror is to pursue and achieve two objectives
:
- massive displacements of the population in rural areas, combining the principal strategy of war against the rebels - ‘depriving the fish (i.e. the armed rebel movements) of water’ - with the enforcement of a real ‘agricultural counter reform’ by emptying vast stretches of land, which could otherwise be used for agriculture and export or livestock breeding, of their inhabitants [5].
- the systematic elimination of social, political, union leaders, Human Rights defenders, who are executed or forced to leave the country after their stigmatisation as ‘agents of the guerilla’ in public has transformed them into ‘military targets’.
The context in which the massacre of 16th May 1998 took place perfectly illustrates the close links - indisputably established [6] - between the para-military groups and public authorities in general and the armed forces in particular.
Concerted failure by the armed forces to intervene
The town of Barrancabermeja, located in the Magdalena Medio region where the para-military movement is extremely strong, is a river port and forms the centre of the oil industry. Its population is strongly rooted in the trade union movement and is extremely exposed as a target.
This town is subject to strict patrol by the police and military, especially in the North-Eastern and South-Western parts, due to the suspected presence of armed groups and the need to protect the power plants (for heat and electricity) and the oil refinery.
Two military bases are located at the very heart of these neighbourhoods: the base of ‘source no. 7’ and that of the ‘sub-regional power station’.
Patrols, roadblocks, checks, searches by the police or military are very frequent ; hence, the passive behaviour of the government force during the attack of the para-military group can only arouse suspicion.
Visual observations in the place itself, the hearing of witnesses and the reading of the documents brought to the knowledge of the tribunal and the general public on the two days of debate led to the conviction that the failure of the different services to intervene could not be the result of negligence, nor of evil attitudes, but of prior concertation :
- several days before the act was committed, the leader of the Administrative Department of Security (general information) made it known to the police and armed forces that there might be an attack by a para-military group on the town and the neighbourhoods in the North-East and South-West in particular;
- on the day preceding the massacre, home visits were carried out in at least one of these neighbourhoods - these are widely considered by the general public as the precursor of an aggression, prior to which the armed forces are said to have made sure that the population carried no more weapons;
- several operation warrants (no. 100, 101 and 102) were issued by officers of the Nueva Grenada battalion deployed in Barrancabermeja on 15th May. According to warrant no. 100 (‘Furia’) a roadblock should be set up in a place designated ‘Y’ and stay there for 24 hours from the 16th May, to be removed by the commander of the troops only.
This roadblock was actually put in place in this place in the afternoon, but strangely, lifted one hour before the arrival of thepara-military group which followed precisely this route [7] ;
- countless witnesses confirmed the presence of various military troops in the vicinity of the neighbourhood where the attack was launched and at almost the same time;
- a visit to the place itself, organised by the national prosecution authority, shows that the shooting during one of the stops of the para-military group was perfectly audible from the military base of ‘source no.7’, located less than 200 metres away.
What is more, during this site visit, the soldiers of this same base, who had not been informed about it, rushed along, alarmed by the first shots;
- The field visits organised by the Tribunal enabled one to establish the implausibility of the charges of all the police authorites who had pretended that the incidents had only come to their knowledge by the radio news the next morning.
The streets in the South-Eastern part of the city are extremely narrow, with no vertical buildings at all, which makes audio and visual surveillance easier. The entire part of the city is made of insubstantial, modest one-storey constructions of light material, on one level, which provide no visual or sound cover - should be stressed that the aggressors (a group of fifty men), in addition to kidnapping the 30 inhabitants from the neighbourhood and carry them in three lorries, only two of which were covered, passed in front of one of the military bases at least twice, that there was shooting and that the crowd, immediately after it had passed, dispersed into the streets in an emotionally charged atmosphere.
- Lieutenant Colonel Oscar Sanchez Velez of the Nueva Grenada batallion, with astounding cynicism, said in his judicial hearing that it was ‘impossible for anyone who has the least knowledge of the logistical support necessary to get rid of 40 people, escorted by another 30 - 50, to imagine such a thing and to accuse official government forces. This would require a fleet of 50 vehicles which one could never hide, or still less move around in a town which on that date was awake and where normally everyone knows about everything !’
- As soon as the aggressors had disappeared, countless relatives of victims turned to the various police stations and the armed forces to seek assistance. They did not get any, although the route taken by the cars during the hunt would have allowed them to locate and rescue those who had been kidnapped.
All these elements suggest the deliberate and concerted retreat of all the security forces that might have posed an obstacle to the activities of a para-military group which had been announced beforehand, rather than simple negligence.
Furthermore, the witnesses mentioned the direct involvement of members of government force in the para-military group. Several had heard the masked men question each other, addressing each other with their army titles, such as ‘lieutenant’, ‘commander’, etc.); some also noticed that they were wearing different parts of uniforms from different forces. Finally, a sub-officer of the ‘source no. 7’ base, who got recognised by two witnesses, was accused, kept in custody and released for reasons purely relating to the procedure.
In truth, the para-militarist movement, apart from developing anti-revolutionary techniques destroying the social structure, today operates a real transition towards private actors perpetrating human rights violations inherent in a ‘dirty war’, as is reflected in the breathtaking rise in the number of human rights violations attributable to para-military groups over the last ten years, with a simultaneous decline of those attributable to the armed forces to a relatively insignificant number.
The organisation of impunity
These acts can only be committed with such unfailing regularity because of the impunity of their perpetrators and, above all, their official accomplices.
The way they are organised is linked to the functioning of the judicial system. Although numerous social activists are still subjected to blind repression without serious legal guarantee by this ‘faceless justice’, the system can by no means guarantee effective measures against para-military violence.
Despite the promise of confidentiality in theory, the representative of the Prosecution in charge of carrying out the investigations was subjected to such pressure that he had to leave the country and seek asylum in another country a few months after the opening of investigations. During the following months, the new representative in charge of the investigations released the only member of the armed forces who had been persecuted and was held in detention for reasons purely related to the procedure and a bail of $ 160, an amount which was totally insignificant. In addition, an arrest warrant was issued against the alleged leader of a para-military group, which has still not been executed until the present day.
The nine officers of the police and armed forces whose responsibility by omission gave rise to a disciplinary procedure were not temporarily suspended, which should normally be the case according to Article 115 of the Disciplinary Code and which would have been justified by the gravity of the acts in particular. One of them has been confirmed in the post he had held temporarily until then.
The present case-law of the Supreme Magistrates Council leaves the members of the armed forces in complete impunity, by transferring its competence to the military tribunals which are considered as being also responsible for dealing with acts in the category of crimes against humanity - which stands in total contradiction with the clearly established jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court.
Added to that is the indulgence of the military tribunals, despite indisputable evidence [8]. Often enough the positions in these tribunals are occupied by those immediately superior in the hierarchy to those being prosecuted and even those ‘superiors’ may sometimes be responsible...
The para-military forces and the way this impunity is handled constitute two sides of the same coin : a sort of crime for which government officials can be held accountable in terms of their criminal responsibility and the political responsibility of the government itself.
Apart from the conclusions drawn by the International Tribunal of Opinion, the debate has opened up a space where people could give vent for the search for truth and remembrance.
The field visits presented the best opportunity for this, since the residents of the neighbourhood and the families of the victims were able to give an account of the exact sequence of events there and then.
Finally, the big headlines in the press have opened up a broad debate on what some in the government and armed forces describe as ‘foreign intervention into the country’s own affairs’.
Eduardo Cifuentes Munoz, President of the Constitutional Court, has summarised the situation in very harsh words: ‘The country loses its sovereignty if it abstains from punishing the perpetrators of human rights violations ... We are sovereign as far as we are citizens and vigilant in defending Human Rights. We lose our sovereignty if the opposite is the case.’
Françoise Mathe
Chargée de mission of the FIDH
Footnotes :
1. including ASFADES, the association of families of those who ‘disappeared’, the Nunca Mas (‘Never Again’) project, a workers’ Union, the diocese of Barrancabermeja, the José Alvear Restrepo Lawyers’ Association, affiliated to the FIDH ;
2. ‘sachant’ (expert witness)
3. The term ‘massacre’ is used wherever more than four people are killed at once.
4. Source : CINEP databank
5. More than 1 million people are currently affected by this phenonemon in Colombia, with 308,000 people only for 1998
6. See third report of the Inter-American Commission on the Human Rights situation in Colombia (1999).
7. Retrospectively, the Colonel responsible for the base was to claim that the withdrawal of the armoured vehicles which formed the roadblock had become necessary, because they were needed to ensure the safe evacuation of a soldier who was suffering injuries, although he was only injured at 11 :00 p.m., i.e. two hours after the roadblock had been withdrawn and half an hour after the departure of the para-military group. Moreover, the register of the ‘Nueva Grenada’ batallion shows that the armoured patrols responsible for the roadblock returned to the base at 9 :30 p.m. and that the Colonel in charge of the base only left there at 11 :20 p.m., although he is claiming that he had not been informed of the alteration of the warrant he had issued for the armoured vehicles to stay in place for 24 hours, an alteration which can only have been made by him or perhaps even by a higher authority.
8. In the case of the military intelligence network 007 which programmed the execution of more than 60 leaders of society, trade unions and human rights defenders in Barrancabermeja in 1992, and whose procedure has been carefully updated by the judicial enquiries, including in particular detailed declarations of several paid killers, and the seizure of accounts books which showed outgoings that corresponded to those payments and the rent of buildings for use as cover.
All the officers whose chain of commands had been completely proved benefited from a final decision of acquittal by the Supreme Military Tribunal in September 1998.(Cf. Report on the intelligence and execution networks of Barrancabermeja, by the Regional Corporation for Human Rights Defense (CREDHOS) and the José Alvear Restrepo Lawyers’ Association (1999).