

fidh

Fédération Internationale des Ligues des Droits de l'Homme
International Federation for Human Rights
Federación Internacional de Derechos Humanos
الفدرالية الدولية لحقوق الانسان

In cooperation with :
Ligue tchadienne des droits de l'Homme
Association tchadienne pour la promotion et la
défense des droits de l'Homme
Sudan Organisation Against Torture
Inter African Union for Human Rights
Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies

Darfur and Eastern Chad

“We want security, we want justice”

International fact-finding mission report



The Gaga camp for Sudanese refugees, Eastern Chad.

Table of contents

INTRODUCTION	3
1. Context of the mission	3
2. Mission's objectives and deployment	4
3. Composition of the delegation	4
4. Persons met by the chargés de mission	5
I- Darfur remains ablaze: testimonies	6
1. Difficult to access information on grave violations of human rights in Darfur	6
2. Continued grave violations of human rights and international humanitarian law	7
A/ Testimonies of Sudanese refugees who recently arrived in camps in Chad.....	7
B/ Surviving trauma and violence	8
3. The Darfurians want	9
A/ Summary of demands : we want our rights, peace, and justice	9
B/ Testimonies	9
4. The hybrid force : necessary but not sufficient	11
II- Causes and consequences of the extension of the Darfur conflict to Eastern Chad	14
1. Rebels have a free hand on both sides of the Chad-Sudan border	14
2. Eastern Chad, another land of strife	15
A/ Testimonies on incursions of janjaweed in Chad	15
B/ Aggravated inter-ethnic violence	16
C/ Total impunity	16
D/ Consequences : More refugees, more displaced persons	17
3. The humanitarian situation and security, both very precarious	17
A/ Sudanese refugees	17
i) Management and daily life.....	17
ii) Security problems	20
B/ Displaced persons	21
i) Humanitarian catastrophe.....	21
ii) Great insecurity.....	22
4. Urgent need for the deployment of a multidimensional force	22
Conclusions and recommendations	24
Annex 1 : UN Security Council Resolution 1769 (2007)	27
Annex 2 : UN Security Council Resolution 1778 (2007)	30
Annex 3 : Map : Presence of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in Eastern Chad/Estimation of the Number of IDPs per sites	33
Annex 4 : Map of the Sudanese refugees' camps in Eastern Chad/Sudanese Refugees in Eastern Chad	34

Introduction

1. Context of the mission

Since 2003 Darfur has been set ablaze by armed conflict between the Sudanese authorities and the rebel movements – mainly, the Sudan Liberation Army/Movement, (SLA/SLM) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). Although they differ on political and ideological religious grounds, both movements share a common agenda seeking: the end of the political and socio-economic marginalisation of Darfur, stronger representation of Darfur populations in the central government’s institutions, and a better apportionment of wealth.

Khartoum is fighting the rebels by relying on the historical inter-ethnic rivalry over land and water resources in the region. The Government started mobilising and arming a local militia called the “janjaweed”, mainly recruited from the “Arab” ethnic groups (nomad herders) to fight rebels who are mainly from the Fur, Zaghawa and Masaalit tribes (pastoralists and sedentary farmers).

The conflict seriously violates human rights and international humanitarian law since the warring parties are directing indiscriminate attacks against civilians. Killings, rapes, torture, systematic looting, villages set aflame is decimating the Darfur population. In its report of 1 February 2005, the International Commission of Inquiry, mandated by the United Nations Security Council¹, spoke of crimes against humanity committed by the Sudanese government and the janjaweed militia. The commission indicated that the rebel forces “*were guilty of grave violations of human rights that constitute war crimes*”.

In nearly five years of fighting, at least 200,000 people have been killed, close to two million people have been forced to move and some 250,000 Sudanese have had to take refuge in Chad and the Central African Republic. Recent attacks against the personnel of humanitarian organisations and the African Union (AU) forces, which arrived in 2004, impede assistance to civilian populations and make the situation, which the UN calls a “humanitarian catastrophe”, even worse.

Numerous attempts to settle the conflict have been thwarted by a lack of willingness of the warring parties to end the hostilities. In September 2003, the Government and the SLA/SLM signed the first ceasefire agreement .

These two parties signed a second (humanitarian) ceasefire on 8 April 2004. On 5 May 2006, during the seventh series of negotiations, led by the AU, the Government signed a Peace Agreement with only one rebel faction “ the Sudanese Liberation Army (SLA)” led by Mini Minawi ; the faction led by Abdul Wahid (SLM/AW) did not sign, nor did the JEM.

In its press release of 25 May 2004, the AU Peace and Security Council decided to deploy an observation mission that included a civilian component and a protection unit and called for all necessary measures to be taken to ensure effective control of the humanitarian ceasefire. In October 2004, the AU Peace and Security Council created an enlarged mission, the AMIS (African Mission in the Sudan) and assigned it a broader mandate, i.e. to improve security in Darfur and monitor the safe return of refugees and displaced persons (IDPs). The assignment was designed to “*protect civilians under imminent threat and in the immediate vicinity, within resources and capability, it being understood that the protection of the civilian population is the responsibility of the GoS*”.

Aware of the continued serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian rights, despite the Darfur Peace Agreement² and the incapacity of the AMIS – because of an imprecise mandate and for lack of manpower, logistics, and also experience – to effectively protect the civilian populations, the United Nations Security Council authorised in August 2006 the deployment of a United Nations peace-keeping force³. Although strongly against this intervention, the Sudanese Government finally gave in to pressure from the international community and the human rights organisations by publicly accepting the deployment of a hybrid UN-AU force. But Sudan tried to delay the operation by requiring the UN, prior to the dispatch of its troops, to finance AMIS (logistical component, additional staff, humanitarian aid and equipment for the operation). Finally, on 12 June 2007, the day before the FIDH mission in Eastern Chad, Sudan reiterated its agreement for the hybrid force.

However over the past months the tragedy of Darfur has stretched beyond its borders destabilizing the security and humanitarian situation in the north-east of the Central African Republic (CAR)⁴ and in eastern Chad. A few

weeks before the FIDH mission took place, France, disconcerted by the situation and in view of its military presence in the two countries, proposed the establishment of a multidimensional force under the partial command of the European Union, following the precedents of Macedonia, Kosovo and Ituri.

Further, responding to recommendations from the International Commission of Inquiry and the concerns of international human rights NGOs, namely FIDH⁵, the Security Council called upon the International Criminal Court (ICC) Prosecutor to open an investigation on the situation in Darfur, on March 2005⁶. The Government of Sudan's response to fight impunity of perpetrators of the most serious crimes through the establishment of special courts and other bodies has proved ineffective in terms of willingness and capacity to bring perpetrators to justice. The persistent refusal of the Government of Sudan to cooperate with the ICC forced the Office of the Prosecutor to carry out its investigation from outside Darfur. On 3 May 2007 the Pre-trial I Chamber of the ICC, issued warrants of arrest against Ahmad Muhammad Harun (Ahmad Harun), former Minister of State for the Interior and currently Minister of Humanitarian Affairs of the Government of Sudan and against Ali Muhammad Al Abd-Al-Rahman (alias Ali Kushayb), a militia/janjaweed leader accused on 51 counts of murder, rape, acts of torture and other serious crimes against the civilian population, crimes consider as war crimes and crimes against humanity. At the time of FIDH mission in Eastern Chad, the authorities of Sudan had still not transferred these two persons to the ICC.

After five years of relative inaction, the international community, – including China which has close economic ties with Sudan– seems to be more anxious to settle the conflict. But Khartoum, the main actor in the conflict, is delaying progress by playing up the principle of national sovereignty. The African Union, which wanted to use Darfur as its first test case in regional conflict settlement, did not facilitate the implementation of measures to protect the civilian population.

The FIDH mission in Eastern Chad took place in this particular context. It is noteworthy that International Non Governmental Organisations (INGOs) are de facto prohibited from entering Darfur by Khartoum authorities.

2. Mission's objectives and deployment

An FIDH delegation visited Chad from 13 to 23 June 2007 to assess human rights and international humanitarian rights in Darfur and Eastern Chad, in particular through testimonies of Sudanese refugees who recently arrived in camps in Eastern Chad. The aim of the mission was to identify a number of recommendations that could contribute to establishing peace in Darfur and throughout the region, especially with regard to the protection of civilians, the fight against impunity, and progress in political negotiations towards peace agreements.

In carrying out its mandate, the FIDH delegation met with several members of the Chadian government and with representatives of the diplomatic community and UN agencies (See below the list of persons encountered by the *chargés de mission*). The delegation went to Abéché, chief-town of the Ouaddai region and the Ouaraa *département*, 900 km to the east of the capital, and visited the refugee camps of Gaga, Bredjing and Farchana⁷ near the Sudanese border. In the camps, the *chargés de mission* met representatives of various UN and humanitarian organisations and recorded the testimony of over 30 refugees, both men and women.

FIDH would like to thank the Chadian authorities for the expeditious authorisations to travel throughout the country and to visit the refugee camps. FIDH would also like to thank the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) for having facilitated visits in the camps.

3. Composition of the delegation

The mission was composed of the following experts:

- Isobel Renzulli, member of the Sudan Organisation Against Torture (SOAT), FIDH member organisation;
- Osman Hummaida, *chargé de mission*;
- Mohamed Ahmed, Coordinator of Actions on Sudan at the Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies (CIHRS);
- Marceau Sivieude, FIDH Africa Desk Director;
- Delphine Kemneloum Djiraibe, member of the Association tchadienne pour la promotion et la défense des droits de l'homme (ATPDH), FIDH member

Darfur and Eastern Chad
“We want security, we want justice”

organisation;

- Massalbaye Tenebaye, President of the Ligue tchadienne des droits de l'homme (LTDH), FIDH member organisation, and representative of the Inter-African Union of Human Rights;

- Koudher Mahamat Tidjani, President of the LTDH section at Ouaddai and Biltine;

- Yaldet Bégoto Oulatar, Director of N'djamena Bi-Hebdo.

4. Persons met by the chargés de mission

- Dr. Kassiré Coumakoye, Prime Minister, Head of Government of Chad;

- Fatimé Issa Ramadane, Minister in charge of Human Rights;

- Djidda Moussa Outman, Secretary of State for External Relations, in charge of international cooperation;

- François Barateau, Prime conseiller, French Embassy in Chad;

- Ann Maymann, Chief Administrator for External Relations, UNHCR;

- Anna Laura Sacco, Protection Officer, Abéché, Chad, UNHCR;

- Pieter D. Smidt van Gelder, JPO Child Protection, United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF);

- Mbaïbarem Reoutag, Bureau Chief, Humanitarian Affairs, Africare, Abéché

- Mbaïtel Am Pabam, Chief Administrator of Gaga camp, Africare humanitaire

- Henri Ntonde Namwira, Bureau Chief, Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society (HIAS) at Bredjing and Tréguine;

- Over 30 refugees, registered or not, whose names are not given in this report for safety reasons.

1. See International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, Report to the Secretary General. Report drawn up in application of Security Council Resolution 1564 (2004) on 18 September 2004. <http://www.un.org/Docs/journal/asp/ws.asp?m=S/2005/60>

2. This agreement was signed by the government and the faction of the Sudanese Liberation Movement led by Minni Minawi. "The agreement imposes obligations to Khartoum, especially the disarming of the janjaweed militia." Disarmament must be "complete and veritable" by mid-October 2006.

3. See Resolution 1706 (2006) of the Security Council, adopted on 31 August 2006.

4. On the security situation in the North East of CAR, see the FIDH report n°457 of 12/10/2006: « Forgotten and stigmatised: the double burden of victims of international crimes ». <http://www.fidh.org/spip.php?article3707>

5. See FIDH press release "Darfur: FIDH appeals to the Security Council to refer the matter to the ICC", 1/02/2005 / "Security Council has to trigger the International Criminal Court on the situation in Darfur", 17/09/04. http://www.fidh.org/article.php3?id_article=1908

6. See Security Council Resolution 1593 (2005) adopted on 31 March 2005 / See FIDH press release "When will the insults to the victims of crimes committed in Darfour end? 3/10/07. www.fidh.org

7. See in Annex the map of the refugee camps in Eastern Chad.

I- Darfur remains ablaze: testimonies

At the time of the mission, UN and European Union diplomatic efforts concentrated on gaining acceptance by the governments of Sudan, Chad and CAR of the deployment of international forces for the protection of civilian populations. Yet these positive initiatives have not had the immediate effect of securing stability in the region. On the contrary, according to Sudanese refugees' testimonies gathered during the mission, violence in Darfur is escalating. Indeed, during the delicate phase of conflict resolution negotiations it is often the case that warring parties step up their military activities in order to gain political weight and bargaining power in the peace process.

1. Difficult to access information on grave violations of human rights in Darfur

Since the year 2006, it is extremely difficult to draw up a complete list of grave violations of human rights and international humanitarian law perpetrated against Sudanese civilians during the conflict that is pitting government forces, supported by the Janjaweed militia, against the rebels. One reason is that the authorities in Khartoum have de facto prohibited the human rights INGOs from entering Darfur. Access to places of conflict is becoming increasingly difficult for humanitarian organisations whose personnel, furthermore, is facing greater insecurity. Furthermore reports and information of resurging violence in the Darfur regions during the last few months have mainly been supplied by the small number of independent Sudanese NGOs that are working in the field, the limited number of documents made public by UNMIS (United Nations Mission in Sudan), and UN figures on the number of persons displaced because of the conflict. All this information tends to evidence the extreme insecurity reigning in Darfur

The resurgence of violence in Darfur since the second half of 2006 has been confirmed by UNHCR figures and the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA): “We figure that two million people have been displaced in the north, south and west of Darfur, of which 250,000 have fled the fighting during the last six months [July-December 2006]”⁸.

In his report to the Security Council on the situation in Darfur for November and December 2006 and January

2007, the United Nations Secretary General, Ban Ki-Moon, spoke of this alarming situation: “*Sudanese Government forces supported by armed militia engaged in clashes with Darfur Peace Agreement non-signatory forces, especially in Northern and Southern Darfur. In their ongoing efforts to flush out non-signatory combatants, the Government of the Sudan intensified aerial bombardment of non-signatory forces positions, including civilian targets. Tension also persisted along the Sudan-Chad border.*”⁹.

UNHCR estimates that between March and April 2007, over 400 families, i.e. 1,700 individuals, arrived in the Hemidya camp for displaced persons. Most of these people came from the Jebel Marra region where security was precarious during this period and access for humanitarian personnel almost impossible¹⁰.

In June 2007 the report of the President of the Commission of the AU and UN Secretary General on the hybrid force in Darfur¹¹ denounced “*new aerial bombardments in Northern Darfur carried out by the Sudanese army. On the 19, 21 and 23 of April [2007], these forces bombarded Jira, Umm Rai, Anka and Hashasba. On the 26 of April, some 300 armed men attacked the IDP camps of Argo and Dabanera, near Tawilla in Northern Darfur, pillaged, carried out abductions and acts of violence*”.

On 4 and 5 June 2007, the UNMIS and the OCHA teams visited Um Dukhnet and reported that the camp had received 200 displaced persons who had arrived from Um Dafok during the preceding week. Forty other families from that same village arrived on 5 June¹² saying that they had fled the “attacks by the Arab militia”.

In July 2007, the United Nations reported that violence in Darfur had forced 160,000 people to leave their homes since the beginning of the year. Furthermore, four Darfurians who worked for humanitarian organisations have been killed, 64 vehicles used by these organisations have been stolen, and 132 employees of these organisations have been temporarily detained, some threatened by firearms¹³. OCHA added that since January 2007, 35 convoys with humanitarian aid had been ambushed and looted.

Information is also available on recent attacks on the AMIS forces in Darfur. On 5 March 2007 three of the AMIS

Darfur and Eastern Chad
“We want security, we want justice”

soldiers were killed at an SLA Minawi control point in Gereida. On 31 March 2007, in Northern Darfur, a helicopter transporting a senior AMIS delegation, including the AMIS Deputy Force Commander, was shot at in the general area of Kurni, which is controlled by the Abdul Wahid faction of the SLM (SLM-Wahid). Furthermore, five AMIS peacekeepers were killed in an attack by SLA-Minawi forces on 1 April while guarding the water point in Umm Barru, Northern Darfur. Three of the attackers were killed during the fight, and their weapons confiscated. On 10 April, an AMIS soldier died from injuries sustained near Sortony, and on 14 April 2007, near the headquarters of the mission, the body of another AMIS officer was found. Unidentified armed men killed him on his way home from work.

In its last report before the UN Security Council dated 17 July 2007, the UN Secretary General made the following assessment of the human rights situation in Darfur : *“In recent months, the overall security situation in Darfur has been characterized by continual violence and insecurity. The nature of that insecurity, however, differed in the three states of the region. Western Darfur suffered from cross-border tensions between Chad and the Sudan, including direct hostilities in early April. Northern Darfur remained*

heavily affected by the conflict between the Government of the Sudan and the Darfur Peace Agreement non-signatory factions, particularly in the areas north of El Fasher and in Jebel Marra, while in Southern Darfur persistent tribal conflict also continued to result in violent attacks¹⁴”. He added : *“Human rights abuses continued in various forms during the reporting period. Among the major areas of concern were the aerial attacks on villages by Government aircraft; attacks against internally displaced persons in and around camps; and sexual and gender-based violence against girls and women”*.

2. Continued grave violations of human rights and international humanitarian law

A/ Testimonies of Sudanese refugees who recently arrived in camps in Chad

The Gaga camp¹⁵ for Sudanese refugees is the last camp established in eastern Chad and it is the only camp which continues to register and accommodate new refugee arrivals. According to UNHCR statistics of 30 April 2007, there are 15,988 refugees listed in the Gaga camp¹⁶.



The Gaga camp for Sudanese refugees, Eastern Chad.

Darfur and Eastern Chad
“We want security, we want justice”

These statistics also indicated that 883 refugees arrived between March and April and were registered at Gaga camp in April. They came from Chadian border towns (around Borota) and Sudanese villages (around Beida and Masteri). This is an indication of the fact that insecurity is forcing the civilian populations in Darfur to leave their homes and flee to Chad.

When the delegation went to Gaga camp on 18 June 2007, dozens of Sudanese refugees, who had arrived more than a month earlier or just a few days before the FIDH mission, were wandering outside the confines of the camp, waiting for registration. Grandmothers, women, children and even a newborn baby, were waiting, in temperatures of 50°C, for registration, the precious “open sesame” that would allow them to benefit from the facilities in the camp such as adequate accommodation and other humanitarian services. One refugee showed the delegation a baby born the day before: “The doctors help us. I arrived 25 days ago, and I am still not registered”.

The delegation heard testimony from two newcomers¹⁷.

M. X. Married, one child. Ethnic group: Masaalit.

“I have always lived in the village of Masteri (Darfur). When the first incidents started, I was in Libya. I got back to my village in April 2007. I saw two successive attacks by the janjaweed and the government forces. The first attack took place on the 1st of May. Six people were killed and four were wounded. During the second attack, which I think took place on 12 May, four people were killed and two were wounded. I knew the people who were killed well. They were people from my village. The scenario of the attacks was the same. They [TrNote: the janjaweed] came by donkey, horse or camel, early in the morning. There were lots of them so that they were strong enough to take the cattle and everything else that is precious. Anyone who resisted was killed. After each attack, I went to alert the Police and Army so that they could react. They said ‘we do not have enough weapons to fight back’. Because of the insecurity, I left my village. I left Sudan seven days ago. I am waiting to register.”

M. X, 25 years old. Married, no children. Ethnic group: Masaalit.

“I come from the village of Tirti in Darfur. Three years ago our village was subjected to repeated attacks by the janjaweed. They looted everything. I repeatedly told the

police, (who are 5 km away), but they never came to protect us. During one attack, the janjaweed killed 15 people, including both my parents. I decided in 2004 to flee with 20 other families in the Masteri region. Masteri is a village bigger than Gaga. The janjaweed recently attacked us in Masteri, several times. They harassed us. When they come, they whip the people, they hit them with the butt of their rifles and with sticks. They say, ‘why don’t you leave for Chad where everyone has fled to?’ During the three years that I lived in Masteri, the janjaweed killed around 2,000 people. I was an eye witness to several executions. Anyone who resisted and refused to give his belongings got killed, and they shot at people everywhere nearby. During each attack they killed 5, 10 or even 15 people. And the women were sexually assaulted when they went to get firewood or water. The Sudanese army is around but does not do anything. I can confirm that the janjaweed chief, Amad Dawai came to Masteri several times. He is said to be the one who distributes weapons and food to the janjaweed.

I left the village a month ago because of the insecurity. I went by donkey to the village of Brota, in Chad. From there I got a ride to Bredjing. In Bredjing I was told that I had to go to Gaga. I got here with my wife 10 days ago. Some people in Gaga told me that since my departure, the janjaweed have again returned to Masteri.”

Mbaitel Am Pabam, the camp manager who works for Africare, told the delegation that for the last few months “refugees have been arriving in waves of approximately 80 persons. They come on foot or by donkey. We have asked for the camp to be expanded in order to be able to take them in.”

B/ Surviving trauma and violence

All the refugees who spoke to the delegation were victims or witnesses of traumatic incidents. All gave similar testimonies, i.e. attackers are men arriving by camel or horse, they kill and torture and rape, destroy and burn villages, loot the belongings of the inhabitants.

Testimonies on sexual violence differ depending on a number of factors including the victim’s length of stay in the refugee camp, the access of the victimised women to medical care, and the person’s level of integration in camp’s structures and institutions such as women’s or block committees. In the Bredjing camp, the representatives of the women’s committees spoke on

Darfur and Eastern Chad
“We want security, we want justice”

behalf of the women in the camp. They confirmed the presence of a large number of women who had been subjected to rape and sexual violence. They described these incidents as humiliating and degrading, and expressed their desire for justice and security.

However, as noted by the responsible for the Psychosocial Support Programme in the Bredjing camp, sexual violence and anything related to sexuality remains a major cultural and social taboo among the refugee communities. This partly explains some women’s hesitation to speak about the violence they were subjected to. Several women in the Gaga camp spoke to the delegation about witnessing the death of members of their family. Some told about being kidnapped by the attackers.

In one case a young woman was abducted for three days and then released, however she could not “recollect” what happened during those three days. She explained that her abductors told her that they would take her because she looked like an “Arab” not like an “African”.

Another young woman said that she still had nightmares about men chasing her. She complained about chest pains and headaches. She said she has lost all her strength and constantly feels weak. When she reached the Gaga camp, she reported to the health clinic. The doctors said there was no infection and gave her some medicine which, she said, did not improve her health.

The Head of the Psychosocial Support Programme explained that when cases like the latter are reported to the clinic, the persons are referred to

counselling groups. However, notwithstanding the existence of psychosocial education and awareness programmes in the camps, reaching out to victims of trauma is a daunting task. There are several reasons for this: the size of the refugee camps, the victim’s shame and fear of being stigmatised, the shortage of professional healthcare staff, the insufficient knowledge of the victims concerning the ill effects of traumatic and emotional shocks on one’s health. This is true irrespective of sex and gender roles. Many men survivors of trauma have found the counselling experience, which is strictly sex segregated, extremely difficult because of having to deal with war trauma itself and having to confront notions of masculinity which inhibits them from expressing feelings of pain and distress.



Women, chiefs of blocks, in the Bredjing camp

Darfur and Eastern Chad
“We want security, we want justice”

Children are especially vulnerable to serious trauma after witnessing violations of human rights or being victims themselves. Humanitarian agencies are providing education and have set up schools in all camps so as to provide a secure and protective environment. Meanwhile traumatised children are being treated through play therapy provided by the already overstretched psychosocial support programmes.

Children recently arrived in Gaga camp, drew their own personal accounts when handed crayons and paper. Images include the bombing of civilians and children; horsemen armed with rifles shooting villagers; homes being set on fire and destroyed; helicopter and tank gun attacks.



3. The Darfurians want

A/ Summary of demands : “we want our rights, peace, and justice”

During its visit to the Sudanese refugee camp of Bredjing, the delegation organised a work session with the chiefs (both men and women) of the 33 blocks. They were encouraged to speak as openly as possible about the Darfur conflict, especially about their suggestions for achieving a peaceful, permanent settlement to the conflict.

Most of the people (see testimonies below) wanted to start by reviewing the grave violations of human rights that they were subjected to or which they witnessed: murders, sexual violence, systematic looting, burnt villages.

All of them stressed the fact that the violations were committed by the janjaweed, whose criminal behaviour was supported by the authorities in Khartoum, whose primary obligation should have been to protect the Sudanese citizens.

All of them said they were very anxious to go home to their village, back to their roots, that they wanted to cultivate the land of their ancestors. But they explained that despite the presence of AU forces, Darfur is still too insecure for them to return.

They emphasised the pressing need for an international United Nations force, the only way to eradicate violence. Furthermore, they felt that fighting impunity was an essential element in establishing sustainable peace. If the national judiciary is not independent enough, they want international justice to be used to pursue as many perpetrators of serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law as possible.

B/ Testimonies

Intervention by X, President of Committees of Bredjing

“There is no security in Darfur. We do not have confidence in our government. The janjaweed go on killing people. We were forced to leave our land although we have not committed any crime. This region should be put under the protection of an international force that includes the police to arrest the criminal. The criminals should be judged for what they have done. Otherwise we will never be able to live together again. We support the work of the International Criminal Court and we want it to hunt down and prosecute the criminals more. All Sudanese should have the same rights. Our individual and collective rights should be respected. If we are marginalised, there can never be peace.”

Intervention by X, Chief of block

“The government has caused great injustice in Darfur. We have been murdered, looted, tortured and chased away from our lands. And this extortion is still going on. We need international troops in Darfur to protect the population. When security has been reestablished, we will go home.”

Intervention by X, Chief de block

“We were chased out of Darfur and got to Chad alive. If we

Darfur and Eastern Chad
“We want security, we want justice”

hadn't received help from international organisations such as yours, we would be dead. Our government, normally, should be responsible for protecting us but does just the contrary, it kills us. The janjaweed came in to impose pan-Arabism. They want to get rid of us and take our rich, fertile lands.

One fourth of the Darfur population has been killed. The criminals should be judged. We are calling for the intervention of an international force, under U.N. command. This is the only way to help us. The AU forces that came two years ago were not able to protect us.

We want the government to accept a representation of the Darfur population as part of a federal state. We want the mosques, the schools and the houses to be reconstructed. We want to go back to our lands and be compensated for the suffering we have endured. We want the rights of men, women and children to be respected.

I believe in reconciliation by the people, not through the government. We are used to living together.”

Intervention by X, Member of Women Committees of Bredjing

“We have been treated unfairly. Especially the women. We have been raped, we have been widowed, we have lost our children. I am unable to describe the humiliations that we have suffered. We want the United Nations to intervene. We want the United Nations to be firm and hunt down the criminals. We are calling for justice even if we have to wait 500 years for all the criminals to be judged. We want compensation. Our community has been totally destroyed and has to be reconstructed.

We want to go back to our lands. But acts of violence and rape are still going on despite the presence of the AU forces. The situation is even getting worse.”

Intervention by X, Member of Women Committees of Bredjing

“Darfurians never had any rights. Women have never been educated. Now the women are being killed. They are raped in front of their husbands and children. A United Nations force is the only force that can protect us. We need compensation. We know that there is no compensation for the loss of our loved ones. But our cows and goats should be returned to us. We want to go home. We will only respect ourselves as women again when we get home.”

Intervention by X, Chief of block

“First I would like to thank the Chadian authorities and the humanitarian organisations for helping us.

We have been tortured and humiliated in our own country. We were not expecting to be attacked in this way. In the beginning, we thought that they were nothing more than thieves. But very quickly we understood that the Sudanese government was helping the attackers commit crimes, by giving them weapons, vehicles, horses and camels. We saw government planes flying overhead. Sudan is in the process of becoming an Arab country. They are expelling us from our country. The government should be there for everyone, not only for the Arabs. We are all Moslems. We have one Kaba, the same Koran. It is only under this government that Moslems have been attacking other Moslems.

Before going home, we have to be sure that the janjaweed are not there anymore. Because at present they are still there and are free. The African Union is there, but according to what we hear, it is not doing anything. I am an African but let's be honest, let's have the courage to say that the Africans have not succeeded in protecting us. We want a UN intervention force, the only force with the experience to protect us. We need security and justice to be able to go back to our lands. As concerns justice, I wonder why the International Criminal Court is only prosecuting two criminals since there are 52 on the list.”

4. The hybrid force : necessary but not sufficient

On 31 of July 2007, just a few weeks after the FIDH mission, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1769 (2007) authorising the deployment, for an initial period of 12 months, of a hybrid AU /UN force in Darfur (UNAMID)¹⁸. The mission is mandated to support the early and effective implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement and the outcome of the negotiations between the Sudanese government and the rebel groups. The force will be composed of circa 20,000 military personnel, including some 4,000 police personnel. UNAMID shall be authorised to take the “necessary action” to prevent armed attacks, protect civilians as well as its personnel and ensure the security and freedom of movement of aid workers. UNAMID shall assume authority from AMIS as soon as possible and no later than 31 December 2007.

The hybrid force is the military component of the “three

Darfur and Eastern Chad
“We want security, we want justice”

track” strategy presented on 12 September 2007 by the UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon to the Security Council. The Secretary General’s strategy also includes a humanitarian component for a rapid delivery of urgent humanitarian aid through UN humanitarian agencies and a political element aiming at facilitating peace talks and reaching a peace agreement.

The Secretary General announced that a first round of peace talks will be held in Tripoli, Lybia, on the 27 October 2007. The talks will be facilitated by the Secretary General Special Envoy, Jan Eliasson, former president of the UN General Assembly and former Swedish Minister of Foreign Affairs. However, while the hybrid force still remains to be deployed, the upcoming political negotiations are marred by an upsurge of hostilities between warring parties aiming at gaining political leverage and bargaining power during the peace talks. This is clearly illustrated by the testimonies gathered during FIDH’s mission and the recent attacks by rebel and splinter groups¹⁹ and subsequent Sudanese government bombardments on the village of Haskanita²⁰ and more recently on Muhajirya village²¹. These attacks have been carried out in spite of the Security Council Resolution 1769 calling for a ceasefire agreement to which the Sudanese authorities had pledged to commit at the time of the Secretary General’s visit to Sudan in September 2007. FIDH believes that the establishment of an effective cease-fire, as stated in Security Council Resolution 1769, is a precondition for successful political negotiations. These should in turn be opened to and attended by representatives of civil society, internally displaced persons and refugees in order to include their concerns and recommendations in the process.

Furthermore, alongside the « three track » strategy envisaged by the United Nations, FIDH calls on the international community to pursue a «fourth» essential avenue, namely the fight against impunity. Political negotiations should include in the peace agreement explicit reference to fighting impunity for the most serious crimes committed in Darfur in cooperation with the International Criminal Court. This fourth element needs to be included according to the “complementarity” principle stemming from the referral by UN Security Council²² of the situation in Darfur to the International Criminal Court.

Reference in the peace agreement of the need to fight impunity is all the more relevant given the impunity perpetrators continue to enjoy so far. This has been greatly facilitated by the fact that Sudanese authorities have been

involved and bear responsibility for the crimes committed against the civilian population and by the lack of independence of the judicial system. The free hand de facto granting authority to kill, contributes to the continuing violations committed against the civilian population. Authorities in Khartoum have set up a number of judicial bodies responsible for investigating the grave violations of human rights and bringing to justice those responsible, namely a national commission of inquiry²³, ad hoc national commissions and the Special Criminal Court on the Events in Darfur²⁴. However none of these bodies has demonstrated any independence and their action remains ineffective when confronting the extent of the crimes committed in the region. The unwillingness of Sudanese authorities to fight impunity has been further highlighted by the refusal to cooperate with the International criminal Court (ICC). The ICC prosecutor has been barred from carrying out his investigations in Darfur and Khartoum to this date has refused to cooperate with the ICC and to transfer the two suspects for whom international arrest warrants were issued in April 2007. To add insult to injury, one of the suspects, Ahmed Haroun, has recently been nominated head of an inquiry commission on human rights violations committed in Darfur²⁵.

The importance of including the fight against impunity in the peace process was highlighted by the ICC Prosecutor, Luis Moreno Ocampo, during his visit to the UN headquarters at the end of September, “In Darfur today, there can be no political solution, no security solution, and no humanitarian solution as long as the alleged war criminals remain free in the Sudan”. He also condemned the UN silence concerning the nomination of Ahmed Haroun, a silence which undermines the credibility of the ICC and the Security Council. A number of Security Council Ambassadors (Belgium, as well as the UK and France) have condemned Ahmed Haroun’s nomination and on the 21 September the Secretary General, Ban Ki Moon, observed that “justice is a part of the peace process, and these should go hand in hand” a statement which he reiterated on the 7 October 2007 at the time of the meeting with the President of the FIDH.

An effective and immediate cease-fire, the deployment of a fully operational hybrid force (UNAMID), political negotiations supported by the international community, and the obligation to fight against impunity for the grave crimes committed in Darfur are the necessary conditions for the protection of the civilian population and for a sustainable peace in Darfur and consequently in the wider region.

Darfur and Eastern Chad
“We want security, we want justice”

8. Declarations by Jennifer Pagonis, HCR spokesperson at a press conference on 30 January 2007, at Palais des Nations in Geneva..
9. See Monthly report of the Secretary General on Darfur, S/2007/104, 23 February 2007. <http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/sgrep07.htm>
10. See UNHCR report on the situation in Sudan, Update 73.
<http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/chad?page=sitreps>
11. Cf. the document of the 79th meeting of the AU Peace and Security Council, 22 June 2007
12. See UNHCR report on the situation in Sudan, Update 74.
<http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/chad?page=sitreps>
13. See press release: “Sudan: Darfur actors to discuss road map for peace”. <http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?ReportID=73191>
14. See Report of the Secretary General on Darfur, S/2007/462, dated 27 July 2007
<http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/sgrep07.htm>
15. See in Annex the map of the refugee camps.
16. Source: CNAR / UNHRC Protection.
<http://www.unhcr.org>
17. The testimonies were recorded in Arabic by Osman Hummaida, Mohamed Ahmed and Koudher Mahamat Tidjani who then translated them into English or French.
18. Cf. UNSC 1769 (2007): http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_resolutions07.htm
19. Cf. UNMIS Press Release No. 17/07, <http://www.unmis.org/english/2007Docs/PR017.pdf>
20. Cf. Article Le Monde, 11 September 2007: <http://www.afrik.com/breves?date=2007-09-11>
21. Cf. BBC Africa press release, Darfur : AU confirms a governmental attack, 10/10/2007
22. UN SC Resolution 1593 (2005), http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_resolutions05.htm.
23. Created in May 2004 by Presidential Decree, the mandate of the Commission is to investigate human rights violations committed by the warring parties in Darfur.
24. Established in June 2005 by the Chief Justice and President of the Supreme Court in Sudan, the Court was originally established as a single court, presided by three judges, which would be seated in Fashir, the capital of North Darfur, and travel throughout Darfur whenever deemed necessary. The Court was given a broad jurisdiction covering acts which constitute crimes in accordance with the Sudanese Penal Code; any charges submitted to it concerning investigations into the violations cited in the report of the [Sudanese government’s] Commission of Inquiry; any charges pursuant to any other law, as determined by the Chief Justice. In November 2005, new amended decrees broadened the Special Court’s jurisdiction to include “international humanitarian law” and established two more permanent seats for the court in Nyala and Geneina, the capitals respectively of South Darfur and West Darfur. Cf. the report of the High Level Mission on the human rights situation in Darfur, presented in accordance with the Human Right Council Resolution S-4/101*.
25. Cf. FIDH press release: A step further towards impunity - <http://www.fidh.org/spip.php?article4678>

II- Causes and consequences of the extension of the Darfur conflict to Eastern Chad

1. Rebels have a free hand on both sides of the Chad-Sudan border

The Darfur tragedy has been spreading throughout the region over the last 12 months further aggravating the very precarious security that existed in Chad and Central African Republic (CAR).

Idriss Deby Itno, President of Chad, has had to cope with rebellion movements against his regime for several years. These movements grew stronger towards the end of 2005 when the Darfur conflict grew more intense .

On 18 December 2005, the rebels of the Rally for Democracy and Liberty (*Rassemblement pour la démocratie et les libertés*) took the Chadian city of Adré, located on the border with Sudan. When the attackers were quelled, the prefect of Adré, the first to react, described the military equipment taken from the rebels: "The material was made in China. China is helping Sudan, and Sudan is helping the rebels."²⁶ President Deby Itno stated that he was "on belligerent terms with Sudan", which he said was responsible for the attack aimed at destabilising his country. In response, the Sudanese President, Omar El-Bechir denied any involvement in the attack and accused the Chadian authorities of supporting the Sudanese rebels in Chad.

The Tripoli Agreement of 8 February 2006, signed by Sudan and Chad, under the mediation of Colonel Mouamar Kadhafi, exhorted the Sudanese and Chadian parties "not to support the rebel groups anymore and to prevent their infiltration over the two sides of the borders."

Despite the Agreement, On 13 April 2006, rebels from the United Front for Change (FUC) swept in from Sudan via Central African Republic to launch an attack on N'djamena²⁷. After the retreat of the rebels, supported by French military cooperation, the President of Chad declared to its troops : "You have just shown international public opinion and traitors to the national cause that you are not about to let your country be occupied by mercenaries sent by Bechir, the traitor"²⁸.

According to international observers, the Chadian rebels are well established in El-Geneina (Sudan) where they are openly supported by the Popular Defence Forces (PDF),

with the help of Sudanese back up troops. They also receive logistic support, i.e. arms and supplies. For a while Chad had broken off diplomatic relations with Sudan.

On 21 November 2006, a Libyan peace initiative convened Chad, Sudan, Central African Republic, and Eritrea to a summit meeting in Tripoli. But on 25 November, Chadian rebel groups comprised of the *Rassemblement des forces démocratiques* (RFD) and the *Union des forces pour la démocratie et le développement* (UFDD) crossed the Sudanese border to attack Abéché, capital of the Ouaddai region, in Eastern Chad. On 28 December, Chad declared that it was at war with Sudan claiming that Sudan once again had supported the Chadian rebels. Chad retaliated by sending the Chadian army into Sudan several times, notably on 12 December at Armankul (Western Darfur) which resulted in the forced displacement of the local civilians.

According to the joint UN-AU report dated July 2007, "the cross-border attacks and the presence of Chadian rebels in Western Darfur and that of Sudanese rebels in Eastern Chad as the main reasons for the acute deterioration of the security situation. ... Although various initiatives continue to seek a solution to the Chad-Sudan situation, insecurity continues to endanger the lives of civilians on both sides of the common border."²⁹

Another bilateral agreement between Chad and Sudan was signed on 3 May 2007 at Riyadh (Saudi Arabia). This agreement notably calls for mutual respect for territorial integrity and commitment by each of the two countries to refrain from supporting the opposition forces in the other country.

In N'djamena on 22 June 2007, FIDH delegation met the Chadian Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs who, in response to a question on current support by the Chadian authorities for the Sudanese rebels, said that between Sudan and Chad "things are becoming normal. We cannot allow ourselves to give shelter to forces hostile to our neighbours. According to the Tripoli and Riad agreements, these troops should be disarmed... He added, with a bit of irony: "if there are still some on Chadian territory, that means that the borders are porous. And some of them have family in Chad."

The Prime Minister of Chad, Dr Kassiré Coumakoye, who

met with the delegation on the same day, gave a similar response: “*President Deby is clear about this issue. Either the Sudanese rebels leave Chad or they will be disarmed.*” He stressed: “*I told the rebels, ‘either you find a solution or you go home.’*”

Political statements display the intention to abide by the agreements signed with Sudan but the reality is somewhat different. In Eastern Chad, the FIDH delegation actually saw a large number of well armed Sudanese rebels, who received support from the “Toroboro”, the Chadian self-defence militia, and were working hand in glove with the Chadian army. Their presence was visible in Abéché and around all the Sudanese refugee camps the delegation visited. The Chadian authorities said they wanted to disarm the Sudanese rebels, but this, clearly, has not yet been done.

As for the presence of Chadian rebels in Sudan, the Chadian Prime Minister emphasised that negotiations were underway “*to bring them home. Dialogue, nothing else than dialogue. Dialogue made it possible for Mahamed Nour to come home*”³⁰. *Chadian rebels are anti-establishment protesters not revolutionaries, The conflict is political and social not ideological.*” The day after this interview, a Chadian government delegation and the chiefs of the rebel groups³¹ hostile to President Idriss Deby Itno launched negotiations³² in Tripoli.

According to certain sources, even if the Chadian rebel groups receive less and less support from Khartoum, they will still be able to hassle the N’djamena authorities. “*But if Mahamat Nour rallied, the other rebels should also. But this will obviously be at a cost and the World Bank is already worrying about the extra-budgetary charges.*”

Moreover, France, under the European Union, is supporting Chad’s internal political negotiations to reach a global political agreement between all the political parties. The goal is to hold legislative elections that are accepted by all sides by the year 2009. One French diplomat told FIDH delegation that once this goal had been achieved, Chad’s political existence would become “*credible*” which would “*make the rebels lose heart*”.

2. Eastern Chad, another land of strife

Beyond the actions of the rebels on both sides of the Chad-Sudanese border, the Darfur conflict is having tragic repercussions in Eastern Chad where great insecurity

reigns. The Janjaweed militia cross the border whenever they please and carry out violent attacks against the Chadian and Sudanese civilians. Also the conflict is exacerbating the underlying inter-ethnic tensions between the “ethnic Arabs” and the “ethnic Africans” in Chad.

A/ Testimonies on incursions of Janjaweed in Chad

The UNHCR in June 2006 started alerting the international community of the repeated attacks by the Janjaweed in Chad. “The Janjaweed attacks against Chadians appear to have become more systematic and deadly over the past three months, and there is no sign that this pattern will stop. [...] armed militiamen stole 350 head of cattle from a village 20 km west of Koukou Angarana, in the Goz Beida region [...] On April 13, hundreds of Janjaweed attacked the village of Djawara, massacring more than 100 men and stealing hundreds of cattle. Djawara, 60 km from the Sudan border, and other surrounding villages are now deserted. [...] On May 1, a group of 150 Janjaweed attacked cattle herders near Koukou, stealing 2,000 head of cattle and killing five people.”³³

The number of attacks increased significantly during the first half of 2007 forcing Chadian civilians to leave their homes and forcing the many Sudanese living in Chad to register in the refugee camps. Most of the Sudanese had settled near the border, on the Chadian side, fleeing Janjaweed attacks in Darfur as of 2003.

Mbaitel Am Pabam, one of the camp managers at Gaga, led the FIDH delegation to Block 10 (each refugee camp is composed of blocks, a type of administrative division used in camp management. Gaga camp has 14 blocks) where the most recent newcomers were housed. It accommodated 211 women and 99 men. The delegation met with about 20 people, in groups or alone, (mainly women) to listen to their story.

Testimony by X, 28 years old. Masaalit.

“In November 2005, the Janjaweed attacked my village (in Darfur, ed. note) Kango Haraza. They stole 31 goats, 22 cows and a horse. They rode into the village on horseback and camelback, heavily armed. My brother was sleeping. They chose him and demanded that he give them all our livestock. The Janjaweed came to the village regularly, in groups of 20 or 30 persons. Sometimes they would kill as many as seven people in a single day. Since I had lost

Darfur and Eastern Chad
“We want security, we want justice”

everything and felt that I was in danger, I left the village in March 2006 to go to Djenesé, Chad. But in Djenesé we were attacked several times by Chadian rebels and the janjaweed. I sold my donkey to pay for the trip to Gaga camp. I arrived here four months ago.”

Testimony by X, 30 years old, married, father of four children. Masaalit.

“I come from the village of Kango Haraza in Darfur. In November 2005, the janjaweed attacked us. They came as a group to extort money and cattle from us. If you refused to give them what they wanted, they killed you. The Sudanese police did not do anything. One night I decided to leave. I went back and forth several times to take my family to safety. We left the lands that were given to us by our ancestors. We went to find safety in Djenesé, Chad, where we had relatives. But in Djenesé, the janjaweed often came in groups of between 10 and 60 people to loot the place. I personally saw four people get killed. But in all, the janjaweed killed nine people in the village to get hold of their belongings. The Chadian army could not do anything. They were stationed in Adré, 80 km away. Because of the growing insecurity, I left again, with my children, on a donkey to go to the refugee camps. After passing through Tréguine and Bredjing I was told to go to Gaga.”

Testimony by X, 47 years old.

“I come from Kelme, a village near Nyala. I had to flee from Adré (Ed. note: in Chad) in February 2003 because of the janjaweed attacks. They arrived on camels, shot at the village population, and set the village on fire. Because of the recent insecurity in Adré, I left for the Gaga camp where I arrived four months ago. My two daughters and three sons are in camps for displaced persons in Sudan.”

Testimony by X, 45 years old.

“I come from a village near El Geneina. In 2004 some “Arab” men arrived in the evening. They killed my husband Nurredin Yussef. They took all my belongings including 25 goats and 10 sheep. I fled with my mother and my children to Adré, in Chad. I stayed there for two years. In February 2007, men on horses attacked the town. They whipped me and took all my belongings again. That is when I decided to come to the Gaga camp.”

Another woman from Burunga village in Sudan told the delegation about her flee to a village at the Chadian border

because of the janjaweed attacks. That is where, three months earlier, she witnessed the killing of her husband and her brother by ‘Arab militia’. She fled again and ended up in Adré or, as she put it, “*We moved little by little in the hope that things would ‘cool down’ but finally we are now here at this (Gaga) camp”*.”

B/ Aggravated inter-ethnic violence

As the Darfur conflict became more intense in 2005, repercussions could be felt in neighbouring territories, Eastern Chad. The politically motivated tension and fighting between the janjaweed and the ethnic “Africans” Fur, Zaghawa and Masaalit in Sudan generated tension between the ethnic “Arabs” and the ethnic African in Chad.

According to the UNHCR, some 63,000 Chadian have been displaced by inter-ethnic violence in Eastern Chad. The violence continued during 2006 (especially during the second half) and in 2007.

As an example, early in November 2006, 200 men on horseback attacked the villages of Bandicao, Badia, Neweya, Kerfi, Agourtoulou, Abougsoul, Djorlo, Tamadjour and Loubitegue. These attacks forced over 1,000 people to flee to the IDP camp in Habile, which already was hosting 3,500 displaced Chadians. These attacks apparently have caused the death of at least 220 persons³⁴.

OCHA recently recorded similar inter-ethnic fighting and killings in March and April 2007, near Goz Beida and in May 2007 at Guéréda, Kou kou Angarana and Mabrone.

Beginning of October 2007, fightings between Tama and Zaghawa ethnic groups near Gualda, in Wadi Fira region, caused the death of 20 persons. The Chadian Government declared the state of emergency for 12 days.

The occurrence of these attacks is also shown through the arrival in Darfur of more and more Chadian refugees who are describing themselves as of ethnic “Arab” origin. They are fleeing retaliation orchestrated by the Chad self-defence militia, who are of ethnic “African” origin, the toroboro who often receive support from the Sudanese rebels.

C/ Total impunity

In Chad protecting civilian population and fighting impunity of perpetrators of grave crimes are issues that remain

unaddressed because of military and police forces' lack of sufficient and trained human resources. A refugee noted: *“Chadian militaries couldn't do anything; they were in Adré at 80Km (from here).”*

In certain cases, justice is hampered by lack of capacity in the local courts and lack of independence of the police and the army. The delegation spoke with Ahmad Daoud Chari, Prosecutor of the Republic in Abéché, who has been under surveillance since March 2007 in the Ouaddai region. He took advantage of a conference on justice to go to N'djamena. He brought his wife, children and all their belongings. Because of the insecurity, he does not want to go back to Abéché.

His story: *“As the Public Prosecutor of the Republic I am not allowed to move around freely. The administrative authorities want to control the judiciary at all cost. I have to inform the governor any time I go anywhere, and get his authorisation if I want to talk to refugees who have been victims of crimes or other offences or if I want to visit refugees who are detained. I have told the Minister of Justice about this constraint and he said, in a letter, that he was supporting me. But it is extremely difficult to render justice in Eastern Chad.*

The State lacks authority. The army and the police are everywhere but do not do their job. The Sudanese rebel groups, for instance, are completely free to move around the region. They cause traffic accidents and carry out attacks, but the security forces refuse to arrest the guilty ones. Likewise, everything that happens at the border between the Chadian army and the janjaweed or the Chadian rebels remains hidden and escapes any sort of justice. Sometimes they arrest the janjaweed and take them to N'djamena, but we are never informed. In March 2007, for instance, some 20 Chadian rebels and two civilians were arrested in Abéché and taken to the capital. I wrote a letter to the Minister of Justice to tell him about this situation and denounce the arbitrary arrest of civilians. The two civilians were finally released, but we do not know what happened to the rebels.”

Total impunity for perpetrators of grave violations of human rights and international humanitarian in Chad is greatly contributing to the growing insecurity in the region.

D/ Consequences : More refugees, more displaced persons

The tremendous insecurity in Darfur and Eastern Chad, coupled with the prevailing impunity, add up to ever more refugees and displaced persons in Chad.

In May 2006, UNHCR figures reported that close to 200,000 Sudanese refugees were living in 12 camps in Eastern Chad. On 30 April 2007 the number had risen to 227,574 plus an estimation of 8,000 non registered refugees, in total 235,574 (see Annex 4). In the camps visited by the FIDH delegation the figures were as follows: 19,318 refugees in Farchana, 15,988 in Gaga, and 29,388 in Bredjing. The latest group of refugees to arrive in the most recent camp, i.e. Gaga, are either Sudanese who come straight from Darfur or Sudanese who fled to Chad in previous years and now, because of the insecurity at the Sudan/Chad border finally decided to register in the camp.

The most upsetting phenomenon during the last few months is the constantly growing number of displaced persons, evidence of the major violations of human rights in Eastern Chad. According to HCR statistics, by 30 June 2006, 30,000 persons had been forced to leave. By 31 December 2006, the figure had reached 112,686, by May 2007, 167,313 (see Annex 3), and by 17 June 2007, 172,659. Apparently there are close to 100,000 displaced persons in the Dar Sila *département*.

3. The humanitarian situation and security, both very precarious

A/ Sudanese refugees

On 30 April 2007, there were 227,574 Sudanese refugees registered in the 12 camps in Eastern Chad. Close to 57% of them are women. The vast majority of the refugees are from the Masaalit, Zaghawa and Fur ethnic groups.

i) Management and daily life

All the refugees are registered and placed under the protection of UNHCR although the camps are run by a variety of organisations.

Gaga camp, for instance, is managed by AFRICARE. It was opened in 2005 and received its first refugees in May

Darfur and Eastern Chad
“We want security, we want justice”



Gaga camp : 15.998 Sudanese refugees.

of the same year. Until December 2005 there were fewer than 5,000 refugees. In December 2006 the number had risen to 12,000. Now the UNHCR count is 15,988. This increase comes from the arrival of Sudanese from Darfur and from the Chadian side of the border who fled insecurity. The forecast for Gaga camp is to reach its maximum limit of 20,000 people; 80% of the camp residents are of the Masaalit ethnic groups, the others are Zaghawa and Fur.

The representative of AFRICARE in Abéché told us about his organisation's mandate. "AFRICARE works on the distribution of food and non-food items, drinking water, the organisation set up small agriculture scheme inside the camp as an income-generating project, and cooperation with other partners." And there are many partners: the World Food Program (WFP) is in charge of food; the UN High Commission for Refugees is in charge of community services, particularly education working with UNICEF (there are 6 primary schools for 4,800 scholars), the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is responsible for family unification, the CNAR (*Commission nationale d'accueil et de réinsertion des réfugiés*) is a Department within the Ministry of the Interior which is responsible for security, and UNHCR handles refugee protection.

The water supply system includes a pumping station which was built 3 km from the camp to pump water from the wells and distribute water in each block of the camp. The camp also has a market, a vegetable cultivation area, and slaughter houses.

The Farchana camp has 19,318 refugees (i.e. 5,180 families, mostly from the Masaalit ethnic group. It was created in January 2004 by *Secours Catholique et Développement* (SECADEV) under the protection of CNAR. Up to now none of the camp residents (56% women) have decided to return to Sudan. The delegation met with the CNAR representatives who explained that this gender imbalance was explained by the fact that "*the men are either dead, fighting on the front, or still at the border.*"

SECADEV distributes food and non-food items and water in the camp (3 of the 4 boreholes are operational and can be used to channel water to the camp). SECADEV also takes care of public infrastructure, education, firewood collection and distribution and everything related to agriculture and livestock production.

Darfur and Eastern Chad
“We want security, we want justice”



Sudanese refugees in the Fachana camp.

The Bredjing camp (29,388 refugees, 54.6% are women) is managed by CARE International. FIDH delegation was especially interested in the educational model proposed in this camp. Aboubakar Akarem, who is in charge of education, told FIDH delegation, “We now have 43 nurseries and seven primary schools. There is no secondary school. We have 8,642 students and 133 teachers. Some of them have the necessary qualifications, others only have their certificate. They are paid US \$25 a month. Every student has one book note for all the subjects and shares a school book with five other students. The students are taught mathematics, Arabic language,

Islamic studies, environmental issues, home economics, (5th year), rules of safety/security (6th year), sciences (7th year), Islamic vocabulary and theology, advanced Koranic studies (8th year), English. At the end of the 8th year, the students pass the same examination as the one given in El Geneina (Sudan). Last year, 30 students sat for the exam, 12 passed it, 10 were boys. These students attended secondary school this year. They are studying Arab literature, Arab grammar, mathematics, English, agriculture, physics, new technology, engineering. Unfortunately the two girls stopped their studies because they got married.”

Darfur and Eastern Chad
“We want security, we want justice”



Primary school in the Bredjing camp.

ii) Security problems

In 2005, a Memorandum of Understanding on refugee protection was signed between UNHCR and the Chad Government. The MoU provides for the presence of one gendarme per 1,000 refugees, mainly to maintain the civilian, humanitarian character of the camps.

One type of insecurity that the delegation observed inside the refugee camps particularly affected the women. As the CNAR representative at the Farchana camp and other humanitarian staff pointed out, the women often are subjected to violence and discrimination within their own community and family.

Numerous cases of domestic violence have been recorded in the refugee camps. Men beat up their wives. Brothers attack their sisters, especially when they are faced with 'forced pregnancy'. Humanitarian organisations are also

reporting numerous cases of early or forced marriage, and female genital mutilation. Furthermore, in a situation of massive displacement of populations, polygamous husbands sometimes abandon some of their wives, leaving them on their own to care for the children and other members of the family.

Incidents of rape has also been reported committed by some of camp's teachers against their own students, including little girls between the ages of 8 and 10.

The refugees are also subject to aggression by people outside the camp.

According to the AFRICARE representative who is running the Gaga camp: *"the refugees are allowed to leave the camp if they get permission from CNAR, but are not allowed to go more than 5 km away. It is often dangerous to go out. Some of the female refugees are sexually*

Darfur and Eastern Chad
“We want security, we want justice”

assaulted when they go out to get firewood. And fights often break out between the refugees and the local population. Justice does not exist in Chad.”

There has also been testimony about roadblocks set up by local Gangs to steal the possessions of the refugees when they leave the camp.

All the representatives of the humanitarian organisations in the camps spoke of the increasing tension between the refugees and the local populations. The latter feel wronged: they are hosting Sudanese in their land and do not receive equal humanitarian assistance, despite their precarious situation. The Ouaddai region, for instance, is extremely poor. Because of the assistance programme, the refugees sometimes have more purchasing power than the local populations. And prices at the market seem to be going up. To help refugees avoid being stigmatised in the eyes of the local population, and thus avoid tension between these communities, UNHCR and the humanitarian organisations are establishing development programmes for all of the people in the area.

The Chadian Prime Minister, Dr Kassiré Coumakoye, told the delegation, *“it is important to look at the problem of refugees and displaced persons from a ‘developmental’ viewpoint, in other words, recognise that the local populations are entitled to the same humanitarian assistance to avoid any social crisis. Interventions by the international community in the field of water, healthcare, education and security must be directed to the whole population of Eastern Chad.”* The Prime Minister added that, as of now *“we have to take heed of the fact that not all the Sudanese refugees will be going home. The ones who decide to stay here must be made to feel at home. This makes it essential to plan for structural rather than circumstantial assistance. The United Nations Development Program, UNDP, should coordinate this action.”*

Insecurity is also the result of regular movement of Chadian and Sudanese rebels and the self-defence militia in the camps and surrounding areas. During its visit to the Bredjing camp, for instance, the delegation saw some toroboro just a few meters away from the entrance.

More specifically, Darfur rebel groups in Eastern Chad recruit many refugees, including minors, by force. On 16 May 2007, the HCR reported³⁵ that in March alone some 4,700 men and boys had been recruited by force, or

voluntarily, in the Sudanese refugee camps at Bredjing and Tréguine. In April, the Goz Amer camp was also a place of active recruitment. The young refugees who managed to return to the camps said they were taken to makeshift training camps along the Sudan-Chad border and were taught, *inter alia*, to clean weapons. The ones who refused were beaten. The ones who escaped back to the camps are afraid that the rebel groups will return and will recognise them³⁶.

B/ Displaced persons

At the time of publication of this report, over 170,000 persons, according to UNHCR, had been forcibly displaced to Eastern Chad because of the regional insecurity. These people are living in about 15 sites, the majority (over 100,000 person) are in the Dar Sila *département*. The displaced persons are supposed to be protected by the Chadian government which, in 2007, presumably allocated four billion CFA francs for this purpose.

j) Humanitarian catastrophe

The humanitarian situation for displaced persons is catastrophic. Food distribution is organised every three months. In most places, there is no drinking water. Humanitarian assistance in some cases can only provide 5 litres of water per person while the normal requirement is 20 litres. Canvas covers are given to the displaced persons; there is often not enough wood even to make temporary constructions. Education for the children is almost impossible except when they can go to schools in nearby refugee camps. The displaced persons do not have access to arable lands. In 2006, many people tried to get closer to their own land in the hopes of cultivating it during the rainy season, but couldn't because of the lack of security. This extremely unstable situation pushes people to stay continually on the move, which makes it even harder to help them. Further, insecurity in Eastern Chad, especially near the town of Adré, prevents humanitarian organisations from going to where the IDPs are staying.

According to Doctors Without Borders (Médecins sans Frontières - MSF), a recent epidemiological study confirmed that one child out of five is suffering from malnutrition in the IDP site of Goz Beida³⁷. MSF also warned the international community that the rainy season (which starts in July) will greatly increase the number of malaria and diarrhea victims and that the OCHA

emergency plan for displaced persons launched in April 2007 was inadequate, especially as concerns food and water supplies. UNHCR wants a profile of displaced persons to be made this year to assess the specific needs.

ii) Great insecurity

Displaced persons are also confronted with tremendous insecurity. There is no specific mechanism for their protection or any official Memorandum of Understanding that has been agreed upon for their protection, like the one that exists for the refugees. Men and children are likely to be forcibly recruited into the armed groups, often in the Chadian toroboro militia. Some sources claim that children may have been recruited by the Chadian army. The procedure always seems to be the same: the armed groups talk to the village chiefs and the religious leaders about organising recruitment in exchange of protection. Sometimes the armed groups pay families for handing over their children. There are also reports that girls have been kidnapped to become the wives of or sexually enslaved by military chiefs.

UNICEF also reports cases of sexual violence within the sites. One representative on the site said that *“the problem is that the displaced persons do not know what their rights are. They never file complaints to denounce violations of their human rights.”*

4. Urgent need for the deployment of a multidimensional force

The situation in Eastern Chad is very insecure for the refugees, the displaced persons, the local population, and the personnel of the UN agencies and the humanitarian organisations. Deployment of the hybrid UN-AU forces in Darfur will certainly contribute to making the situation in Chad a little more stable, especially by preventing the incursion of the janjaweed. But security problems in Chad can be traced to endogenous causes that have been generated or exacerbated by the Darfur conflict, e.g. fighting between Chadian military and rebels, and inter-ethnic tension. The area is rife with weapons. The traditional local authorities are unable to cope with the security problem. State authority is almost invisible in these vast stretches of land. According to certain observers, the Chadian army is *“completely in tatters”* and is incapable of meeting the civilian population’s need for protection, and the perpetrators of grave violations of human rights enjoy total impunity.

The United Nations Security Council has been calling for the deployment of a *“multidimensional presence”* in Eastern Chad since August 2006.

In November 2006, President Idriss Deby Itno accepted the idea of deploying an international force in Eastern Chad but insisted that it should only be composed of civilians Police. On 1 March 2007, Chad confirmed its refusal to have an international military peacekeeping force stationed along the Chad-Sudan border. At a meeting in N’jamena with the ambassadors of four UN Security Council member states (USA, Russia, Chad and China), the Chadian Deputy Minister of External Affairs, Djidda Moussa Outman, reasserted Chad’s desire for the deployment of *“civilian forces composed of gendarmes and policemen to secure the Sudanese refugee camps, the displaced persons, and the active humanitarian organisations.”*

Finally, on 12 June, Idriss Deby Itno became more flexible and seemed to accept the intervention of an international police-cum-military force in Eastern Chad.

Following this consensus, on 26 of September 2007 the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1778 (2007) authorising the establishment of a multidimensional force in eastern Chad and north-east of the Central African Republic (CAR), mandated to protect refugees, internally displaced persons and civilian populations in danger, as well as to establish an environment conducive to the protection of human rights and the rule of law.

The resolution authorizes the deployment of MINURCAT, a United Nations mission composed of 300 police forces, 50 militaries and civilians responsible for helping to create conditions contributing to the security of Sudanese refugees in Chad, internally displaced persons and civilian populations and responsible for supporting the Police tchadienne pour la protection humanitaire (PTPH). The mission is also mandated to contribute to the monitoring and to the promotion and protection of human rights, with particular attention to fighting impunity. Furthermore, the resolution authorizes the European Union to deploy an operation, composed of military personnel, aimed at the protection of civilian populations in Chad and CAR; facilitating humanitarian aid and protect UN personnel.

FIDH welcomes this resolution in light of the urgent need to protect civilian populations and calls on the Chadian and Central African Republic governments to facilitate a swift and effective deployment of the multidimensional force.

Darfur and Eastern Chad
“We want security, we want justice”

The human rights component of this force is essential for contributing to the establishment in the relevant countries of the rule of law based on the respect of human rights and fight against impunity. FIDH believes that for greater impact and effectiveness, this component should avail itself of the cooperation of independent human rights organization working on the ground.

FIDH believes that a successful operation should be accompanied by effective Peace Talks with all the rebels, in conformity with international law, as well as political negotiations between the party in power and the opposition with a view to seeking a long term solution for a sustainable peace in the region.

26. See Article published on the RFI internet site on 21/04/2006: *Tchad : implications croisées*.

http://www.rfi.fr/actufr/articles/076/article_43201.asp

27. See FIDH Report 457, Central African Republic, “Forgotten, stigmatised: the double suffering of victims of international crimes”, p.53 and 54.

28. *Ibid*.

29. Report of the President of the Commission and the U.N. Secretary General on the hybrid operation in Darfur, 79th meeting of the AU Peace and Security Council, 22 June 2007, doc. PSC/PR/2(LXXIX)

30. EdNote: Mahamat Nour Abdelkerim, former head of Chad’s FUC (United Front for Change), rallied to the N’djamena government in December 2006 and was appointed Minister of Defence on 4 March 2007. See text of Chad/FUC peace agreement.

<http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/KHII-6WV5SB?OpenDocument&rc=1&cc=tcd>

31. The rebel groups were represented by Mahamat Nouri, President of the *Union des forces pour la démocratie et le développement* (UFDD), Abdelwahid Aboud Makkay, of UFDD-Fondamentale, Timane Erdimi, head of the *Rassemblement des forces pour le changement* (RFC), and Hassan Saleh al-Djinédi, leader of the *Concorde nationale tchadienne* (CNT).

32. According to the parties in attendance, the negotiations were to lead to a ceasefire proclamation, the disarming of the rebels, and a declaration of general amnesty.

33. See News: UNHCR concerned about janjaweed attacks in eastern Chad. 6/06/06.

Cf. See News UNHCR : L'UNHCR préoccupé par les attaques de milices janjawid dans l'est du Tchad. 6/06/06

<http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/news/opendoc.htm?tbl=NEWS>

<http://www.unhcr./cgi-bin/texis/vtx/chad?page=new>

34. See. *Ibid*. 9/11/06 - Chadian villages attacked and set on fire, numerous deaths and hundreds of people fleeing.

35. See Press Point “Forced recruitment in refugee camps in Chad”, published on 16 May 2007.

36. *Idem*.

37. Press release of MSF 08/06/07 “While attention is focusing on Darfur, an emergency situation is unfolding in Eastern Chad”.

Conclusions and recommendations

The present report finds that despite the international community efforts for a peaceful resolution of the conflict in Darfur, violations of international human rights and humanitarian law are continuing if not increasing. In this respect testimonies of newly arrived refugees in eastern Chad are instructive. Civilians continue to flee Government bombardments and rebels' attacks. Moreover, the government-backed Janjaweed militias continue to commit, with total impunity, both inside Darfur and across the Chadian border, grave crimes against civilians: summary executions, torture, rape, pillaging. In the meanwhile, the conflict in Darfur has exacerbated inter-ethnic violence in Chad.

During the period preceding the convening of the peace negotiations due to start on the 27 October 2007 in Libya under UN mediation, there has been an upsurge of violence, with each warring party increasing their military activities in the attempt to gain political leverage during the peace talks.

The findings of the report confirm that the current severe insecurity is contributing to the worsening of the already acute humanitarian crisis. An estimated 2 million people have been forced from their homes in Darfur, with 235,000 having sought refuge in neighbouring Chad. The report presents an account on the extremely harsh social, economic and security conditions faced by refugees from Darfur. Finally, the mission was able to observe the consequences of the « regionalisation » of the conflict in Darfur. Janjaweed militias cross border attacks into eastern Chad and inter-ethnic violence have now displaced approximately 170,000 Chadian who face complete destitution and lack of support by Chadian authorities.

The upcoming UN, AU, EU military, police and humanitarian force interventions in the region are an important response to the concerns expressed in this report. Although during the past years the lack of reaction to the situation has contributed to the deterioration of the conflict, the international community now seems to be responding to its duty to protect civilian populations suffering from grave human rights violations. In light of the extreme insecurity in the region the international community should urgently provide adequate funding and resources necessary for the rapid deployment of the

forces. At the same time the governments of Sudan, Chad and CAR should facilitate their deployment.

However international military and police presence on its own is not sufficient to guarantee protection. Their presence needs to be complemented by a political solution to the conflicts in the region. Here again the international community, the African Union and the League of Arab States in particular, has an important role to play in ensuring that all the different parties sit down at the negotiating table.

In the case of Darfur, negotiations should take place on the basis of the existence of an effective cease-fire as determined by the Security Council Resolution 1769 (2007). Finally, negotiations between governments and rebels have to be carried out according to international law.

Specifically, FIDH calls on all parties to exclude the use of any amnesties or immunities for the gravest crimes according to the Statute of the International Criminal Court. Otherwise there is a likelihood of nurturing vengeance rather than a process of national reconciliation. The fight against impunity is essential for the promotion of the rule of law and for reaching sustainable peace.

The international community's efforts bring hope to people suffering from a conflict which has been ignored for too long. Now these hopes should not be disappointed.

FIDH recommendations

With regard to the urgent need to protect civilian population and respect human rights in Darfur

To the Sudanese authorities and Sudanese rebels

-Establish an effective cease-fire and stop all attacks against the civilian population, the humanitarian organisations, AMIS forces, according to United Nations Security Council Resolution 1769 (2007);

-Abide by the roadmap for Darfur political process established jointly by the AU and the UN on 8 June 2007;

-Reach as soon as possible a comprehensive and inclusive peace agreement;

Darfur and Eastern Chad
“We want security, we want justice”

-Exclude from the political negotiations any amnesties or immunities for the perpetrators of the gravest crimes committed in Darfur according to international law, specifically the Statute of the International Criminal Court.

To the Sudanese authorities

-Facilitate the immediate deployment of the hybrid UN-AU force according to United Nations Security Council Resolution 1769 (2007);

-To abide by the Tripoli and Ryad agreements between Sudan and Chad by stopping all support to the Chadian rebels in Sudan and by conducting a disarmament programme;

-To stop all support to the Janjaweed militia, disarming them, and proposing a social reintegration programme;

-To facilitate the movement of humanitarian organisations;

-To allow human rights NGOs to access Darfur;

-To respect the provisions of the UN General Assembly 1998 Declaration on Human Rights Defenders;

-To facilitate the voluntary return of Sudanese refugees and displaced persons;

-To put in place programs for resettlement and compensation of refugees and Idps;

-To take all effective measures to combat impunity for the most serious crimes by the national courts according to the complementarity principle of the International Criminal Court;

-To cooperate fully with all the services of the International Criminal Court, in particular by transferring the two suspects for whom international arrest warrants were issued on 27 April 2007;

-To ratify and implement the Statute of the International Criminal Court;

-To implement fully the recommendations of the Group of Experts on Darfur created by the United Nations Human Rights Council.

To UNAMID

-To submit periodic public reports on the human rights situation in Darfur and parties' respect for the peace negotiations;

-To support the Prosecutor of International Criminal Court to which the situation in Darfur was referred.

To the UA-UN Joint Mediation Support Team (JMST)

-To integrate in the political negotiations the concerns and recommendations of Sudanese civil society, namely refugees, internally displaced persons, women's community groups.

To the African Union

-To provide as soon as possible the necessary financial and human resources for UNAMID to become effectively operational and carry out its mandate;

-To support the political negotiations between the Sudanese authorities and the rebels.

To the League of Arab States

To publicly express a firm stance

-denouncing the serious violations of human rights and humanitarian law committed in Darfur;

- Demanding the Khartoum authorities to prosecute the authors of the most serious crimes, in cooperation with the International Criminal Court;

- Supporting the hybrid force.

To the United Nations Human Rights Council:

-To renew the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on Sudan;

To the United Nations Security Council

-To consider possible sanction against any party to the conflict who impedes the political negotiations;

-To insist upon the justice track in its initiatives towards peace settlement in Darfur, in Chad and in Central African

Darfur and Eastern Chad
“We want security, we want justice”

Republic;

- To ensure the implementation of Resolution 1593, including the duty of the States to cooperate with the International Criminal Court;

-To immediately consider the worrying situation in north-eastern Central African Republic where serious human rights and humanitarian violations are perpetrated in the conflict opposing the CAR army and rebels.

With regard to the urgent need to protect civilian population and respect human rights in Chad.

To the Chadian authorities and Chadian rebels

-Establish an effective cease-fire and stop all attacks against the civilian population and the humanitarian organisations;

-Strengthen negotiations to reach as soon as possible effective and inclusive peaceful solution to the conflict, in compliance with international law.

To the Chadian authorities

-To abide by the Tripoli and Ryad agreements between Sudan and Chad by stopping all support to the Sudanese rebels in Chad and by conducting a disarmament programme;

-Disarm selfdefence militias;

-To protect civilians located in Eastern Chad and to provide relevant humanitarian support to Idps;

-To continue negotiations with all political parties with a view to agree on legislative elections to be carried out according to the conditions stated in article 25 of the ICCPR.

To the Chadian and Central African Governments

-To facilitate the rapid deployment of the multidimensional force and to commit to the fight against impunity of the authors of the most serious crimes and to pursue their efforts for the political settlement of the conflicts opposing them to rebels.

To the European Union

-To provide as soon as possible the human and financial resources necessary for the deployment of the European component of the multidimensional force in Chad and CAR according to United Nations Security Council Resolution 1778 (2007) for the force to be able to carry out its mandate and protect civilian populations, refugees and internally displaced persons;

-Guarantee the neutrality of its operation, in light of the French military presence, under a military cooperation agreement, in Chad and the CAR;

To the International Community

-To provide, as soon as possible, the human and budgetary resources necessary to the MINURCAT for the realization of its mandate, in particular with regards to human rights and the rule of law, in cooperation with local and independent organizations for the defence of human rights;

-To cooperate with the International Criminal Court, notably in order to implement the warrants of arrest issued by the Court.

To MINURCAT

-To submit periodic public reports on the human rights and humanitarian situation in the region;

-To support the work of the Prosecutor of International Criminal Court to which the situations in Darfur and in the Central African Republic were referred, in order to contribute to the fight against impunity of the authors of the most serious crimes perpetrated in the region.

To the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights

-To remain actively seized of the human rights and humanitarian situation in Darfur, Chad and Central African Republic

Annex 1- UN Security Council Resolution 1769 (2007)

UN Security Council Resolution 1769 (2007) **Adopted by the Security Council at its 5727th meeting, on 31 July 2007**

Determining that the situation in Darfur, Sudan continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security,

1. Decides, in support of the early and effective implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement and the outcome of the negotiations foreseen in paragraph 18, to authorise and mandate the establishment, for an initial period of 12 months, of an AU/UN Hybrid operation in Darfur (UNAMID) as set out in this resolution and pursuant to the report of the Secretary-General and the Chairperson of the African Union Commission of 5 June 2007, and further decides that the mandate of UNAMID shall be as set out in paragraphs 54 and 55 of the report of the Secretary General and the Chairperson of the African Union Commission of 5 June 2007;

2. Decides that UNAMID, which shall incorporate AMIS personnel and the UN Heavy and Light Support Packages to AMIS, shall consist of up to 19,555 military personnel, including 360 military observers and liaison officers, and an appropriate civilian component including up to 3,772 police personnel and 19 formed police units comprising up to 140 personnel each;

3. Welcomes the appointment of the AU-UN Joint Special Representative for Darfur Rodolphe Adada and Force Commander Martin Agwai, and calls on the Secretary-General to immediately begin deployment of the command and control structures and systems necessary to ensure a seamless transfer of authority from AMIS to UNAMID;

4. Calls on all parties to urgently facilitate the full deployment of the UN Light and Heavy Support Packages to AMIS and preparations for UNAMID, and further calls on member states to finalise their contributions to UNAMID within 30 days of the adoption of this resolution and on the Secretary-General and the Chairperson of the African Union Commission to agree the final composition of the military component of UNAMID within the same time period;

5. Decides that:

(a) no later than October 2007, UNAMID shall establish an initial operational capability for the headquarters, including the necessary management and command and control structures, through which operational directives will be implemented, and shall establish financial arrangements to cover troops costs for all personnel deployed to AMIS;

(b) as of October 2007, UNAMID shall complete preparations to assume operational command authority over the Light Support Package, personnel currently deployed to AMIS, and such Heavy Support Package and hybrid personnel as may be deployed by that date, in order that it shall perform such tasks under its mandate 769 (2007) as its resources and capabilities permit immediately upon transfer of authority consistent with sub-paragraph (c) below;

(c) as soon as possible and no later than 31 December 2007, UNAMID having completed all remaining tasks necessary to permit it to implement all elements of its mandate, will assume authority from AMIS with a view to achieving full operational capability and force strength as soon as possible thereafter;

6. Requests the Secretary General to report to the Council within 30 days of the passage of this resolution and every 30 days thereafter, on the status of UNAMID's implementation of the steps specified in paragraph 5, including on the status of financial, logistical, and administrative arrangements for UNAMID and on the extent of UNAMID's progress toward achieving full operational capability;

7. Decides that there will be unity of command and control which, in accordance with basic principles of peacekeeping, means a single chain of command, further decides that command and control structures and backstopping will be provided by the United Nations, and, in this context, recalls the conclusions of the Addis Ababa high level consultation on the situation in Darfur of 16 November;

Darfur and Eastern Chad
“We want security, we want justice”

8. Decides that force and personnel generation and administration shall be conducted as set out in paragraphs 113-115 of the report of the Secretary-General and the Chairperson of the African Union Commission of 5 June 2007, and requests the Secretary-General to put in place without delay the practical arrangements for deploying UNAMID including submitting to the General Assembly recommendations on funding and effective financial management and oversight mechanisms;

9. Decides that UNAMID shall monitor whether any arms or related material are present in Darfur in violation of the Agreements and the measures imposed by paragraphs 7 and 8 of resolution 1556 (2004);

10. Calls on all Member States to facilitate the free, unhindered and expeditious movement to Sudan of all personnel, as well as equipment, provisions, supplies and other goods, including vehicles and spare parts, which are for the exclusive use of UNAMID in Darfur;

11. Stresses the urgent need to mobilise the financial, logistical and other support required for AMIS, and calls on member states and regional organisations to provide further assistance, in particular to permit the early deployment of two additional battalions during the transition to UNAMID;

12. Decides that the authorised strength of UNMIS shall revert to that specified in resolution 1590 (2005) upon the transfer of authority from AMIS to UNAMID pursuant to paragraph 5(c);

13. Calls on all the parties to the conflict in Darfur to immediately cease all hostilities and commit themselves to a sustained and permanent cease-fire;

14. Demands an immediate cessation of hostilities and attacks on AMIS, civilians and humanitarian agencies, their staff and assets and relief convoys, and further demands that all parties to the conflict in Darfur fully co-operate with AMIS, civilians and humanitarian agencies, their staff and assets and relief convoys, and give all necessary assistance to the deployment of the United Nations Light and Heavy Support Packages to AMIS, and to UNAMID;

15. Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations:

(a) decides that UNAMID is authorised to take the necessary action, in the areas of deployment of its forces and as it deems within its capabilities in order to:

(i) protect its personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, and to ensure the security and freedom of movement of its own personnel and humanitarian workers,

(ii) support early and effective implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement, prevent the disruption of its implementation and armed attacks, and protect civilians, without prejudice to the responsibility of the Government of Sudan;

(b) requests that the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Chairperson of the African Union Commission, and the Government of Sudan conclude within 30 days a status-of-forces agreement with respect to UNAMID, taking into consideration General Assembly resolution 58/82 on the scope of legal protection under the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel and General Assembly resolution 61/133 on the Safety and Security of Humanitarian Personnel and the Protection of United Nations Personnel, and decides that pending the conclusion of such an agreement the model status-of-forces agreement dated 9 October 1990 (A/45/594) shall provisionally apply with respect to UNAMID personnel operating in that country;

16. Requests the Secretary-General to take the necessary measures to achieve actual compliance in UNAMID with the United Nations zero-tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and abuse, including the development of strategies and appropriate mechanisms to prevent, identify and respond to all forms of misconduct, including sexual exploitation and abuse, and the enhancement of training for personnel to prevent misconduct and ensure full compliance with the United Nations code of conduct, and to further take all necessary action in accordance with the Secretary-General's Bulletin on special measures for protection from sexual exploitation and sexual abuse (ST/SGB/2003/13) and to keep the Council informed, and urges troop-contributing countries to take appropriate preventive action including the conduct

Darfur and Eastern Chad
“We want security, we want justice”

of pre-deployment awareness training and, in the case of forces previously deployed under AU auspices, post-deployment awareness training, and to take disciplinary action and other action to ensure full accountability in cases of such conduct involving their personnel;

17. Calls on all concerned parties to ensure that the protection of children is addressed in the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement, and requests the Secretary-General to ensure continued monitoring and reporting of the situation of children and continued dialogue with parties to the conflict towards the preparations of time-bound action plans to end recruitment and use of child soldiers and other violations against children;

18. Emphasises there can be no military solution to the conflict in Darfur, welcomes the commitment expressed by the Government of Sudan and some other parties to the conflict to enter into talks and the political process under the mediation, and in line with the deadlines set out in the roadmap, of the United Nations Special Envoy for Darfur and the African Union Special Envoy for Darfur, who have its full support, looks forward to these parties doing so, calls on the other parties to the conflict to do likewise, and urges all the parties, in particular the non-signatory movements, to finalise their preparations for the talks;

19. Welcomes the signature of a Joint Communiqué between the Government of Sudan and the United Nations on Facilitation of Humanitarian Activities in Darfur, and calls for it to be fully implemented and on all parties to ensure, in accordance with relevant provisions of international law, the full, safe and unhindered access of relief personnel to all those in need and delivery of humanitarian assistance, in particular to internally displaced persons and refugees;

20. Emphasises the need to focus, as appropriate, on developmental initiatives that will bring peace dividends on the ground in Darfur, including in particular, finalising preparations for reconstruction and development, return of IDPs to their villages, compensation and appropriate security arrangements;

21. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council for its consideration no later than every 90 days after the adoption of this resolution on progress being made on, and immediately as necessary on any obstacles to:

- (a) the implementation of the Light and Heavy Support Packages and UNAMID,
- (b) the implementation of the Joint Communiqué between the Government of Sudan and the United Nations on Facilitation of Humanitarian Activities in Darfur,
- (c) the political process,
- (d) the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement and the parties' compliance with their international obligations and their commitments under relevant agreements, and
- (e) the cease-fire and the situation on the ground in Darfur;

22. Demands that the parties to the conflict in Darfur fulfil their international obligations and their commitments under relevant agreements, this resolution and other relevant Council resolutions;

23. Recalls the reports of the Secretary-General of 22 December 2006 (S/2006/1019) and 23 February 2007 (S/2007/97) which detail the need to improve the security of civilians in the regions of eastern Chad and north-eastern Central African Republic, expresses its readiness to support this endeavour, and looks forward to the Secretary-General reporting on his recent consultations with the Governments of Chad and CAR;

24. Emphasises its determination that the situation in Darfur shall significantly improve so that the Council can consider, in due course and as appropriate, and taking into consideration recommendations of the Secretary-General and the Chairperson of the African Union, the drawing down and eventual termination of UNAMID;

25. Decides to remain seized of the matter.

Annex 2- UN Security Council Resolution 1778 (2007)

UN Security Council Resolution 1778 (2007) Adopted by the Security Council at its 5748th meeting, on 25 September 2007

Determining that the situation in the region of the border between the Sudan, Chad and the Central African Republic constitutes a threat to international peace and security,

1. Approves the establishment in Chad and the Central African Republic, in accordance with paragraphs 2 to 6 below and in consultation with the authorities of Chad and the Central African Republic, of a multidimensional presence intended to help create the security conditions conducive to a voluntary, secure and sustainable return of refugees and displaced persons, inter alia by contributing to the protection of refugees, displaced persons and civilians in danger, by facilitating the provision of humanitarian assistance in eastern Chad and the north-eastern Central African Republic and by creating favourable conditions for the reconstruction and economic and social development of those areas;

2. Decides that the multidimensional presence shall include, for a period of one year, a United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (the acronym MINURCAT is to be used in all languages), with the following mandate in eastern Chad and the north-eastern Central African Republic, in liaison with the United Nations country team:
Security and protection of civilians

(a) To select, train, advise and facilitate support to elements of the Police tchadienne pour la protection humanitaire referred to in paragraph 5;

(b) To liaise with the national army, the gendarmerie and police forces, the nomad national guard, the judicial authorities and prison officials in Chad and the Central African Republic to contribute to the creation of a more secure environment;

(c) To liaise with the Chadian Government and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in support of their efforts to relocate refugee camps which are in close proximity to the border, and to provide to UNHCR, on availability and cost-reimbursable basis, logistical assistance for that purpose;

(d) To liaise closely with the Sudanese Government, the African Union, the African Union Mission in the Sudan (AMIS), the African Union/United Nations Hybrid operation in Darfur (UNAMID) which will succeed it, the United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in the Central African Republic (BONUCA), the Multinational Force of the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (FOMUC) and the Community of Sahelo-Saharan States (CEN-SAD) to exchange information on emerging threats to humanitarian activities in the region;

Human rights and the rule of law

(e) To contribute to the monitoring and to the promotion and protection of human rights, with particular attention to sexual and gender-based violence, and to recommend action to the competent authorities, with a view to fighting impunity;

(f) To support, within its capabilities, efforts aimed at strengthening the capacity of the Governments of Chad and the Central African Republic and civil society through training in international human rights standards, and efforts to put an end to recruitment and use of children by armed groups;

(g) To assist the Governments of Chad and, notwithstanding the mandate of BONUCA, the Central African Republic in the promotion of the rule of law, including through support for an independent judiciary and a strengthened legal system, in close coordination with United Nations agencies;

3. Decides that MINURCAT shall include a maximum of 300 police and 50 military liaison officers and an appropriate number of civilian personnel;

4. Requests the Secretary-General and the Governments of Chad and the Central African Republic to conclude status-of-forces agreements for MINURCAT as soon as possible, taking into account General Assembly resolution 59/47 on the scope of legal protection under the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel, General Assembly resolution 60/42 on the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel and General Assembly resolution 61/133 on the Safety and Security of Humanitarian

Darfur and Eastern Chad
“We want security, we want justice”

Personnel and the Protection of United Nations Personnel, and notes that the model status-of-forces agreement of 9 October 1990 (A/45/594) shall apply provisionally pending the conclusion of such an agreement with one or other of the countries;

5. Endorses the police concept referred to in the report of the Secretary-General, including the provisions regarding the establishment of the Police tchadienne pour la protection humanitaire (PTPH), which would be dedicated exclusively to maintaining law and order in refugee camps, sites with concentrations of internally displaced persons and key towns in neighbouring areas and to assisting in securing humanitarian activities in eastern Chad, and, in this regard, encourages the Government of Chad to establish the PTPH, emphasizes the urgent need to provide logistical and financial support to the PTPH and requests the Secretary-General to mobilize member States and institutional donors for this purpose;

6. Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

(a) Authorizes the European Union to deploy, for a period of one year from the date that its initial operating capability is declared by the European Union in consultation with the Secretary-General, an operation (hereinafter referred to as “the European Union operation”) aimed at supporting the elements referred to in paragraphs 2 to 4, and decides that this operation shall be authorized to take all necessary measures, within its capabilities and its area of operation in eastern Chad and the north-eastern Central African Republic, to fulfil the following functions, in accordance with the arrangement to be concluded between the European Union and the United Nations, in liaison with the Governments of Chad and the Central African Republic:

(i) To contribute to protecting civilians in danger, particularly refugees and displaced persons;

(ii) To facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid and the free movement of humanitarian personnel by helping to improve security in the area of operations;

(iii) To contribute to protecting United Nations personnel, facilities, installations and equipment and to ensuring the security and freedom of movement of its staff and United Nations and associated personnel;

(b) Authorizes the European Union operation, at the close of the period referred to in subparagraph a, to take all appropriate measures to achieve an orderly disengagement, by means including fulfilment of the functions indicated in subparagraph a, and within the limits of its residual capacity;

7. Invites the European Union, as may be required for the proper execution of the mandate of its operation, to take part in the liaison and support activities referred to in paragraphs 2 (b) to 2 (d);

8. Invites the European Union operation to immediately take all appropriate measures to prepare its full operational capability and requests the Secretary-General to coordinate closely with the European Union particularly with regard to those arrangements required to ensure appropriate protection for United Nations personnel, facilities, installations and equipment and ensure freedom of movement of United Nations staff;

9. Requests the European Union, the Secretary-General and the Governments of Chad and the Central African Republic to cooperate closely throughout the period of deployment of the European Union operation, until its complete disengagement;

10. Requests the Secretary-General to report to it, after due consultations with the Governments of Chad and the Central African Republic, six months from the date indicated in paragraph 6, subparagraph a, on the arrangements for following up the intended European Union operation which has been authorized for a one-year period, including a possible United Nations operation, depending on the developments in the situation, and notes that, to that end, the United Nations and the European Union shall perform an evaluation of needs before the date in question;

11. Invites the Governments of Chad and the Central African Republic and the European Union to conclude status-of-forces agreements as soon as possible for the operation referred to in paragraph 6;

Darfur and Eastern Chad
“We want security, we want justice”

12. Requests the European Union to report to the Security Council, in the middle and at the end of the period referred to in paragraph 6, subparagraph a, above, on how its operation will fulfil its mandate;

13. Calls upon all the parties to cooperate fully in the deployment and operations of MINURCAT and the European Union operation, including by guaranteeing the security and freedom of movement of their personnel and associated personnel;

14. Urges all the Member States, particularly the States bordering Chad and the Central African Republic, to facilitate the delivery to Chad and the Central African Republic freely, without obstacles or delay of all personnel, equipment, provisions, supplies and other goods, including vehicles and spare parts, intended for MINURCAT and the European Union operation;

15. Encourages the respective Governments of the Sudan, Chad and the Central African Republic to ensure that their territories are not used to undermine the sovereignty of others and to cooperate actively with a view to implementing the Tripoli Agreement and other agreements aimed at ensuring security along their common borders;

16. Encourages the authorities and political stakeholders in Chad and the Central African Republic to pursue their efforts of national dialogue, with respect for the constitutional frameworks;

17. Reaffirms the obligation of all parties to implement fully the rules and principles of international humanitarian law, particularly those regarding the protection of humanitarian personnel, and furthermore requests all the parties involved to provide humanitarian personnel with immediate, free and unimpeded access to all persons in need of assistance, in accordance with applicable international law;


18. Takes note of the measures already undertaken by the authorities of Chad to put an end to the recruitment and use of children by armed groups, encourages them to pursue their cooperation with United Nations bodies, particularly UNICEF, and calls on all the parties involved to ensure that children are protected;

19. Exhorts the donor community to redouble its efforts to address the humanitarian, reconstruction and development needs of Chad and the Central African Republic;

20. Requests the Secretary-General to keep it informed of the liaison arrangements set out in OP2-b to 2-d above, and to report regularly on the security and humanitarian situation, including movements of refugees and internally displaced persons, in eastern Chad, the north-eastern Central African Republic and the region, of progress towards the objective of helping to create the security conditions conducive to a voluntary, secure and sustainable return of refugees and displaced persons and of the implementation of the mandate of MINURCAT, and to submit to it a report on that matter every three months;

21. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

Annex 3- Map : Presence of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in Eastern Chad



**Estimation of the Number of IDPs per sites
 UNHCR Statistics, may 2007**

Goundo	2 500	
Kekerke	870	
Adré	4 400	
Goungour	9 517	
Goz Baga	15 904	
Alacha	5 856	
Abdi	5 856	
Ade	9 543	
Haouich	8 043	
Goz Beida	35 800	
Kerfi	2 192	
Kou Kou - Angarana	36 754	
Dogdore	27 500	
Daguessa	600	
Mishegue	499	
Idater	1 592	
Ardo, Badiné, El Kouk	4 887	
Total		167 313

Annex 4- Map of the Sudanese refugees' camps in Eastern Chad

Number of Sudanese Refugees Per Camp in Eastern Chad. Statistics: 30 April 2007

Sources : CNAR / UNHCR Protection



Sudanese Refugees in Eastern Chad	
Location	Registered refugees
ENNEDI EST Department (Bahai)	
OURE-CASSONI camp	26 786
KOBE Department (Iriba)	
IRIDIMI camp	17 617
TOULOUM camp	22 610
«AM NABAK» camp	16 693
DAR-TAMA Department (Guereda)	
KOUNOUNGOU camp	13 483
MILE camp	15 782
ASSOUNGA Deépartement (Adre)	
FARCHANA camp	19 318
BREDJING camp	29 388
TREGUINE camp	15 255
OURA Department (Abeche)	
GAGA camp	15 988
DAR-SILA Department (Goz Beida)	
DJABAL camp	15 208
GOZ AMER camp	19 446
Total	227 574
Total, including an estimation of non registered refugees	235 574

FIDH represents 155 Human Rights organisations

155 organisations

ALBANIA - ALBANIAN HUMAN RIGHTS GROUP
ALGERIE - LIGUE ALGERIENNE DE DEFENSE DES DROITS DE L'HOMME
ALGERIE - LIGUE ALGERIENNE DES DROITS DE L'HOMME
ALLEMAGNE - INTERNATIONALE LIGA FÜR MENSCHENRECHTE
ARGENTINA - CENTRO DE ESTUDIOS LEGALES Y SOCIALES
ARGENTINA - COMITE DE ACCION JURIDICA
ARGENTINA - LIGA ARGENTINA POR LOS DERECHOS DEL HOMBRE
ARMENIA - CIVIL SOCIETY INSTITUTE
AUTRICHE - OSTERREICHISCHE LIGA FÜR MENSCHENRECHTE
AZERBAIJAN - HUMAN RIGHTS CENTER OF AZERBAIJAN
BAHRAIN - BAHRAIN CENTER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
BAHRAIN - BAHRAIN HUMAN RIGHTS SOCIETY
BANGLADESH - ODHIKAR
BELARUS - HUMAN RIGHTS CENTER VIASNA
BELGIQUE - LIGUE DES DROITS DE L'HOMME
BELGIQUE - LIGA VOOR MENSCHENRECHTEN
BENIN - LIGUE POUR LA DEFENSE DES DROITS DE L'HOMME
BHUTAN - PEOPLE'S FORUM FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN BHUTAN
BOLIVIE - ASAMBLEA PERMANENTE DE LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS DE BOLIVIA
BOTSWANA - THE BOTSWANA CENTRE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS - DITSHWANELO
BRASIL - CENTRO DE JUSTICA GLOBAL
BRASIL - MOVIMENTO NACIONAL DE DIREITOS HUMANOS
BURKINA - MOUVEMENT BURKINABE DES DROITS DE L'HOMME & DES PEUPLES
BURUNDI - LIGUE BURUNDAISE DES DROITS DE L'HOMME
CAMBODGE - LIGUE CAMBODGIENNE DE DEFENSE DES DROITS DE L'HOMME
CAMBODIA - CAMBODIAN HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION
CAMEROUN - LIGUE CAMEROUNAISE DES DROITS DE L'HOMME
CAMEROUN - MAISON DES DROITS DE L'HOMME
CANADA - LIGUE DES DROITS ET DES LIBERTES DU QUEBEC
CHILE - CORPORACION DE PROMOCION Y DEFENSA DE LOS DERECHOS DEL PUEBLO
CHINA - HUMAN RIGHTS IN CHINA
COLOMBIA - ORGANIZACION FEMININA POPULAR
COLOMBIA - COMITE PERMANENTE POR LA DEFENSA DE LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS

COLOMBIA - CORPORACION COLECTIVO DE ABOGADOS
COLOMBIA - INSTITUTO LATINO AMERICANO DE SERVICIOS LEGALES ALTERNATIVOS
CONGO - OBSERVATOIRE CONGOLAIS DES DROITS DE L'HOMME
COSTA RICA - ASOCIACION SERVICIOS DE PROMOCION LABORAL
COTE D'IVOIRE - MOUVEMENT IVOIRIEN DES DROITS DE L'HOMME
COTE D'IVOIRE - LIGUE IVOIRIENNE DES DROITS DE L'HOMME
CROATIE - CIVIC COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
CUBA - COMISION CUBANA DE DERECHOS HUMANOS Y RECONCILIACION NACIONAL
DJIBOUTI - LIGUE DJIBOUTIENNE DES DROITS HUMAINS
ECUADOR - CENTRO DE DERECHOS ECONOMICOS Y SOCIALES
ECUADOR - COMISION ECUMENICA DE DERECHOS HUMANOS
ECUADOR - FUNDACION REGIONAL DE ASESORIA EN DERECHOS HUMANOS
EGYPT - EGYPTIAN ORGANIZATION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
EGYPT - HUMAN RIGHTS ASSOCIATION FOR THE ASSISTANCE OF PRISONERS
EL SALVADOR - COMISION DE DERECHOS HUMANOS DE EL SALVADOR
ESPAÑA - ASOCIACION PRO DERECHOS HUMANOS
ESPAÑA - FEDERACION DE ASOCIACIONES DE DEFENSA Y DE PROMOCION DE LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS
ETHIOPIAN - ETHIOPIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL
EUROPE - ASSOCIATION EUROPEENNE POUR LA DEFENSE DES DROITS DE L'HOMME
FINLANDE - FINNISH LEAGUE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
FRANCE - LIGUE DES DROITS DE L'HOMME ET DU CITOYEN
GEORGIE - HUMAN RIGHTS CENTER
GRECE - LIGUE HELLENIQUE DES DROITS DE L'HOMME
GUATEMALA - CENTRO PARA LA ACCION LEGAL EN DERECHOS HUMANOS
GUATEMALA - COMISION DE DERECHOS HUMANOS DE GUATEMALA
GUINEE - ORGANISATION GUINEENNE POUR LA DEFENSE DES DROITS DE L'HOMME
GUINEE-BISSAU - LIGA GUINEENSE DOS DIREITOS DO HOMEM
HAITI - COMITÉ DES AVOCATS POUR LE RESPECT DES LIBERTÉS INDIVIDUELLES
HAITI - CENTRE OCEANIQUE DES DROITS DE L'HOMME

HAITI - RÉSEAU NATIONAL DE DÉFENSE DES DROITS HUMAINS
INDIA - COMMONWEALTH HUMAN RIGHTS INITIATIVE
IRAN - DEFENDERS OF HUMAN RIGHTS CENTER
IRAN - LIGUE IRANIENNE DE DEFENSE DES DROITS DE L'HOMME
IRAQ - IRAQI NETWORK FOR HUMAN RIGHTS CULTURE AND DEVELOPMENT
IRLANDE - COMMITTEE ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE
IRLANDE - IRISH COUNCIL FOR CIVIL LIBERTIES
ISRAEL - ADALAH
ISRAEL - ASSOCIATION FOR CIVIL RIGHTS IN ISRAEL
ISRAEL - BT'SELEM
ISRAEL - PUBLIC COMMITTEE AGAINST TORTURE IN ISRAEL
ITALIA - LIGA ITALIANA DEI DIRITTI DELL'UOMO
ITALIA - UNIONE FORENSE PER LA TUTELA DEI DIRITTI DELL'UOMO
JORDAN - AMMAN CENTER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS STUDIES
JORDAN - JORDAN SOCIETY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
KENYA - KENYA HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION
KIRGHIZISTAN - KYRGYZ COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
KOSOVO - CONSEIL POUR LA DEFENSE DES DROITS DE L'HOMME ET DES LIBERTES
LAOS - MOUVEMENT LAOTIEN POUR LES DROITS DE L'HOMME
LEBANON - PALESTINIAN HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANIZATION
LEBANON - FOUNDATION FOR HUMAN AND HUMANITARIAN RIGHTS IN LEBANON
LETTONIE - LATVIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE
LIBAN - ASSOCIATION LIBANAISE DES DROITS DE L'HOMME
LIBERIA - LIBERIA WATCH FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
LIBYA - LIBYAN LEAGUE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
LITHUANIAN - LITHUANIAN HUMAN RIGHTS LEAGUE
MALAYSIE - SUARAM
MALI - ASSOCIATION MALIENNE DES DROITS DE L'HOMME
MALTE - MALTA ASSOCIATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
MAROC - ASSOCIATION MAROCAINE DES DROITS HUMAINS
MAROC - ORGANISATION MAROCAINE DES DROITS HUMAINS
MAURITANIE - ASSOCIATION MAURITANAIENNE DES DROITS DE L'HOMME
MEXICO - COMISION MEXICANA DE DEFENSA Y PROMOCION DE LOS

DERECHOS HUMANOS
MEXICO - LIGA MEXICANA POR LA DEFENSA DE LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS
MOLDOVA - LEAGUE FOR THE DEFENCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN MOLDOVA
MOZAMBIQUE - LIGA MOCANBICANA DOS DIREITOS HUMANOS
NETHERLAND - LIGA VOOR DE RECHTEN VAN DE MENS
NICARAGUA - CENTRO NICARAGUENSE DE DERECHOS HUMANOS
NIGER - ASSOCIATION NIGERIENNE DES DROITS DE L'HOMME
NIGERIA - CIVIL LIBERTIES ORGANISATION
NOUVELLE CALEDONIE - LIGUE DES DROITS DE L'HOMME DE NOUVELLE CALEDONIE
OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES - RAMALLAH CENTER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS STUDIES
OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES - AL HAQ
OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES - PALESTINIAN CENTRE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
PAKISTAN - HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION OF PAKISTAN
PANAMA - CENTRO DE CAPACITACION SOCIAL
PERU - ASOCIACION PRO DERECHOS HUMANOS
PERU - CENTRO DE ASESORIA LABORAL
PHILIPPINE - PHILIPPINE ALLIANCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS ADVOCATES
POLYNESIE - LIGUE POLYNESIENNE DES DROITS HUMAINS
PORTUGAL - CIVITAS
RDC - ASSOCIATION AFRICAINE DES DROITS DE L'HOMME
RDC - GROUPE LOTUS
RDC - LIGUE DES ELECTEURS
RÉPUBLIQUE CENTRAFRICAINE - LIGUE CENTRAFRICAINE DES DROITS DE L'HOMME
RÉPUBLIQUE CENTRAFRICAINE - ORGANISATION POUR LA COMPASSION ET LE DÉVELOPPEMENT DES FAMILLES EN DÉTRESSE
RÉPUBLIQUE DOMINICAINE - COMISION NACIONAL DE LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS
RÉPUBLIQUE TCHÈQUE - HUMAN RIGHTS LEAGUE
ROUMANIE - LIGUE POUR LA DEFENSE DES DROITS DE L'HOMME
RUSSIA - CITIZEN'S WATCH
RUSSIA - MOSCOW RESEARCH CENTER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
RWANDA - ASSOCIATION POUR LA DEFENSE DES DROITS DES PERSONNES ET LIBERTES PUBLIQUES

RWANDA - COLLECTIF DES LIGUES POUR LA DEFENSE DES DROITS DE L'HOMME
RWANDA - LIGUE RWANDAISE POUR LA PROMOTION ET LA DEFENSE DES DROITS DE L'HOMME
SENEGAL - RENCONTRE AFRICAINE POUR LA DEFENSE DES DROITS DE L'HOMME
SENEGAL - ORGANISATION NATIONALE DES DROITS DE L'HOMME
SERBIE - CENTER FOR PEACE AND DEMOCRACY DEVELOPMENT
SUDAN - SUDAN HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANISATION
SUDAN - SUDAN ORGANISATION AGAINST TORTURE
SUISSE - LIGUE SUISSE DES DROITS DE L'HOMME
SYRIA - DAMASCUS CENTER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS STUDIES
SYRIE - COMITE POUR LA DEFENSE DES DROITS DE L'HOMME EN SYRIE
TAIWAN - TAIWAN ALLIANCE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
TANZANIA - THE LEGAL & HUMAN RIGHTS CENTRE
TCHAD - ASSOCIATION TCHADIENNE POUR LA PROMOTION ET LA DEFENSE DES DROITS DE L'HOMME (ATPDH)
TCHAD - LIGUE TCHADIENNE DES DROITS DE L'HOMME
THAILAND - UNION FOR CIVIL LIBERTY
TOGO - LIGUE TOGOLAISE DES DROITS DE L'HOMME
TUNISIE - ASSOCIATION TUNISIENNE DES FEMMES DÉMOCRATES
TUNISIE - CONSEIL NATIONAL POUR LES LIBERTES EN TUNISIE
TUNISIE - LIGUE TUNISIENNE DES DROITS DE L'HOMME
TURKEY - HUMAN RIGHTS FOUNDATION OF TURKEY
TURKEY - INSAN HAKLARI DERNEGI / ANKARA
TURKEY - INSAN HAKLARI DERNEGI / DIYARBAKIR
UGANDA - FOUNDATION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS INITIATIVE
UNITED KINGDOM - LIBERTY USA - CENTER FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
UZBEKISTAN - HUMAN RIGHT SOCIETY OF UZBEKISTAN
UZBEKISTAN - LEGAL AID SOCIETY
VIETNAM - COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS & QUE ME : ACTION FOR DEMOCRACY IN VIETNAM
YEMEN - HUMAN RIGHTS INFORMATION AND TRAINING CENTER
YEMEN - SISTERS' ARABIC FORUM FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
ZIMBABWE - HUMAN RIGHTS ASSOCIATION

The International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) is an international non-governmental organisation dedicated to the world-wide defence of human rights as defined by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948. Founded in 1922, the FIDH has 155 national affiliates in all regions. To date, the FIDH has undertaken more than a thousand international fact-finding, judicial, mediation or training missions in over one hundred countries.

PRIX DES ABONNEMENTS PUBLICATIONS DE LA FIDH	<i>La Lettre de la FIDH</i> 6 N°/an	Rapports de Mission 12 N°/an	<i>La Lettre et Rapports</i>
France	25 Euros	45 Euros	60 Euros
UE	25 Euros	50 Euros	65 Euros
Hors UE	30 Euros	55 Euros	75 Euros
Bibliothèque/Étudiant	20 Euros	30 Euros	45 Euros

FIDH

17, passage de la Main d'Or - 75011 Paris - France
 CCP Paris : 76 76 Z
 Tél. : (33-1) 43 55 25 18 / Fax : (33-1) 43 55 18 80
 E-mail : fidh@fidh.org
 Site Internet : <http://www.fidh.org>

Director of the publication : Souhayr Belhassen
 Editor : Antoine Bernard
 Authors : Marceau Sivieude, Isobel Renzulli
 Translation : Tilly Gaillard, Isobel Renzulli
 Assistant of publication : Céline Ballereau-Tetu
 Printing by the FIDH - Dépôt légal October 2007 -
 ISSN en cours - N°482/2
 Commission paritaire N° 0904P11341
 Fichier informatique conforme à la loi du 6 janvier 1978 (Déclaration N°330 675)