

Submission to the UN Special Rapporteur on climate change

Human Rights in the life cycle of Renewable Energy and Critical Minerals

Joint submission prepared by the International Federation for Human Rights – FIDH and its member
and partners organisations (detailed presentation of each organisation in annex):

Acción Ecológica (Ecuador)

Association Marocaine des Droits Humains (Morocco)

Ligue des Droits de l'Homme (France)

Organisation Guinéenne de Défense des Droits de l'Homme et du Citoyen – OGDH (Guinea)

Transforming Energy and Development in Asia – Trend Asia



FIDH INTERNATIONAL
FEDERATION FOR
HUMAN RIGHTS




Introduction

This contribution builds on relevant information submitted by FIDH and its members to various UN bodies and mechanisms in past months.ⁱ In a previous contribution, FIDH urged “states to move away from a fossil fuel-dependent economy and address the challenges posed by climate change **while simultaneously preventing the negative impacts such actions have on human rights, justice, equality, and the environment;**” adding that “just transition pathways can only be such if fully respectful of human rights and mindful of systemic power imbalances and historical and structural discrimination and injustices.”ⁱⁱ

This contribution highlights cases of mineral extraction and transformation embedded in renewable energy supply chains or serving the decarbonization of other economic sectors such as transportation, on which FIDH and/or its member organizations have worked. It subsequently provides a traversal analysis and recommendations to address the human rights and environmental impacts of such activities and to foster a more just transition. The contribution addresses two groups of questions: the human rights impact of renewable energy development at the extraction and transformation stage (questions 1 and 2 of the call for inputs); and some of the barriers in the context of State regulation or business conduct that undermine the protection of human rights (question 6).

I. The human rights impact of a new wave of extraction

Since the late 1990s, the world has witnessed a strong development of extractives, with mining sites reaching new frontiers and yielding a considerable impact on human rights – especially those of marginalised groups – and the planet.



In the absence of consequential political action, such trends risk being reinforced as a consequence of policies of decarbonization, which, in their current design, are extremely resource-intensive.ⁱⁱⁱ The International Energy Agency estimates that demand for “critical minerals” will triple by 2030 and quadruple by 2040.^{iv} In the case of specific minerals, figures are considerably higher: lithium demand, for example, is expected to grow between 13 and 40 times by 2040.^v Combined, 69% of “energy transition minerals and metals projects” are located on or near Indigenous peoples’ or peasant land, two groups whose land and participatory rights are protected by UN instruments.^{vi} In numerous states – which usually have very limited historical responsibility in greenhouse gas emissions – such extraction is already yielding negative human rights impacts, as exemplified through the case studies below.

Lithium development in Argentina, Bolivia and Chile, presented by Observatorio Ciudadano (Chile) and the Center for Legal and Social Studies (Argentina)

The high Andean salt flats in Argentina, Bolivia, and Chile hold 53% of the world's lithium reserves. Chile is currently the second-largest lithium producer in the world, Argentina the fifth. While regulatory environments and the history of lithium development considerably differ, all three countries have planned to significantly develop lithium located on traditional territories of indigenous peoples, whose economies and cultures are already impacted by a history of large-scale mining.

All three countries have ratified ILO Convention 169; Argentina and Bolivia recognize indigenous rights in their constitutions, which are also protected by regional and international instruments.^{vii} However, existing extraction of lithium in the region has had significant adverse impacts on these rights. Among others, lithium is associated with violations of property rights resulting from a lack of recognition or titling of traditional land which in turn is exploited by lithium companies. The rights to participation, consultation, and consent of indigenous communities have also been disregarded: Save for exceptional cases, in Chile and Argentina, consultations organized in the context of lithium operations have not been undertaken in an adequate manner, in good faith or with a view to reaching agreement or consent with the communities likely to be directly affected, as mandated by relevant international instruments. In the few cases in which consultations have been organised around state-approved lithium operations, they have been tainted by procedural shortcomings, were limited to certain aspects of the projects or to a limited number of affected communities. Despite the scale of their impacts, in none of these consultations has it been possible to obtain the free, prior and informed consent of indigenous peoples.

Moreover, the local communities’ rights to water and to a healthy environment have been affected. In the case of the Atacama salt flat, in Chile, where the extraction of lithium through the extraction of brine and its decantation in evaporation ponds dates back several decades, the University of Chile established in 2024 that the salt flat was sinking at a rate of between 1 and 2 cm per year and that the groundwater levels have fallen by more than 10 meters in the past 15 years as a result of mining operations.^{viii} This has led to a significant loss of vegetation cover in areas used for agriculture and

grazing, and to the disappearance of lagoons in the salt flat.^{ix} Similar impacts on the waters of the Hombre Muerto salt flat in Argentina have also been documented.^x Such environmental and social impacts have rarely been compensated. Even less have the consequential profits that earned by lithium project developers been equitably shared.

The case of cobalt extraction in Morocco,

presented by Association Marocaine des Droits Humains (AMDH) and Ligue des Droits de l'Homme

Several civil society organizations in Morocco, France and Germany have reported serious violations of the rights of workers, local populations and the environment around Bou Azzer, a former arsenic mine repurposed for cobalt extraction in Morocco.^{xi} Investigations carried out for several newspapers showed structural risks to the safety and health of the miners, with, for example, a lack of information, equipment and training for miners despite health hazards.^{xii} The local population – some of whom live only hundreds of meters from mine – also face strong hazards due to the contamination of the environment by mining waste, which was documented by corporate audits.^{xiii} In the past, the miners' attempts to mobilize or to form an independent union were violently repressed.^{xiv} Workers and members of AMDH were also subject to SLAPP actions.^{xv} Recently, 254 employees were not paid for months, and discovered that their employer, a subcontractor of the mine operator, failed to pay the state for their social security.

This case highlights failures to conduct adequate human rights and environmental due diligence on the part of mining and automobile companies. It appears that Management, the mine operator, did not take the necessary measures to leverage its sub-contractors to address the human rights and environmental violations, despite the urgency of the situation.^{xvi} Surprisingly, European automobile groups BMW and Renault, which have direct sourcing partnerships with the mine, still label the minerals they buy from Bou Azzer as "responsible cobalt," as part of a larger environmental-friendly rebranding.^{xvii} To date, they have been criticized for their lack of consequential response to address the severe impacts of Bou Azzer or the failures in its sub-contracting chain.

Bauxite in Guinea,

presented by Organisation Guinéenne de Défense des Droits de l'Homme et du Citoyen (OGDH)

Guinea, a country rich in energy and mineral resources, relies on renewable energy for its electricity supply, notably through hydroelectric dams. With nearly 7 billion tons of bauxite, Guinea is the country with the largest reserves and largest production on the global bauxite market. Several national and international companies – notably Chinese, European and Emirati^{xviii} – are involved in the exploitation, transportation, processing, and export of bauxite. Bauxite is mainly mined to be transformed into aluminium and is classified as a « critical raw material ».

Bauxite mining activities have led to deforestation and loss of biodiversity, pollution of waterways, and degradation of agricultural land. The mining operations have also caused forced displacement of

populations, social conflicts, and have impeded access to essential services such as water, education, and healthcare for certain local communities.

Moreover, the extraction of bauxite has been associated with a variety of economic, social and environmental impacts in Guinea. Bauxite production represents around 25% of Guinea's gross domestic product and 80% of its exports. It has also contributed to job creation in the mining regions of Boké, Boffa, and Téliélé. However, there is low processing capacity within the country, and most of the minerals mined are exported. Practices of tax evasion and poor governance of mining revenues have also had negative effects on the country's economy. These practices and imbalances in value distribution on the part of the companies have a significant impact the capacity of Guinea to fulfil the progressive realization economic and social rights of its residents.

Copper extraction in Ecuador,

presented by Accion Ecologica

In Ecuador, the extraction of copper at the Mirador mine, which started operations a decade ago, has led to serious violations of the human rights of local populations and of the rights of nature, both protected by the country's constitution. Almost from the outset, the mine caused deforestation,^{xix} pollution^{xx} and the displacement of local populations, which have been documented by various sources.^{xxi} Operated by the Chinese consortium ECSA,^{xxii} the mine's activities violate Ecuador's international human rights obligations,^{xxiii} domestic and constitutional law. Moreover, current plans to open a new road network to transport the minerals for export,^{xxiv} risks having serious consequences for forests, land and territories.

The Mirador project illustrates that mining expansion in countries like Ecuador to massively expand renewable energy technologies causes large-scale negative impacts and that in no way current policies represent a just transition.^{xxv} It reinforces global injustices, deepening the country's role as an exporter of raw materials to fuel energy consumption in countries like China, North America and Europe, while indigenous peoples and the Amazonian forests and rivers disproportionately shoulder the burden of such activities. The indigenous peoples of the Cordillera del Cóndor, where the Mirador mine is located, see their collective rights to territory, to food sovereignty and to culture violated,^{xxvi} while defenders have been persecuted, silenced and murdered.^{xxvii}

The injustice also concerns the planet and humanity as a whole: With its considerable energy demands, such large-scale mining also currently does not replace the use of oil, gas and coal, and therefore poses a risk of worsening global warming and the climate disasters caused by a model of unsustainable production and consumption.^{xxviii}

The pressure to exploit copper ore has also led to many threats to villages in the north-west of Ecuador, in the Intag area. This is where the Llorimagua project is located, which has not yet been opened as a result of 30 years of resistance by the local population, including through a legal battle.^{xxix} This struggle has led to the persecution of leaders and the harassment of organizations, such as DECOIN,^{xxx} that defend the Toisán Mountain Range.^{xxxi}

*Nickel extraction and smelting in Indonesia,
presented by Trend Asia*

Nickel smelting plants in Indonesia have been the site of repeated workplace accidents which have resulted in hundreds of victims but continue to occur without regulatory changes, improvements, or any sanctions imposed by the Indonesian government on the Chinese-owned companies operating the smelters.

Other violations of labor rights are also persistent, as many of these companies, predominantly backed by Chinese investment, are benefiting from Indonesian regulations that fail to ensure labor welfare. These include entrenched practices of low wages, excessively long working hours, lack of legal certainty in addressing labor issues, health risks from the environment of smelters, and the absence of personal protective equipment, all of which remain unresolved to this day.

Moreover, local communities living in proximity to mining and smelting sites are also suffering from serious human rights violations. These include illnesses caused by pollution and waste from coal-fired power plants, fly ash from coal, pollution from nickel processing, and dust from mining activities. These communities are facing the loss of livelihoods, forced evictions, criminalization, and ongoing health issues.

Trend Asia has recorded, between 2015 and 2024, a total of 242 injuries, 120 deaths, and 137 incidents. In 2024 alone, these incidents were categorized as follows: 7 in nickel mining, 18 in mining transportation, and 20 at smelter sites.^{xxxii}

II. Analysis

In the words of FIDH Ecuadorian member Acción Ecológica: “No transition is just if it is not grounded in people’s capacity to ameliorate their quality of life and conserve their ways of living and culture. Equally, given the deep interdependence between humans and natural ecosystems, a transition that violates the rights of nature also violates human rights.” The above cases illustrate that a new wave of mining fuelled by a demand for renewable and the decarbonization of the economy is already yielding significant impacts on the rights to water, to a healthy environment and on workers’ rights, among others. In most of these cases, environmental human rights defenders and union representatives face heightened risks of reprisals, violence and harassment from either governments or private actors, while the rights to consultation and participation are widely disregarded. Despite increasing acknowledgement of human rights issues linked to mining in past decades, much is needed for present and future operations to avoid reproducing past abuses. Moreover, as evidenced with the case of smelting in Indonesia, the rights of workers and local communities near processing, refining, transportation and manufacturing sites, which are also significantly affected, also require further attention.^{xxxiii}

These impacts are far from affecting people homogeneously. The cases of Guinea and Ecuador highlight how historical patterns of injustice are reproduced by contemporary minerals and renewables supply chains, with certain states maintained in a role of supplier of raw materials, while more affluent states and transnational companies capture most of the value and benefits to the detriment of the full realization of economic and social rights. Within states, certain territories, overwhelmingly populated by indigenous and peasant populations, bear a much higher burden. Women and marginalized populations are most at risk both of being impacted by climate change and by these types of climate mitigation policies.^{xxxiv}

In many sites, the (undeniable) need for transition out of fossil fuels is regularly used to discredit voices concerned with human rights and the environment, and risk putting in jeopardy the rights to participation and consultation in environmental matters. Human rights and environmental subject to smear campaigns disregarding them as obstacles to the climate agenda (as well as to local development).^{xxxv} The inherent contradictions of labelling “transition mineral” projects as environmentally friendly or rights compliant are blatant in the case of Bou Azzer, in Morocco, where the impacts of “responsible cobalt” are severe, and where attempts to organise or denounce them were stifled.

In past decades, the gradual recognition of indigenous rights and the establishment of constitutional or regional mechanisms protecting human rights have represented a significant milestone and have offered tools to protect rights in the context of mining. But the cases above, notably that of Argentina, Bolivia and Chile show the gap that still exists between policies and practice. Worryingly, recent policy debates have revolved around the need to accelerate the implementation of large-scale projects, often to the detriment of proper impact assessment, consultation or licensing practices.^{xxxvi} Similarly, the development of mandatory human rights due diligence standards has represented an important step for accountability and prevention of human rights abuse. In France and Germany, legislation on corporate due diligence is already in force, and similar bills have been proposed in various countries around the world.^{xxxvii} In 2024, the adoption of the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive by the European Union was seen as a milestone moment for the development of such policies, despite certain loopholes and shortcomings. But the recent Omnibus proposal by the European Commission risks compromising the progress done, thereby significantly weakening the prospects of a *just* transition.^{xxxviii}

Lastly, certain states, whose policies drive mineral expansion (notably the European Union or North America) or who control mineral supply chains and parent companies bear a particular responsibility to take action to address the above-mentioned risks, in virtue of their international human rights obligations. In this sense, policies addressing the overconsumption of energy and materials in high income countries or innovation seeking to reduce the impact of specific products could contribute to reducing the pressure on mining sites and to fulfilling the extraterritorial obligations of these states. Lastly, China, which holds a dominant position in this new material extraction and a quasi-monopoly on mid- and down-stream supply chains, has a specific obligation to address the

extraterritorial impacts of its companies, establish mechanisms furthering their transparency and accountability.^{xxxix}

III. Recommendations

- **Encourage robust prevention and corporate accountability frameworks:** The development of supply chain accountability laws should be encouraged and existing laws protected and reinforced. But the structure of renewable supply chains also illustrates broader shifts in the economy – with Chinese companies becoming dominant forces in renewable supply chains or state-owned capital on the rise, for example -- which need to be captured by business and human rights regulations. The growing multiplicity of centres of economic and political power and the high level of human rights risks in many of the key localities of renewable supply chains make the need for international legally binding standards ever more important. The process to elaborate an international legally binding instrument on transnational corporations and other business enterprises with respect to human rights represent an important avenue to achieve a global regulation establishing a level playing field.^{xl}
- **Reinforce the global recognition and implementation of the rights of indigenous peoples and peasants and other rural communities** by states and other economic actors such as businesses, development banks, and business associations, given the overwhelming burden these groups face in the context of contemporary mining projects. Protect the right to free, prior and informed consent in the context of extraction projects.
- **Address gaps in regulatory frameworks** that enable human rights and environmental violations and issues in the weak implementation of safeguards. Center human rights protection in the design of climate policies, reinforce the protection of land rights, systematize the production of human rights impact assessments elaborated through meaningful participatory processes, and mechanisms of access to justice and remedy in cases of human right violations, among others.
- **Protect human rights and environmental defenders** against harassment, intimidation, violence, smear campaigns and SLAPP actions, among others, **and reinforce participatory rights**^{xli}
- **Promote a human rights economy** addressing the root causes of violations, seeking to redirect policy decisions and frameworks to place the wellbeing of people and the planet at the heart of economic policies, investment decisions, consumer choices, and business models, with the aim of advancing the effective realisation of human rights for everyone and

eradicate poverty and social exclusion. This implies a move from an economy driven by profit maximisation and financialisation, to one that strives for the realisation of human rights by internalising externalities to ultimately come back within planetary boundaries. Such a shift would entail to lower environmental pressures, by tackling over-consumption and inequalities, while ensuring well-being, social justice and human rights for all. Development should not be equated with a GDP increase, but the realisation of human rights and increased social and ecological well-being. This also implies addressing the global debt crisis hampering the fiscal ability of many countries and progressive tax systems and tackling tax avoidance to ensure greater equality and generate the resources needed to realise human rights for all.

Annex 1: Signatory organisations

The International Federation for Human Rights – FIDH

The International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) is an international human rights NGO that unites 188 member organisations from 116 countries. Since its foundation in 1922, FIDH has been defending all civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights set out in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR).

Acción Ecológica

Acción Ecológica, FIDH member organisation in Ecuador, is an environmental organisation that has been working for 40 years to defend human rights and nature and a pioneer in the global campaign to leave oil in the ground in order to effectively tackle climate change.

Association Marocaine des Droits Humains (AMDH)

A national network of 96 local and 10 regional chapters in Morocco, AMDH has observer status with the United Nations Economic and Social Council. The Association works to preserve human dignity, respect for all human rights in their universality and globality, and to protect and promote these rights. AMDH's main objectives are:

- To raise awareness, disseminate information and educate people about human rights, especially among women, young people, children and workers.
- To work for Morocco to ratify without reservations all international human rights covenants, to incorporate their provisions into Moroccan legislation, and to ensure compliance between the latter with these covenants and the guarantee of their respect.
- To identify, denounce and condemn all human rights violations and work for their cessation.
- To provide solidarity and support to victims of violations.

Ligue des Droits de L'Homme (LDH)

The *Ligue des Droits de l'Homme* is an independent association committed to defending rights and freedoms. It acts against injustice, racism, sexism, anti-Semitism and discrimination, and defends freedom of expression, the right to protest and the right to live in a healthy and sustainable environment. It carries out its activities throughout France through its local branches and its members, who engage with public authorities and international institutions, monitor police practices, provide legal aid services and intervene in schools.

Organisation Guinéenne de Défense des Droits de l'Homme et du Citoyen – OGDH

The Organisation Guinéenne de Défense des Droits de l'Homme et du Citoyen, OGDH, was founded in the 1990s but only recognised in 1995. It is a member of the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) and the Inter-African Union for Human Rights (UIDH) and has observer status with the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights. It promotes, protects and defends human rights.

It was awarded the Roger Baldwin Prize in 2001 in the United States and the Courage for Democracy Award in Durban, South Africa, in 2004. It has accompanied several victims in their quest for justice, the most famous of whom are the victims of the crimes of 28 September 2009, whose case is currently under appeal following the conviction of the perpetrators in the first instance.

Transforming Energy and Development in Asia – Trend Asia

Trend Asia is an independent civil society organization that aims to accelerate energy transformation and sustainable development in Asia. Our mission is to promote a just, peaceful, and prosperous society through the widespread adoption of renewable energy, sustainable production, and consumption. Our focus is developing ecosystems and models for clean energy, encouraging democratic and sustainable economies, and advocating for social and environmental justice.

Endnotes

- i FIDH (2025). [Submission for the Secretary-General's synthesis report on just transition and human rights](#); Ahead of its participation to UNFCCC COP 29, FIDH also published FIDH (2024). [COP29. A human rights-based position on climate negotiations in Baku](#). Parallel to the present contribution, the Observatory for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders (FIDH-OMCT partnership) also provided a contribution to the call for inputs of the UN Special Rapporteur for her report on human rights defenders working on climate change and a just transition and participated in a collective submission as a member of the Human Rights and Climate Change Working Group (HR&CCWG).
- ii FIDH (2025). [Submission for the Secretary-General's synthesis report on just transition and human rights](#).
- iii While the latter industries represent the main drivers, other sectors, notably technology and defence also significantly contribute to the rise in demand. See, for example, Izoard, Celia (2024). *La ruée minière au XXI^e siècle. Enquête sur les métaux à l'ère de la transition*. Seuil.
- iv UN Secretary-General's Panel on Critical Energy Transition Minerals (2024). [Resourcing The Energy Transition: Principles to Guide Critical Energy Transition Minerals Towards Equity and Justice](#).
- v International Energy Agency (2021). [The Role of Critical Minerals in Clean Energy Transitions](#).
- vi Owen, John R. et al. (2023). [Energy transition minerals and their intersection with land-connected peoples](#), *Nature Sustainability*, 6(2), pp. 203–211.
- vii UN General Assembly (2007). [United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples](#). A/RES/61/295; OAS General Assembly (2016). [American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples](#). AG/RES.2888 (XLVI-O/16).
- viii Universidad de Chile. (n.d.). [Estudio U. de Chile detecta que Salar de Atacama se hunde a una tasa de 1-2 cm por año](#). Departamento de Geología - Universidad de Chile.
- ix Alywin, José; Didier, Marcel; and Mora, Oriana (2021). [Evaluación de impacto en derechos humanos de SQM en los derechos del pueblo indígena Lickanantay](#). Observatorio Ciudadano
- x FARN (2019). [Extracción de litio en Argentina: un estudio de caso sobre los impactos sociales y ambientales](#).
- xi Baudouin, P. et al. (2023). [Scandale du « cobalt responsable » de BMW et Renault au Maroc](#). Le Club de Mediapart.
- xii France Inter (2023). [Mines au Maroc : la sinistre réalité du "cobalt responsable"](#); Izoard, Celia; Bergnes, Benjamin (2023). [Mines au Maroc : la sinistre réalité du « cobalt responsable »](#). Reporterre ; Izoard, Celia; Bergnes, Benjamin (2023). [Au Maroc, une mine de cobalt empoisonne les oasis](#). Reporterre ; Izoard, Celia; Bergnes, Benjamin (2023). [Les voitures électriques assoiffent](#)

[les pays du Sud](#). Reporterre; Izoard, Celia; Bergnes, Benjamin (2023). [BMW et Renault impliqués dans un scandale écologique au Maroc](#). Reporterre .

xiii Stefan Krempel (2024). [E-cars: BMW admits to environmental problems at Moroccan cobalt mine](#). Heise online.

xiv Baudouin, P. et al. (2023). [Scandale du « cobalt responsable » de BMW et Renault au Maroc](#). Le Club de Mediapart.

xv *ibid.* and Izoard, Celia; Bergnes, Benjamin (2023). [Mines au Maroc : la sinistre réalité du « cobalt responsable »](#). Reporterre

xvi Baudouin, P. et al. (2023). [Scandale du « cobalt responsable » de BMW et Renault au Maroc](#). Le Club de Mediapart.

xvii *ibid.*

xviii They include Société Minière de Boké (SMB), a consortium formed by Chinese companies, notably Winning Shipping, and Guinean partners; Compagnie de Bauxite de Guinée (CBG), with 49% for the Guinean state and 51% Halco Mining, a consortium of Rio Tinto, Alcoa and Dadco; Guinea Alumina Corporation (GAC), subsidiary of the Emirates Global Aluminium group; RUSAL, comprised of Société de Bauxite de Kindai (CBK), FRIGUIA (alumina), Dian Dian; HENAN CHINA; CHALCO GUINEA COMPANY, subsidiary of the Chinese Aluminum Corporation of China Limited; But also emerging or developing players such as Alliance minière responsable (ARM) a French company; DYNAMIC MINING the WINING CONSORTIUM for Simandou iron and the Guinean State through the Société Guinéenne du Patrimoine Minier (SOGUIPAMI)

xix MAAP (2018). [Impactos del Proyecto Minero “Mirador” en Amazonía Ecuatoriana](#). MAAP #89.

xx Acción Ecológica (2023). [Grave riesgo en el proyecto minero Cóndor Mirador](#).

xxi See Acción Ecológica (n. d.). [“Mirador”](#); Acción Ecológica et. al. (2017). [La herida abierta del Cóndor. Vulneración de derechos, impactos socioecológicos y afectaciones psicosociales provocados por la empresa minera china Ecuacorriente S.A. y el Estado ecuatoriano en el Proyecto Mirador](#); Van Teijlingen, Karolien (2019). [Los depósitos de relaves en Ecuador y sus riesgos socio-ambientales](#); INREDH (n.d.). [“Mirador”](#).

xxii Koop, Fermín (2023). [Latam NGOs raise concerns on Chinese investments to UN body](#). Dialogue Earth.

xxiii CIDH (2022), [Informe No. 41/22. Petición 2139-13. Admisibilidad. Abel Marclino Arpi Bermeo y otros. Ecuador](#).

xxiv Bnamericas (2025). [Ecuador mira hacia la construcción de corredores viales mineros para facilitar futuras operaciones](#).

xxv FIDH (2017). [Ecuador: No more mining in the Cordillera del Cóndor. December 2017.](#)

xxvi Salva la Selva (2024). [Peligro tóxico para la selva en Ecuador: la mina Mirador en la Cordillera del Cóndor.](#)

xxvii Business & Human Rights Resource Centre (2023). [Ecuador: Warnings of serious socio-environmental impacts of Ecuacorriente's Mirador mine; with comments from the company;](#) Business & Human Rights Resource Centre (2016). [Ecuador: NGOs allege forced eviction of communities to make room for Chinese mining project Mirador, of Ecuacorriente;](#) Business & Human Rights Resource Centre (2019). [Ecuador: Local communities oppose country's largest copper mine funded by Chinese firm.](#)

xxviii The Mirador mine is one of the four largest consumers of electricity in Ecuador. Despite severe electricity rationing (up to 14 hours a day at the end of 2024) due to the lack of rain to feed the hydroelectric dams in Ecuador, the mine receives subsidised prices from the State for electricity as well as diesel for machinery and the transport of mining material. The Chinese company operating the mine offered in 2012 to build its own hydroelectric power plant but never did so, receiving subsidised energy from the State for its operations. See Novik, Manuel (2023). [Los millonarios subsidios en diésel y electricidad que benefician a la mina Mirador de Ecuacorriente.](#) Plan V; Orozco, Mónica (2024). [Mirador, la mayor mina de Ecuador, reinicia operación parcial tras estar parada 19 días por la crisis eléctrica.](#) Primicias.

xxix Business and Human Rights Resource Centre (2023). [Ecuador: Court revokes environmental licence of the Llurimagua mining project after confirming violations of the right to consultation and environmental rights.](#)

xxx Decoin (2024). [A brief history of the resistance to mining in Intag, Ecuador.](#)

xxxi Salva la Selva (2023). [Ecuador: sentencia a favor de los bosques y contra la minería.](#)

xxxii For more information, see the following publications from Trend Asia: Trend Asia (2024). [The Indonesia Nickel Pickle: The Labor and Employment Disarray at Indonesia Morowali Industrial Park \(IMIP\);](#) Trend Asia (2024). [Another Death: Why Do Work Accidents at Nickel Plants Keep Happening?;](#) Trend Asia (2024). [Worker Exploitation in the Nickel Industry.](#)

xxxiii Rouhana, Francesco et al. (2024). [Ensuring a just transition: The electric vehicle revolution from a human rights perspective,](#) Journal of Cleaner Production, 462, p. 142667; Dall-Orsoletta, Alaize, Ferreira, Paula and Gilson Dranka, Géremi (2022). [Low-carbon technologies and just energy transition: Prospects for electric vehicles,](#) Energy Conversion and Management: X, 16, p. 100271.

xxxiv Women are more exposed to climate disasters due to gender inequalities in information, mobility, decision-making, and access to resources - creating a vicious cycle of vulnerability compounded and exacerbated by other forms of inequality linked to migrant status, age, disability, Indigenous

belonging, ethnicity, class and more. See for instance UN Women (2023). [Policy brief: A gender-responsive just transition for people and planet.](#)

xxxv Dorn, Felix Malte; Hafner, Robert and Plank, Christina (2022). [Towards a climate change consensus: How mining and agriculture legitimize green extractivism in Argentina](#), *The Extractive Industries and Society*, 11, p. 101130.

xxxvi See for example Hunter, David (2025). [No easy path to shorter permitting timelines.](#) *Canadian Mining Journal*; Meadows, Sam (2024). [‘Making Argentina great again’? What a year under a climate-change denying president has done for the country.](#) *The Guardian*.

xxxvii FIDH (2025). [Submission for the Secretary-General’s synthesis report on just transition and human rights.](#)

xxxviii FIDH (2025). [Newly-announced Omnibus proposal strips the EU’s corporate accountability laws of its essence.](#)

xxxix White, Edward (2023). [How China cornered the market for clean tech.](#) *Financial Times*.

xl FIDH (2017). [FIDH advocates for the adoption of an international legally binding instrument to regulate the activities of corporations in relation to human rights.](#)

xli See the detailed contribution provided by the Observatory for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders (FIDH-OMCT partnership) and of the Human Rights and Climate Change Working Group (HR&CCWG) to the call for inputs of the UN Special Rapporteur for her report on human rights defenders working on climate change and a just transition.