MEMO 6

U.S. Department of Justice
Office of Legal Counsel

Office of the Assistant Attorney General
Washington, D.C. 20530

January 22, 2002

Memorandum for Alberto R. Gonzales
Counsel to the President,
and William J. Haynes II
General Counsel of the Department of Defense

RE: Application of Treaties and Laws to al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees

You have asked for our Office’s views concerning the effect of international treaties and federal laws on the treatment of individuals detained by the U.S. Armed Forces during the conflict in Afghanistan. In particular, you have asked whether certain treaties forming part of the laws of armed conflict apply to the conditions of detention and the procedures for trial of members of al Qaeda and the Taliban militia. We conclude that these treaties do not protect members of the al Qaeda organization, which as a non-State actor cannot be a party to the international agreements governing war. We further conclude that that President has sufficient grounds to find that these treaties do not protect members of the Taliban militia. This memorandum expresses no view as to whether the President should decide, as a matter of policy, that the U.S. Armed Forces should adhere to the standards of conduct in those treaties with respect to the treatment of prisoners.

We believe it most useful to structure the analysis of these questions by focusing on the War Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (Supp. III 1997) (“WCA”). The WCA directly incorporates several provisions of international treaties governing the laws of war into the federal criminal code. Part I of this memorandum describes the WCA and the most relevant treaty that it incorporates: the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (“Geneva III”).

Parts II and III of this memorandum discuss why other deviations from the text of Geneva III would not present either a violation of the treaty or of the WCA. Part II explains that al Qaeda detainees cannot claim the protections of Geneva III because the treaty does not apply to them. Al Qaeda is merely a violent political movement or organization and not as State. As a result, it cannot be a state party to any treaty. Because of the novel nature of this conflict, moreover, a conflict with al Qaeda is not properly included in non-international forms of armed conflict to which some

Force — were treated consistently with the Geneva Convention III, until their precise status under that Convention was determined. A 1990 letter to the Attorney General from the Legal Adviser to the State Department said that “[i]t should be emphasized that the decision to extend basic prisoner of war protections to such persons was based on strong policy considerations, and was not necessarily based on any conclusion that the United States was obligated to do so as a matter of law.”

Interventions in Somalia, Haiti and Bosnia. There was considerable factual uncertainty whether the United Nations Operation in Somalia in late 1992 and early 1993 rose to the level of an “armed conflict” that could be subject to common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, particularly after the United Nations Task Force abandoned its previously neutral role and took military action against a Somali warlord, General Aided. Similar questions have arisen in other peace operations, including those in Haiti and Bosnia. It appears that the U.S. military has decided, as a matter of policy, to conduct operations in such circumstances as if the Geneva Conventions applied, regardless of whether there is any legal requirement to do so. The U.S. Army Operational Law Handbook, after noting that “[i]n peace operations, such as those in Somalia, Haiti and Bosnia, the question frequently arises whether the [laws of war] legally applies,” states that it is “the position of the US, UN and NATO that their forces will apply the ‘principles and spirit’ of the [law of war] in these operations.”

It might be argued, however, that the United States has conceded that Geneva III applied, as a matter of law, in every conflict since World War II. The facts, as supplied by our research and by the Defense Department, demonstrate otherwise. Although the United States at times has declared in different wars that the United States would accord Geneva Convention III treatment to enemy prisoners, there are several examples where the United States clearly decided not to comply with Geneva III as a matter of law. Further, such a position confuses situations in which the United States said it would act consistently with the Geneva Conventions with those in which we admitted that enemy prisoners would receive POW status as a matter of law. Our conduct in Panama provides an important example. There, the United States never conceded that the forces of Manuel Noriega qualified as POWs under the Geneva Convention, but did provide for them as a policy matter as if they were POWs.

IV. Detention Conditions Under Geneva III

Even if the President decided not to suspend our Geneva III obligations toward Afghanistan, two reasons would justify some deviations from the requirements of Geneva III. This would be the case even if Taliban members legally were entitled to POW status. First, certain deviations concerning treatment can be justified on basic grounds of legal excuse concerning self-defense and feasibility. Second, the President could choose to find that none of the Taliban prisoners qualify as POWs under Article 4 of Geneva III, which generally defines the types of armed forces that may be considered POWs once captured. In the latter instance, Geneva III would apply and the Afghanistan conflict would fall within common Article 2’s jurisdiction. The President, however, would be interpreting the treaty in light of the facts on the ground to find that the Taliban militia categorically failed the test for POWs within Geneva III’s terms. We


103 Quotet in Bialke, supra, at 56.
should be clear that we have no information that the conditions of treatment for Taliban prisoners currently violate Geneva III standards, but it is possible that some may argue that our GTMO facilities do not fully comply with all of the treaty's provisions.

A. Justified Deviations from Geneva Convention Requirements

We should make clear that as we understand the facts, the detainees currently are being treated in a manner consistent with common Article 3 of Geneva III. This means that they are housed in basic humane conditions, are not being physically mistreated, and are receiving adequate medical care. They have not yet been tried or punished by any U.S. court system. As a result, the current detention conditions in GTMO do not violate common Article 3, nor do they present a grave breach of Geneva III as defined in Article 130. For purposes of domestic law, therefore, the GTMO conditions do not constitute a violation of the WCA, which criminalizes only violations of common Article 3 or grave breaches of the Conventions.

That said, some may very well argue that detention conditions currently depart from Geneva III requirements. Nonetheless, not all of these deviations from Geneva III would amount to an outright violation of the treaty's requirements. Instead, some departures from the text can be justified by some basic doctrines of legal excuse. We believe that some deviations would not amount to a treaty violation, because they would be justified by the need for force protection. Nations have the right to take reasonable steps for the protection of the armed forces guarding prisoners. At the national level, no treaty can override a nation's inherent right to self-defense. Indeed, the United Nations Charter recognizes this fundamental principle. Article 51 of the U.N. Charter provides that "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations." As we have discussed in other opinions relating to the war on terrorism, the September 11 attacks on the Pentagon and the World Trade Center have triggered the United States' right to defend itself. Our national right to self-defense must encompass the lesser included right to defend our own forces from prisoners who pose a threat to their lives and safety, just as the Nation has the authority to take measures in the field to protect the U.S. armed forces. Any Geneva III obligations, therefore, may be legally adjusted to take into account the needs of force protection.

The right to national self-defense is further augmented by the individual right to self-defense as a justification for modifications to Geneva III based on the need for force protection. Under domestic law, self-defense serves as a legal defense even to the taking of a human life. "Self defense is...embodied in our jurisprudence as a consideration totally eliminating any criminal taint....It is difficult to the point of impossibility to imagine a right in any state to abolish self defense altogether...."

As the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has observed, "[m]ore

104 Memorandum for Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, from Patrick F. Philbin, Deputy Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Re: Legality of the Use of Military Commissions to Try Terrorists at 22-33 (Nov. 6, 2001); Memorandum for Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President and William J. Haynes, II, General Counsel, Department of Defense, from John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney General and Robert J. Delahunty, Special Counsel, Office of Legal Counsel, Re: Authority for Use of Military Force to Combat Terrorist Activities Within the United States at 2-3 (Oct. 17, 2001).

than two centuries ago, Blackstone, best known of the expositors of the English common law, taught that 'all homicide is malicious, and of course, amounts to murder, unless . . . excused on the account of accident or self-preservation. . . .' Self-defense, as a doctrine legally exonerating the taking of human life, is as viable now as it was in Blackstone's time. . . ."  

Both the Supreme Court and this Office have opined that the use of force by law enforcement or the military is constitutional, even if it results in the loss of life, if necessary to protect the lives and safety of officers or innocent third parties.  

Thus, as a matter of domestic law, the United States armed forces can modify their Geneva III obligations to take into account the needs of military necessity to protect their individual members.  

Other deviations from Geneva III, which do not involve force protection, may still be justified as a domestic legal matter on the ground that immediate compliance is infeasible. Certain conditions, we have been informed, are only temporary until the Defense Department can construct permanent facilities that will be in compliance with Geneva. We believe that no treaty breach would exist under such circumstances. The State Department has informed us that state practice under the Convention allows nations a period of reasonable time to satisfy their affirmative obligations for treatment of POWs, particularly during the early stages of a conflict. An analogy can be drawn here to a similar legal doctrine in administrative law. For example, it is a well-established principle that, where a statutory mandate fails to specify a particular deadline for agency action, a federal agency's duty to comply with the mandate is lawfully discharged, as long as it is satisfied within a reasonable time. The Administrative Procedure Act expressly provides that a "reviewing court shall . . . compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed." 5 U.S.C. § 706 (emphasis added). Courts have recognized accordingly that a federal agency has a reasonable time to discharge its obligations.  

Thus, "if an agency has no concrete deadline establishing a date by which it must act, . . . a court must compel only action that is delayed unreasonably. . . [When an agency is required to act - either by organic statute or by the APA - within an expeditious, prompt, or reasonable time, § 706 leaves in the courts the discretion to decide whether agency delay is unreasonable."  

107 See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7, 11 (1985) (Fourth Amendment "seizure" caused by use of force subject to reasonableness analysis); Memorandum to Files, from Robert Delahunt, Special Counsel, Office of Legal Counsel, Re: Use of Deadly Force Against Civil Aircraft Threatening to Attack 1996 Summer Olympic Games (Aug. 19, 1996); United States Assistance to Countries that Shoot Down Civil Aircraft Involved in Drug Trafficking, 18 Op. O.L.C. 148, 164 (1994) ("[A] USG officer or employee may use deadly force against civil aircraft without violating [a criminal statute] if he or she reasonably believes that the aircraft poses a threat of serious physical harm . . . to another person.").  

During the India-Pakistan conflicts between 1965 and 1971, prisoners were able to correspond with their families, but there were "some difficulties in getting lists of all military prisoners" - Telically at the beginning of the conflict." Allan Ross, The Legal Status of Prisoners of War at 186 (1976).  

Similarly, during the 1967 War in the Middle East, Israeli authorities delayed access to Arab prisoners on the grounds that "all facilities would be granted as soon as the prisoners were transferred to the camp at Atilat . . . in the meantime, delegates had the opportunity to see some of the prisoners at the transit camp at EI Quantara and Kusseima." Id. at 203 (citation omitted). Although Israel was technically obliged under the Convention to provide access to Arab POWs, immediate compliance with that obligation was infeasible.  

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that neither the federal War Crimes Act nor the Geneva Conventions would apply to the detention conditions of al Qaeda prisoners. We also conclude that the President has the plenary constitutional power to suspend our treaty obligations toward Afghanistan during the period of the conflict. He may exercise that discretion on the basis that Afghanistan was a failed State. Even if he chose not to, he could interpret Geneva III to find that members of the Taliban militia failed to qualify as POWs under the terms of the treaty. We also conclude that customary international law has no binding legal effect on either the President or the military because it is not federal law, as recognized by the Constitution.

We should make clear that in reaching a decision to suspend our treaty obligations or to construe Geneva III to conclude that members of the Taliban militia are not POWs, the President need not make any specific finding. Rather, he need only authorize or approve policies that would be consistent with the understanding that al Qaeda and Taliban prisoners are not POWs under Geneva III.

Please let us know if we can provide further assistance.

Jay S. Bybee
Assistant Attorney General

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL  
CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT  
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS  
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT:  Humane Treatment of al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees

1. Our recent extensive discussions regarding the status of al Qaeda and Taliban detainees confirm that the application of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of August 12, 1949 (Geneva) to the conflict with al Qaeda and the Taliban involves complex legal questions. By its terms, Geneva applies to conflicts involving "High Contracting Parties," which can only be States. Moreover, it assumes the existence of "regular" armed forces fighting on behalf of States. However, the war against terrorism ushers in a new paradigm, one in which groups with broad, international reach commit horrific acts against innocent civilians, sometimes with the direct support of States. Our Nation recognizes that this new paradigm—ushered in not by us, but by terrorists—requires new thinking in the law of war, but thinking that should nevertheless be consistent with the principles of Geneva.

2. Pursuant to my authority as Commander-in-Chief and Chief Executive of the United States, and relying on the opinion of the Department of Justice dated January 22, 2002, and on the legal opinion rendered by the Attorney General in his letter of February 1, 2002, I hereby determine as follows:
   a. I accept the legal conclusion of the Department of Justice and determine that none of the provisions of Geneva apply to our conflict with al Qaeda in Afghanistan or elsewhere throughout the world because, among other reasons, al Qaeda is not a High Contracting Party to Geneva.
   b. I accept the legal conclusion of the Attorney General and the Department of Justice that I have the authority under the Constitution to suspend Geneva as between the United States and Afghanistan, but I decline to exercise that authority at this time. Accordingly, I determine that the provisions of Geneva will apply to our present conflict with the Taliban. I reserve the right to exercise this authority in this or future conflicts.
   c. I also accept the legal conclusion of the Department of Justice and determine that common Article 3 of Geneva does not apply to either al Qaeda or Taliban detainees, because, among other reasons, the relevant conflicts are international
in scope and common Article 3 applies only to "armed conflict not of an international character."

d. Based on the facts supplied by the Department of Defense and the recommendation of the Department of Justice, I determine that the Taliban detainees are unlawful combatants and, therefore, do not qualify as prisoners of war under Article 4 of Geneva. I note that, because Geneva does not apply to our conflict with al Qaeda, al Qaeda detainees also do not qualify as prisoners of war.

3. Of course, our values as a Nation, values that we share with many nations in the world, call for us to treat detainees humanely, including those who are not legally entitled to such treatment. Our Nation has been and will continue to be a strong supporter of Geneva and its principles. As a matter of policy, the United States Armed Forces shall continue to treat detainees humanely and, to the extent appropriate and consistent with military necessity, in a manner consistent with the principles of Geneva.

4. The United States will hold states, organizations, and individuals who gain control of United States personnel responsible for treating such personnel humanely and consistent with applicable law.

5. I hereby reaffirm the order previously issued by the Secretary of Defense to the United States Armed Forces requiring that the detainees be treated humanely and, to the extent appropriate and consistent with military necessity, in a manner consistent with the principles of Geneva.

6. I hereby direct the Secretary of State to communicate my determinations in an appropriate manner to our allies, and other countries and international organizations cooperating in the war against terrorism of global reach.

[Signed George Bush]

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February 7, 2002 / Humane Treatment of al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees
MEMO 14

U.S. Department of Justice
Office of Legal Counsel

Office of the Assistant Attorney General
Washington, D.C. 20530

August 1, 2002

Memorandum for Alberto R. Gonzales Counsel
to the President

RE: Standards of Conduct for Interrogation under 18 U.S.C. §§2340–2340A

You have asked for our Office's views regarding the standards of conduct under the
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or
Punishment as implemented by Sections 2340–2340A of title 18 of the United States
Code. As we understand it, this question has arisen in the context of the conduct of
interrogations outside of the United States. We conclude below that Section 2340A
proscribes acts inflicting, and that are specifically intended to inflict, severe pain or
suffering, whether mental or physical. Those acts must be of an extreme nature to
rise to the level of torture within the meaning of Section 2340A and the Convention.
We further conclude that certain acts may be cruel, inhuman, or degrading, but still
not produce pain and suffering of the requisite intensity to fall within Section 2340A's
proscription against torture. We conclude by examining possible defenses that would
negate any claim that certain interrogation methods violate the statute.

In Part I, we examine the criminal statute's text and history. We conclude that for an
act to constitute torture as defined in Section 2340, it must inflict pain that is difficult to
endure. Physical pain amounting to torture must be equivalent in intensity to the pain
accompanying serious physical injury, such as organ failure, impairment of bodily
function, or even death. For purely mental pain or suffering to amount to torture under
Section 2340, it must result in significant psychological harm of significant duration,
e.g., lasting for months or even years. We conclude that the mental harm also must
result from one of the predicate acts listed in the statute, namely: threats of imminent
death; threats of infliction of the kind of pain that would amount to physical torture;
infliction of such physical pain as a means of psychological torture; use of drugs or
other procedures designed to deeply disrupt the senses, or fundamentally alter an
individual's personality; or threatening to do any of these things to a third party. The
legislative history simply reveals that Congress intended for the statute's definition to
track the Convention's definition of torture and the reservations, understandings, and
declarations that the United States submitted with its ratification. We conclude that
the statute, taken as a whole, makes plain that it prohibits only extreme acts.

In Part II, we examine the text, ratification history, and negotiating history of the
Torture Convention. We conclude that the treaty's text prohibits only the most ex-
treme acts by reserving criminal penalties solely for torture and declining to require
such penalties for "cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment." This con-
ffirms our view that the criminal statute penalizes only the most egregious conduct.
Executive branch interpretations and representations to the Senate at the time of

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ratification further confirm that the treaty was intended to reach only the most extreme conduct.

In Part III, we analyze the jurisprudence of the Torture Victims Protection Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (2000), which provides civil remedies for torture victims, to predict the standards that courts might follow in determining what actions reach the threshold of torture in the criminal context. We conclude from these cases that courts are likely to take a totality-of-the-circumstances approach, and will look to an entire course of conduct, to determine whether certain acts will violate Section 2340A. Moreover, these cases demonstrate that most often torture involves cruel and extreme physical pain. In Part IV, we examine international decisions regarding the use of sensory deprivation techniques. These cases make clear that while many of these techniques may amount to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, they do not produce pain or suffering of the necessary intensity to meet the definition of torture. From these decisions, we conclude that there is a wide range of such techniques that will not rise to the level of torture.

In Part V, we discuss whether Section 2340A may be unconstitutional if applied to interrogations undertaken of enemy combatants pursuant to the President's Commander-in-Chief powers. We find that in the circumstances of the current war against al Qaeda and its allies, prosecution under Section 2340A may be barred because enforcement of the statute would represent an unconstitutional infringement of the President's authority to conduct war. In Part VI, we discuss defenses to an allegation that an interrogation method might violate the statute. We conclude that, under the current circumstances, necessity or self-defense may justify interrogation methods that might violate Section 2340A.

1. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340–2340A

Section 2340A makes it a criminal offense for any person "outside the United States [to] commit or attempt to commit torture." Section 2340 defines the act of torture as an act committed by a person acting under the color of law specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering (other than pain or suffering incidental to lawful sanctions) upon another person within his custody or physical control.

1 If convicted of torture, a defendant faces a fine or up to twenty years’ imprisonment or both. If, however, the act resulted in the victim’s death, a defendant may be sentenced to life imprisonment or to death. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2340A(a). Whether death results from the act also affects the applicable statute of limitations. Where death does not result, the statute of limitations is eight years; if death results, there is no statute of limitations. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3286(b) (West Supp. 2002); id. §§ 2332b(g)(3)(B) (West Supp. 2002). Section 2340A as originally enacted did not provide for the death penalty as a punishment. See Omnibus Crime Bill, Pub. L. No. 103–322, Title VI, Section 60020, 108 Stat. 1979 (1994) (amending section 2340A to provide for the death penalty); H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 103–711, at 388 (1994) (noting that the act added the death penalty as a penalty for torture). Most recently, the USA Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107–56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001), amended section 2340A to expressly codify the offense of conspiracy to commit torture. Congress enacted this amendment as part of a broader effort to ensure that individuals engaged in the planning of terrorist activities could be prosecuted irrespective of where the activities took place. See H. R. Rep. No. 107–236, at 70 (2001) (discussing the addition of "conspiracy" as a separate offense for a variety of "Federal terrorism offenses[s]").
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(b) neither the Code nor other law defining the offense provides exceptions or defenses dealing with the specific situation involved; and

(c) a legislative purpose to exclude the justification claimed does not otherwise plainly appear.

Model Penal Code § 3.02. See also Wayne R. LaFave & Austin W. Scott, 1 Substantive Criminal Law § 5.4 at 627 (1986 & 2002 supp.) ("LaFave & Scott"). Although there is no federal statute that generally establishes necessity or other justifications as defenses to federal criminal laws, the Supreme Court has recognized the defense. See United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 410 (1980) (relying on LaFave & Scott and Model Penal Code definitions of necessity defense).

The necessity defense may prove especially relevant in the current circumstances. As it has been described in the case law and literature, the purpose behind necessity is one of public policy. According to LaFave and Scott, "[t]he law ought to promote the achievement of higher values at the expense of lesser values, and sometimes the greater good for society will be accomplished by violating the literal language of the criminal law." LaFave & Scott, at 629. In particular, the necessity defense can justify the intentional killing of one person to save two others because "it is better that two lives be saved and one lost than that two be lost and one saved." Id. Or, put in the language of a choice of evils, "the evil involved in violating the terms of the criminal law (... even taking another's life) may be less than that which would result from literal compliance with the law (... two lives lost)." Id.

Additional elements of the necessity defense are worth noting here. First, the defense is not limited to certain types of harms. Therefore, the harm inflicted by necessity may include intentional homicide, so long as the harm avoided is greater (i.e., preventing more deaths). Id. at 634. Second, it must actually be the defendant's intention to avoid the greater harm; intending to commit murder and then learning only later that the death had the fortuitous result of saving other lives will not support a necessity defense. Id. at 635. Third, if the defendant reasonably believed that the lesser harm was necessary, even if, unknown to him, it was not, he may still avail himself of the defense. As LaFave and Scott explain, "if A kills B reasonably believing it to be necessary to save C and D, he is not guilty of murder even though, unknown to A, C and D could have been rescued without the necessity of killing B." Id. Fourth, it is for the court, and not the defendant to judge whether the harm avoided outweighed the harm done. Id. at 636. Fifth, the defendant cannot rely upon the necessity defense if a third alternative is open and known to him that will cause less harm.

It appears to us that under the current circumstances the necessity defense could be successfully maintained in response to an allegation of a Section 2340A violation. On September 11, 2001, al Qaeda launched a surprise covert attack on civilian targets in the United States that led to the deaths of thousands and losses in billions of dollars. According to public and governmental reports, al Qaeda has other sleeper cells within the United States that may be planning similar attacks. Indeed, al Qaeda plans apparently include efforts to develop and deploy chemical, biological and nuclear weapons of mass destruction. Under these circumstances, a detainee may possess information that could enable the United States to prevent attacks that potentially could equal or surpass the September 11 attacks in their magnitude. Clearly, any harm that might occur during an interrogation would pale to insignificance compared to the
harm avoided by preventing such an attack, which could take hundreds or thousands of lives.

Under this calculus, two factors will help indicate when the necessity defense could appropriately be invoked. First, the more certain that government officials are that a particular individual has information needed to prevent an attack, the more necessary interrogation will be. Second, the more likely it appears to be that a terrorist attack is likely to occur, and the greater the amount of damage expected from such an attack, the more that an interrogation to get information would become necessary. Of course, the strength of the necessity defense depends on the circumstances that prevail, and the knowledge of the government actors involved, when the interrogation is conducted. While every interrogation that might violate Section 2340A does not trigger a necessity defense, we can say that certain circumstances could support such a defense.

Legal authorities identify an important exception to the necessity defense. The defense is available “only in situations wherein the legislature has not itself, in its criminal statute, made a determination of values.” Id. at 629. Thus, if Congress explicitly has made clear that violation of a statute cannot be outweighed by the harm avoided, courts cannot recognize the necessity defense. LaFave and Israel provide as an example an abortion statute that made clear that abortions even to save the life of the mother would still be a crime; in such cases the necessity defense would be unavailable. Id. at 630. Here, however, Congress has not explicitly made a determination of values vis-à-vis torture. In fact, Congress explicitly removed efforts to remove torture from the weighing of values permitted by the necessity defense.23

B. Self-Defense

Even if a court were to find that a violation of Section 2340A was not justified by necessity, a defendant could still appropriately raise a claim of self-defense. The right to self-defense, even when it involves deadly force, is deeply embedded in our law, both as to individuals and as to the nation as a whole. As the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit has explained:

More than two centuries ago, Blackstone, best known of the expositors of the English common law, taught that “all homicide is malicious, and of course amounts to murder, unless ... excused on the account of accident or self-preservation...” Self-defense, as a doctrine legally exonerating the taking of human life, is as viable now as it was in Blackstone’s time.

23 In the CAT, torture is defined as the intentional infliction of severe pain or suffering “for such purpose as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession.” CAT Article 1.1. One could argue that such a definition represented an attempt to to indicate that the good of of obtaining information – no matter what the circumstances – could not justify an act of torture. In other words, necessity would not be a defense. In enacting Section 2340, however, Congress removed the purpose element in the definition of torture, evidencing an intention to remove any fixing of values by statute. By leaving Section 2340 silent as to the harm done by torture in comparison to other harms, Congress allowed the necessity defense to apply when appropriate.

Further, the CAT contains an additional provision that "no exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war, internal political instability or any other public emergency, may be invoked as a justification of torture." CAT Article 2.2. Aware of this provision of the treaty, and of the definition of the necessity defense that allows the legislature to provide for an exception to the defense, see Model Penal Code §3.02(2), Congress did not incorporate CAT Article 2.2 into Section 2340. Given that Congress omitted CAT’s effort to bar a necessity or wartime defense, we read Section 2340 as permitting the defense.
United States v. Peterson, 483 F.2d 1222, 1228–29 (D.C. Cir. 1973). Self-defense is a common-law defense to federal criminal law offenses, and nothing in the text, structure or history of Section 2340A precludes its application to a charge of torture. In the absence of any textual provision to the contrary, we assume self-defense can be an appropriate defense to an allegation of torture.

The doctrine of self-defense permits the use of force to prevent harm to another person. As LaFave and Scott explain, “one is justified in using reasonable force in defense of another person, even a stranger, when he reasonably believes that the other is in immediate danger of unlawful bodily harm from his adversary and that the use of such force is necessary to avoid this danger.” Id. at 663–64. Ultimately, even deadly force is permissible, but “only when the attack of the adversary upon the other person reasonably appears to the defender to be a deadly attack.” Id. at 664. As with our discussion of necessity, we will review the significant elements of this defense.24 According to LaFave and Scott, the elements of the defense of others are the same as those that apply to individual self-defense.

First, self-defense requires that the use of force be necessary to avoid the danger of unlawful bodily harm. Id. at 649. A defender may justifiably use deadly force if he reasonably believes that the other person is about to inflict unlawful death or serious bodily harm upon another; and that it is necessary to use such force to prevent it. Id. at 652. Looked at from the opposite perspective, the defender may not use force when the force would be as equally effective at a later time and the defender suffers no harm or risk by waiting. See Paul H. Robinson, 2 Criminal Law Defenses § 131(c) at 77 (1984). If, however, other options permit the defender to retreat safely from a confrontation without having to resort to deadly force, the use of force may not be necessary in the first place. La Fave and Scott at 659–60.

Second, self-defense requires that the defendant’s belief in the necessity of using force be reasonable. If a defendant honestly but unreasonably believed force was necessary, he will not be able to make out a successful claim of self-defense. Id. at 654. Conversely, if a defendant reasonably believed an attack was to occur, but the facts subsequently showed no attack was threatened, he may still raise self-defense. As LaFave and Scott explain, “one may be justified in shooting to death an adversary who, having threatened to kill him, reaches for his pocket as if for a gun, though it later appears that he had no gun and that he was only reaching for his handkerchief.” Id. Some authorities, such as the Model Penal Code, even eliminate the reasonableness element, and require only that the defender honestly believed—regardless of its unreasonableness—that the use of force was necessary.

Third, many legal authorities include the requirement that a defender must reasonably believe that the unlawful violence is “imminent” before he can use force in his defense. It would be a mistake, however, to equate imminence necessarily with timing—that an attack is immediately about to occur. Rather, as the Model Penal Code explains, what is essential is that, the defensive response must be “immediately necessary.” Model Penal Code § 3.04(1). Indeed, imminence may be merely another way of expressing the requirement of necessity. Robinson at 78. LaFave and Scott, for

24 Early cases had suggested that in order to be eligible for defense of another, one should have some personal relationship with the one in need of protection. That view has been discarded. LaFave & Scott at 664.
example, believe that the imminence requirement makes sense as part of a necessity defense because if an attack is not immediately upon the defender, the defender has other options available to avoid the attack that do not involve the use of force. LaFave and Scott at 656. If, however, the fact of the attack becomes certain and no other options remain, the use of force may be justified. To use a well-known hypothetical, if A were to kidnap and confine B, and then tell B he would kill B one week later, B would be justified in using force in self-defense, even if the opportunity arose before the week had passed. Id. at 656; see also Robinson at §131(c)(1) at 78. In this hypothetical situation, while the attack itself is not imminent, B’s use of force becomes immediately necessary whenever he has an opportunity to save himself from A.

Fourth, the amount of force should be proportional to the threat. As LaFave and Scott explain, “the amount of force which [the defender] may justifiably use must be reasonably related to the threatened harm which he seeks to avoid.” LaFave and Scott at 651. Thus, one may not use deadly force in response to a threat that does not rise to death or serious bodily harm. If such harm may result, however, deadly force is appropriate. As the Model Penal Code § 3.04(2)(b) states, “[t]he use of deadly force is not justifiable . . . unless the actor believes that such force is necessary to protect himself against death, serious bodily injury, kidnapping or sexual intercourse compelled by force or threat.”

Under the current circumstances, we believe that a defendant accused of violating Section 2340A could have, in certain circumstances, grounds to properly claim the defense of another. The threat of an impending terrorist attack threatens the lives of hundreds if not thousands of American citizens. Whether such a defense will be upheld depends on the specific context within which the interrogation decision is made. If an attack appears increasingly likely, but our intelligence services and armed forces cannot prevent it without the information from the interrogation of a specific individual, then the more likely it will appear that the conduct in question will be seen as necessary. If intelligence and other information support the conclusion that an attack is increasingly certain, then the necessity for the interrogation will be reasonable. The increasing certainty of an attack will also satisfy the imminence requirement. Finally, the fact that previous al Qaeda attacks have had as their aim the deaths of American citizens, and that evidence of other plots have had a similar goal in mind, would justify proportionality of interrogation methods designed to elicit information to prevent such deaths.

To be sure, this situation is different from the usual self-defense justification, and, indeed, it overlaps with elements of the necessity defense. Self-defense as usually discussed involves using force against an individual who is about to conduct the attack. In the current circumstances, however, an enemy combatant in detention does not himself present a threat of harm. He is not actually carrying out the attack; rather, he has participated in the planning and preparation for the attack, or merely has knowledge of the attack through his membership in the terrorist organization. Nonetheless, leading scholarly commentators believe that interrogation of such individuals using methods that might violate Section 2340A would be justified under the doctrine of self-defense, because the combatant by aiding and promoting the terrorist plot “has culpably caused the situation where someone might get hurt. If hurting him is the only means to prevent the death or injury of others put at risk by his actions, such torture should be permissible, and on the same basis that self-defense is permissible.”
Michael S. Moore, *Torture and the Balance of Evils*, 23 Israel L. Rev. 280, 323 (1989) (symposium on Israel’s Landau Commission Report). Thus, some commentators believe that by helping to create the threat of loss of life, terrorists become culpable for the threat even though they do not actually carry out the attack itself. They may be hurt in an interrogation because they are part of the mechanism that has set the attack in motion. Id. at 323, just as is someone who feeds ammunition or targeting information to an attacker. Under the present circumstances, therefore, even though a detained enemy combatant may not be the exact attacker—he is not planting the bomb, or piloting a hijacked plane to kill civilians—he still may be harmed in self-defense if he has knowledge of future attacks because he has assisted in their planning and execution.

Further, we believe that a claim by an individual of the defense of another would be further supported by the fact that, in this case, the nation itself is under attack and has the right to self-defense. This fact can bolster and support an individual claim of self-defense in a prosecution, according to the teaching of the Supreme Court in *In re Neagle*, 135 U.S. 1 (1890). In that case, the State of California arrested and held deputy U.S. Marshal Neagle for shooting and killing the assailant of Supreme Court Justice Field. In granting the writ of habeas corpus for Neagle’s release, the Supreme Court did not rely alone upon the marshal’s right to defend another or his right to self-defense. Rather, the Court found that Neagle, as an agent of the United States and of the executive branch, was justified in the killing because, in protecting Justice Field, he was acting pursuant to the executive branch’s inherent constitutional authority to protect the United States government. Id. at 67 (“We cannot doubt the power of the president to take measures for the protection of a judge of one of the courts of the United States who, while in the discharge of the duties of his office, is threatened with a personal attack which may probably result in his death.”). That authority derives, according to the Court, from the President’s power under Article II to take care that the laws are faithfully executed. In other words, Neagle as a federal officer not only could raise self-defense or defense of another, but also could defend his actions on the ground that he was implementing the Executive Branch’s authority to protect the United States government.

If the right to defend the national government can be raised as a defense in an individual prosecution, as *Neagle* suggests, then a government defendant, acting in his official capacity, should be able to argue that any conduct that arguably violated Section 2340A was undertaken pursuant to more than just individual self-defense or defense of another. In addition, the defendant could claim that he was fulfilling the Executive Branch’s authority to protect the federal government, and the nation, from attack. The September 11 attacks have already triggered that authority, as recognized both under domestic and international law. Following the example of *In re Neagle*, we conclude that a government defendant may also argue that his conduct of an interrogation, if properly authorized, is justified on the basis of protecting the nation from attack.

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25 Moore distinguishes that case from one in which a person has information that could stop a terrorist attack, but who does not take a hand in the terrorist activity itself, such as an innocent person who learns of the attack from her spouse. Moore, 23 Israel L. Rev. at 324. Such individuals, Moore finds, would not be subject to the use of force in self-defense, although they might be under the doctrine of necessity.
There can be little doubt that the nation’s right to self-defense has been triggered under our law. The Constitution announces that one of its purposes is “to provide for the common defense.” U.S. Const., Preamble. Article I, §8 declares that Congress is to exercise its powers to “provide for the common Defence.” See also 2 Pub. Papers of Ronald Reagan 920, 921 (1988–89) (right of self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the U.N. Charter). The President has a particular responsibility and power to take steps to defend the nation and its people. In re Neagle, 135 U.S. at 64. See also U.S. Const., Article IV. §4 (“The United States shall . . . protect [each of the States] against Invasion”).

As Commander-in-Chief and Chief Executive, he may use the armed forces to protect the nation and its people. See, e.g., United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 273 (1990). And he may employ secret agents to aid in his work as Commander-in-Chief. Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105, 106 (1876). As the Supreme Court observed in The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1862), in response to an armed attack on the United States “the President is not only authorized but bound to resist force by force . . . without waiting for any special legislative authority.” Id. at 668. The September 11 events were a direct attack on the United States, and as we have explained above, the President has authorized the use of military force with the support of Congress.26

As we have made clear in other opinions involving the war against al Qaeda, the nation’s right to self-defense has been triggered by the events of September 11. If a government defendant were to harm an enemy combatant during an interrogation in a manner that might arguably violate Section 2340A, he would be doing so in order to prevent further attacks on the United States by the al Qaeda terrorist network. In that case, we believe that he could argue that his actions were justified by the executive branch’s constitutional authority to protect the nation from attack. This national and international version of the right to self-defense could supplement and bolster the government defendant’s individual right.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that torture as defined in and proscribed by Sections 2340–2340A, covers only extreme acts. Severe pain is generally of the kind difficult for the victim to endure. Where the pain is physical, it must be of an

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26 While the President’s constitutional determination alone is sufficient to justify the nation’s resort to self-defense, it also bears noting that the right to self-defense is further recognized under international law. Article 51 of the U.N. Charter declares that “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.” The attacks of September 11, 2001 clearly constitute an armed attack against the United States, and indeed were the latest in a long history of al Qaeda sponsored attacks against the United States. This conclusion was acknowledged by the United Nations Security Council on September 28, 2001, when it unanimously adopted Resolution 1373 explicitly “reaffirming the inherent right of individual and collective self-defense as recognized by the charter of the United Nations.” This right of self-defense is a right to effective self-defense. In other words, the victim state has the right to use force against the aggressor who has initiated an “armed attack” until the threat has abated. The United States, through its military and intelligence personnel, has a right recognized by Article 51 to continue using force until such time as the threat posed by al Qaeda and other terrorist groups connected to the September 11th attacks is completely ended.” Other treaties reaffirm the right of the United States to use force in its self-defense. See, e.g., Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, art. 3, Sept. 2, 1947, T.I.A.S. No. 1838, 21 U.N.T.S. 77 (Rio Treaty); North Atlantic Treaty, art. 5, Apr. 4, 1949, 63 Stat 2241, 34 U.N.T.S. 243.
intensity akin to that which accompanies serious physical injury such as death or organ failure. Severe mental pain requires suffering not just at the moment of infliction, but it also requires lasting psychological harm, such as seen in mental disorders like post-traumatic stress disorder. Additionally, such severe mental pain can arise only from the predicate acts listed in Section 2340A. Because the acts inflicting torture are extreme, there is significant range of acts that though they might constitute cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment fail to rise to the level of torture.

Further, we conclude that under the circumstances of the current war against al Qaeda and its allies, application of Section 2340A to interrogations undertaken pursuant to the President's Commander-in-Chief powers may be unconstitutional. Finally, even if an interrogation method might violate Section 2340A, necessity or self-defense could provide justifications that would eliminate any criminal liability.

Please let us know if we can be of further assistance.

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APPENDIX

Cases in which U.S. courts have concluded the defendant tortured the plaintiff:

- Plaintiff was beaten and shot by government troops while protesting the destruction of her property. See Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 2002 WL 319887 at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2002).
- Plaintiff was removed from ship, interrogated, and held incommunicado for months. Representatives of the defendant threatened her with death if she attempted to move from quarters where she was held. She was forcibly separated from her husband and unable to learn of his welfare or whereabouts. See Simpson v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 180 F. Supp. 2d 78, 88 (D.D.C. 2001) (Rule 12(b)(6) motion).
- Plaintiff was held captive for five days in a small cell that had no lights, no window, no water, and no toilet. During the remainder of his captivity, he was frequently denied food and water and given only limited access to the toilet. He was held at gunpoint, with his captors threatening to kill him if he did not confess to espionage. His captors threatened to cut off his fingers, pull out his fingernails, and shock his testicles. See Daliberti v. Republic of Iraq, 146 F. Supp. 2d 19, 22–23, 25 (D.D.C. 2001) (default judgment).
- Plaintiff was imprisoned for 205 days. He was confined in a car park that had been converted into a prison. His cell had no water or toilet and had only a steel cot for a bed. He was convicted of illegal entry into Iraq and transferred to another facility, where he was placed in a cell infested with vermin. He shared a single toilet with 200 other prisoners. While imprisoned he had a heart attack but was denied adequate medical attention and medication. See Daliberti v. Republic of Iraq, 146 F. Supp. 2d 19, 22–23 (D.D.C. 2001) (default judgment).
- Plaintiff was imprisoned for 126 days. At one point, a guard attempted to execute him, but another guard intervened. A truck transporting the plaintiff ran over a pedestrian at full speed without stopping. He heard other prisoners being