

**FROM SHAM TO SCAM:
Overview of Burma/Myanmar's
Fraudulent Election
(25 Dec 2025 - 31 Jan 2026)**

BN 2026/2119 6 Feb 2026

- Junta boss Min Aung Hlaing led the implementation of repressive electoral amendments to ban parties that won over 90% of seats in 2020, jail critics, and ensure the victory of the military-controlled USDP.
- Although the junta designed the polls to legitimize itself and appease China, the sham election deteriorated from a stage-managed process to overwhelming violence and fraud.
- To ensure tight military control, voting was held in 3 phases - Phase 1 (28 Dec 2025), Phase 2 (11 Jan 2026), and Phase 3 (25 Jan 2026).
- During 20 Dec 2025 - 30 Jan 2026, there were 1,288 armed clashes and attacks against civilians, which killed 281 civilians in 178 (out of 330) townships. The junta launched 308 airstrikes across 89 townships.
- Meanwhile, 404 people were charged under the junta's Election Protection Law, with 9 receiving lengthy jail sentences of up to 49 years.
- The polls took place as the junta held nearly 23,000 political prisoners - the highest number in SE Asia. The number of political prisoners continued to rise during and after the polls.
- 67 townships and 4,000 wards and village tracts were excluded from the sham poll. An estimated 10.5 million voters were excluded, while another 11 million boycotted. In Chin State alone, less than 5% of voters participated.
- Despite disinformation, intimidation, and threats, the junta's USDP won on an abysmal voter turnout of 13.1 million votes, compared with 25.9 million votes cast in the 2020 general election.
- The junta's intention to resume forced conscription and its regressive economic approach make economic recovery and conflict reduction almost impossible.
- Meanwhile, the junta continues to supply Russia with bombs to be used in Ukraine, and colludes with Iran on sanction-busting, making it a greater threat to regional and international stability.

CONTENTS

The junta's Desperate Gamble for Legitimacy
Free & Fair? Think Forced & Flawed 3
 Limited control + public boycott = "joke" 3
 Coercion & fraud 4
 Intimidation & violence fail to raise turnout 4
 Advance Voting manipulation overrides election rejection 5
 USDP buys Rohingya votes with citizenship promise: "diversity" party makes genocide policy 6
 Silencing dissent through violence & arrests... 6
Sham Election Outcomes 7
Worsening Conflict 8
 Attacks & airstrikes during the sham election.. 9
Resistance to the Sham Polls..... 10
International Response..... 11
Prognosis: What's Next? 12
 Armed conflict set to continue 12
 The junta will step up forced conscription 13
Rohingya between Genocide & Conscription 13
 Rohingya continue to be persecuted; "new govt" offers no resolution 13
 Safe return for Rohingya currently impossible..... 14
Sham Election - Sham Economics 14
Glossary: Sham Election Political Parties.... 16
Addendum: States & Regions Breakdown ... 17

This brief provides a summarized overview of all 3 phases of the sham election. Overview of Phases 1 & 2:

[Phase 1 Overview](#) [Phase 2 Overview](#)

More detailed summaries are available at:

[Digest covering 25 Dec – 27 Dec \(noon\)](#)

[Digest covering 27 Dec – 28 Dec \(noon\)](#)

[Digest covering 28 Dec – 29 Dec \(noon\)](#)

[Digest covering 29 Dec – 30 Dec \(noon\)](#)

[Digest covering 30 Dec – 5 Jan \(noon\)](#)

[Digest covering 5 Jan – 11 Jan \(noon\)](#)

[Digest covering 11 Jan – 12 Jan \(noon\)](#)

[Digest covering 12 Jan – 14 Jan \(noon\)](#)

[Digest covering 14 Jan - 21 Jan \(noon\)](#)

[Digest covering 21 Jan – 25 Jan \(noon\)](#)

[Digest covering 25 Jan – 26 Jan \(noon\)](#)

[Digest covering 26 Jan– 28 Jan \(noon\)](#)

Sham election news since 2021:

[Sham election tracker.](#)

The junta's desperate gamble for legitimacy

- The junta's "election" was aimed to appease China and persuade the international community to restore economic and diplomatic relations.
- Instead, it highlighted the junta's limited control and international rejection of the regime.
- Despite widespread threats, coercion, and disinformation to force people in military-controlled areas to vote, the junta got only half the votes cast in the 2020 elections (which the junta overturned through its attempted coup).
- Over 11 million voters boycotted the fraudulent process, while another 10.5 million in resistance areas were excluded.

Burma/Myanmar's military began a coup on 1 Feb 2021 to prevent the convening of parliament by MPs elected during the Nov 2020 election. Since then, the junta has embarked on **unprecedented violence against civilians** in a war to regain territory from the nationwide resistance and to crush the democracy movement.

Five years on from the attempted coup, the regime finally carried out its long-promised "election." Not surprisingly, this process turned out to be **no more than a violent and fraudulent process**.

Lacking both *de jure* legitimacy - the regime's *coup d'état* violated its own military-drafted constitution - and *de facto* legitimacy - the junta controls **less than 50% of Burma's territory**, the election was nothing but a ploy intended to restore foreign relations and appease China.

The polls were led by junta boss Min Aung Hlaing, who desperately needed to shore up trust and some form of legitimacy. The regime's allies were frustrated with its daily atrocity crimes, flailing economy, and incompetence. The sham election was promoted as "**an exit strategy**" – for the international community to feel hopeful for an end to conflict, and for the regime to justify that their crimes would lead to stability and to encourage a return to "business as usual."


This ploy failed. Widespread coercion, dragging residents to the polls, threats of conscription, jail time, and rejection of travel documents, all largely failed to boost the turnout. Burma's residents defied the illegitimate polls with **silent strikes and extensive boycotts**, and demanded the international rejection of the regime's fraudulent, violent, and incompetent "election."

The junta's extreme violence (1,288 attacks including 308 airstrikes within the 6-week period around voting), malfunctioning voting machines, outright fraud, and arrests of civilians for allegedly "disrupting the election process" compelled international **organizations to overwhelmingly condemn the polls**.

Territorial Control of Burma

(as of 08 Dec 2025)

- Largely junta control (150)
- Largely resistance control (66)
- Contested (114)



Largely junta control (+75% of township area controlled by junta)
Largely resistance control (+75% of township area controlled by resistance)
Contested (±50% - ±50% of township area)

Map: ALTSEAN-Burma • Source: Nathan Ruser, Rafal R., Thomas van Linge • Created with Datawrapper

Free & Fair? Think Forced & Flawed

- Polls marred by overwhelming reports of malfunctioning voter machines, coercion, violence, and fraud - secures USDP “win.”
- Only half the number of polling stations, and half the votes compared to 2020 G E.
- 10.5 million voters (30+%) eligible voters excluded from polls, and another 11 million (30+%) boycotted. Junta gains “election” mandate from just 13.1 million (38%) votes.

The junta destroyed genuine political competition by **dissolving or blocking parties that won over 90% of seats** in the 2020 general election, most notably, the National League of Democracy (NLD) and the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy (SNLD). The junta ensured its proxy, Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), could dominate by default.

Even among the 34 parties that supported the military’s 2021 attempted coup, only 8 won seats. The junta forcibly dissolved 14 other parties before polls, while the remainder lost seats.¹ The USDP captured the overwhelming majority of seats; many without contest, and some without a single voter, through **fraud, coercion, electronic voting machine manipulation, and violence,**

Limited territorial control and public boycotts make process a “joke”


The junta’s fake election failed even on its own terms. It managed to conduct **polling in only 39.86% of the country’s territory**, excluding 67 entire townships and an additional 4,000 village tracts and wards across 131 of the townships where limited polling was held.²

Compared to the 2020 general election, the junta-backed Union Election Commission (UEC) admitted they had **almost halved** the number of polling stations from 39,963 to just 21,517 stations.³

2025-2026 Sham Election


The junta’s sham election was staged across only 39.86% of Burma’s territory, excluding over 30% of total eligible voters—about 10.5 million people—who live in areas outside regime control.

- Area excluded from election (352,474 km²)
- Area where election held (267,854 km²)
- Uninhabited area (51,610 km²)



The voter count was synthesized from multiple sources, including the 2014 census, 2020 GAD population data, UNHCR displacement figures, and World Bank population growth rates.

Map: ALTSEAN-Burma • Source: UEC, GAD, MoIP, UNHCR, WB • Created with Datawrapper



¹ [Burma Associated Press \(26 Jan 2026\)](#) စစ်တပ်ကို အာဏာသိမ်းဖို့ တိုက်တွန်းခဲ့တဲ့ပါတီတွေထဲက ရွေးကောက်ပွဲမှာ စ ပါတီ နှင်၊ ၁၂ ပါတီ ရှုံး ပြီး ၁၄ ပါတီ က ပယ်ဖျက်ခံထားရ

² [DVB \(28 Dec 2025\)](#) ၉ မြို့နယ်ရှိ ရပ်ကွက်နှင့် ကျေးရွာအုပ်စု ၁,၀၀၀ ကျော်၌ ရွေးကောက်ပွဲမလုပ်နိုင်ဟု ကြေညာ

³ [BBC Burmese \(28 Dec 2025\)](#) စစ်တပ်ရွေးကောက်ပွဲ - တစ်နိုင်ငံလုံး မဲရပေါင်း နှစ်သောင်းကျော်ရှိတယ်လို့ဆို

A dismal voter turnout was reported across the majority of polling areas. Residents reported a **record-low turnout in Yangon**, and **empty polling stations** were seen across the region - a stark contrast to the queues of eager voters in 2020.⁴ In Thailand, where approximately 6 million people from Burma reside, only about **250 people** voted.⁵ In Chin State, less than 5% of voter-aged residents cast a vote.⁶

ALTSEAN-Burma calculated that the regime's "nationwide election" **excluded about 10.5 million voters**, or 30% of all eligible voters, from voting. This included over 4 million from the 67 excluded townships and over 6.4 million in excluded village tracts and wards in 131 included townships.

Calculations: <https://tinyurl.com/yz7a4xm3>

In Burma, there are an estimated 35 million eligible voters.⁷ However, the junta announced only 24.22 million eligible voters across the 263 townships it could hold polling in. Despite this, **only 13.14 million people voted**, many by force, revealing the fundamental illegitimacy of the process.⁸ An estimated **11.08 million eligible voters boycotted**.

Voter turnout was **almost half of the 2020 general election turnout** at 25.9 million. Following the 3 phases, the UEC claimed a 55% voter turnout, considerably lower than the 2020 general election turnout which was 76%.⁹ Over 10.5 million citizens — 30% of the total eligible population (35 million) — were excluded from voting entirely.¹⁰ Thus, the sham election claimed a mandate from a mere 38% of the national electorate.

Coercion & Fraud

- **The junta weaponized the vote through widespread coercion and threats, including door-to-door intimidation, forced conscription, job termination, denial of essential documents, and physical dragging to polling stations, yet still faced mass boycott and dismal turnout.**
- **It systematically used fraudulent advance ballots to manufacture USDP "victories."**
- **The regime enforced the sham process through violent repression, arrests, and forced voting, while openly promoting perpetrators of genocide.**

Where voting did occur, the junta turned the ballot into a weapon. Administrators, militias, and security forces **forced people to vote** under threat of arrest, door-to-door intimidation, **forced conscription**, rejection of travel documents, overseas travel bans, confiscation of border passes, job termination, fines, and **denial of aid**, compensation, or **replacement land for homes destroyed by fire**.

Intimidation, violence, and fear fail to raise voter turnout

The junta enforced voting through threats and intimidation. The regime ordered junta staff, soldiers' families, and overseas staff to vote for the USDP and provide proof of voting.¹¹ Junta officials also ordered factories and workshops to shut down, then forced factory managers to make workers vote, though many bravely refused.¹² The USDP pressured **IDPs who had been displaced by armed conflict to vote in**

⁴ [Mizzima \(25 Jan 2026\) Voter participation hits record low in Yangon as final phase of general election concludes](#)

⁵ [Myanmar Now \(28 Dec 2025\) အကြောက်တရားကြောင့် အချို့တွေ စစ်တပ်ရွေးကောက်ပွဲတွင် မဲထည့်ခဲ့ကြရသည်](#)

⁶ [DVB \(7 Jan 2026\) စစ်တပ် ရွေးကောက်ပွဲကို ချင်းပြည်နယ်က ပြည်သူ ၈၀ ရာခိုင်နှုန်းကျော် မဲမပေး](#)

⁷ [Union Election Commission \(2024\) ဆန္ဒမဲပေးမှုအခြေအနေ စစ်ဆေးတွေ့ရှိချက်များ](#)

⁸ [Global New Light of Myanmar \(25 Jan 2026\) International Election Observers Welcomed, Briefed on Phase III General Election](#)

⁹ [IFES \(6 Feb 2026\) Myanmar](#)

¹⁰ [Union Election Commission \(2024\) ဆန္ဒမဲပေးမှုအခြေအနေ စစ်ဆေးတွေ့ရှိချက်များ](#)

¹¹ [DVB \(28 Dec 2025\) ဝန်ထမ်းများမဲပေးပြီးကြောင်း အထောက်အထား တင်ပြရန် စစ်ကောင်စီ အကျပ်ကိုင်](#)

¹² [DVB \(25 Jan 2026\) စစ်ကောင်စီ အလုပ်သမားဝန်ကြီး အလုပ်သမားများထံမှ မဲရရန် ခက်ခဲ](#)

exchange for food or compensation for lost land.¹³ **Polling stations were placed inside military compounds**, and junta soldiers **guarded them with armed personnel**, instilling fear in voters.¹⁴

In the days leading up to polling and on voting days, the junta **increased security patrols, deployed police vehicles**, summoned residents by phone, and used loudspeakers to order people to vote. In Mandalay Region, the junta violently forced locals to vote in Phase 3 polls, including by **physically dragging individuals** from their homes to polling stations. Families with conscription-aged members reported voting solely out of fear that refusal would lead to **forced recruitment**.¹⁵ Administrative chaos enabled further fraud. One voter in Chanmyathazi Township (Mandalay Region) was **forced to vote twice** in separate townships for phases 2 and 3.¹⁶

Even under these coercive tactics, **voter turnout remained very low nationwide, with only 13.1 million of 24.2 million eligible voters included in the sham polls** (compared to 29.5 million who voted in 2020). Empty polling stations and early closures were reported, including in Yangon Region. Despite fear, people largely boycotted the sham election, demonstrating a **clear rejection of the regime, its fake parliament, and the illegitimate institutions produced by this process**.

Advanced Voting manipulation overrides the election rejection

In the 2010 sham election, the junta’s USDP was accused of **manipulating advance votes** to secure seats. During the 2025 sham polling period, advanced voting once again became the regime’s primary tool to reverse results it did not like.¹⁷ In early Jan 2026, the Shan and Nationalities Democratic Party (SNDP), Myanmar Farmers Development Party (MFDP), and People’s Party (PP) - 3 of the 6 nationally contesting parties - complained to the UEC that **“excessively high” numbers of advance votes had altered results across several constituencies**.¹⁸ It appeared the military and the USDP was up to its old tricks.

Despite Burma’s election laws, which stipulate that only certain groups of people can vote in advance,¹⁹ regime troops and police **sealed off village entrances** and went door-to-door across Thegon and Waw townships (Bago Region) and forced residents to vote in advance. The regime **ditched the electronic voting machines and explicitly instructed 1 person from each house to tick USDP on a paper ballot** on behalf of every person in the household, then collected the forged votes in plastic rubbish bags.²⁰

In Yangon’s highly populated Insein Township, at least 240 advance votes arrived without the attached voter lists and were counted despite objections by contesting parties.²¹ Residents across multiple Yangon townships reported that local administrators had **pre-filled advance ballots for “guest list” residents** who never voted. Authorities claimed these individuals were exempt from voting, yet their ballots were counted automatically.²²

¹³ [DVB \(26 Dec 2025\) ဘားအံတွင် စစ်ရှောင်များကို မဲပေးမှ ထောက်ပံ့ကြေးရမည်ဟု ကြံ့ခိုင်ရေးပါတီက ဖိအားပေး](#)

¹⁴ [Mizzima \(28 Dec 2025\) သံတောင်ကြီးတွင် စစ်ကော်မရှင်တပ်နှင့် မိသားစုများသာ မဲပေးခွင့်ရ အရပ်သားများ ချန်လှပ်ခံရ](#)

¹⁵ [Irrawaddy \(27 Jan 2026\) Mandalay Residents ‘Pressured to Vote’ in Myanmar Junta’s Election](#)

¹⁶ [Irrawaddy \(27 Jan 2026\) Mandalay Residents ‘Pressured to Vote’ in Myanmar Junta’s Election](#)

¹⁷ [Irrawaddy \(6 Jan 2026\) Same Old Playbook? USDP Accused of Repeating 2010 Advance-Vote Cheating](#)

¹⁸ [Irrawaddy \(6 Jan 2026\) Same Old Playbook? USDP Accused of Repeating 2010 Advance-Vote Cheating; DVB \(24 Jan 2026\) ရွေးကောက်ပွဲ အပိုင်း ၃ ကျင်းပမည့်မြို့နယ်များ၌ လုံခြုံရေးတင်းကျပ်](#)

¹⁹ [Mizzima \(23 Jan 2026\) ပဲခူးရှိ လုံခြုံရေးစိုးရိမ်သည့် နေရာအချို့တွင် ရွေးကောက်ပွဲနေ့မတိုင်ခင် မဲရုံဖွင့်ပြီး မဲကြိုပေးခိုင်း](#)

²⁰ [DVB \(23 Jan 2026\) ဝေါမြို့နယ်၌ စစ်တပ်က ကြံ့ခိုင်ရေးပါတီအတွက် မဲစာရွက်ပေါ် အမှန်ခြစ်ခိုင်းပြီး မဲမသမာမှုလုပ်; Mizzima \(23 Jan 2026\) ပဲခူးရှိ လုံခြုံရေးစိုးရိမ်သည့် နေရာအချို့တွင် ရွေးကောက်ပွဲနေ့မတိုင်ခင် မဲရုံဖွင့်ပြီး မဲကြိုပေးခိုင်း](#)

²¹ [DVB \(12 Jan 2026\) စစ်ခေါင်းဆောင် လာရောက်ခဲ့သည့် အင်းစိန်မြို့နယ်၌ ကြိုတင်မဲ မသမာမှုဖြစ်](#)

²² [DVB \(13 Jan 2026\) ဧည့်စာရင်းဖြင့်နေထိုင်သူများ ကိုယ်တိုင် မဲမထည့်ရဘဲ အလိုအလျောက် ကြိုတင်မဲ ထည့်ပြီးသားဖြစ်နေ](#)

Across dozens of townships, **USDP candidates lost in-person voting** but “won” after the sudden appearance of inflated advance ballots. In Shan State alone, the SNDP lost its stronghold of Mongpan Township—which it had held since 2010—to the USDP, after an influx of nearly 2,000 advance votes overturned the machine results.

In Madaya (Mandalay Region), Mongyawng, and Tangyan townships (Shan State), the late arrival of advance votes from junta troops and police twisted the results in favor of the USDP. The SNDP added that there was no transparency or consistency in the advance voting process, leading to concerns of fraud.²³

Additionally, the junta **manipulated and favored USDP through its rigged voting machines**. A PP candidate for Kawhmu Township (Yangon Region) reported that a Myanmar Electronic Voting Machine (MEVM) in his constituency **registered votes for a “major party” (implied USDP) 6 out of 12 times, regardless of the button pressed**. Also, in Kungyangon Township (Yangon Region), the specific button for the PP was broken, and officials admitted the problem only after a voter pointed it out.²⁴

USDP buys Rohingya votes with citizenship promise; “diversity” party makes genocide policy

During the campaign, the junta-proxy USDP reportedly **bribed Rohingya with cash and ID cards** for votes. The persecuted Rohingya have previously had their citizenship and national rights illegally stripped from them, making the buying of votes with ID promises an even more distorted form of exploitation.²⁵

Its ultra-nationalist ally, the ironically-named Peace and Diversity Party, officially **adopted genocide as policy**, vowing to continue genocidal atrocities against Rohingya.²⁶ Most perversely, the USDP fielded former LID 33 commander, Lt. Gen. Aung Aung, notorious for his role in carrying out the 2017 Rohingya genocide, for the Pyithu Hluttaw seat in Taunggyi Constituency (S. Shan State).²⁷ Although defeated, his candidacy proved that the regime continued to promote perpetrators over accountability and rejected vetting, lustration, and any plan of non-recurrence.

Silencing election dissent through violence and arrests

The junta enacted and weaponized the so-called Election Protection Law to criminalize criticism and opposition. During Sep 2025-19 Jan 2026, the junta **charged at least 404 civilians** for alleged “election interference.”²⁸ On 20 Sep, the junta sentenced **2 young men each to 49 years in prison and a 19-year-old woman to 42 years**, for putting up anti-election posters in Yangon.²⁹ The junta arrested civilians for protesting, refusing to vote, or criticizing the process online. Even “liking” a critical social media post was enough to be charged under the illegal law.

Throughout all phases, the junta imposed **internet and telecommunications blackouts** and jammers in polling areas to restrict information flow and accountability.³⁰ The junta and its notorious Pyu Saw Htee militiamen **obstructed and harassed national and international reporters**, blocked filming, and forced

²³ [DVB \(12 Jan 2026\) ကျားဖြူပါတီ မဲပေးစက်တွင် နိုင်ပြီး ကြိုတင်မဲတွင် ရှုံးနိမ့်ဟု ပါတီဥက္ကဋ္ဌပြော](#)

²⁴ [BBC Burmese \(12 Jan 2026\) ရွေးကောက်ပွဲအပိုင်း ၂ အလွဲတွေနဲ့ ပတ်သက်လို့ PPP နဲ့ ပြည်သူ့ပါတီ ဘာပြောလဲ](#)

²⁵ [DVB \(30 Dec 2025\) ဒေါက်တာအေးမောင် နှင့် ဦးဘရှိန် တို့ မဲရှုံး](#); [DMG \(19 Dec 2025\) စစ်တွေတွင် မွတ်ဆလင်များထံမှ စစ်ကောင်စီ ဝန်ထမ်းများ ငွေညှစ်နေ](#)

²⁶ [Myanmar Now \(19 Jan 2026\) Myanmar nationalist stands by calls to kill Rohingya during genocide hearings](#)

²⁷ [Myanmar Now \(2 Jan 2026\) Myanmar general linked to Rohingya atrocities loses bid for election](#)

²⁸ [DVB \(21 Jan 2026\) စစ်တပ်၏ရွေးကောက်ပွဲကို ဆန့်ကျင်ဝေဖန်မှုဖြင့် ဖမ်းဆီးခံရသူ ၄၀၀ ကျော်ရှိလာ](#)

²⁹ [AAPP \(2 Feb 2026\) What's happening in Myanmar](#)

³⁰ [Myanmar Internet Project \(29 Jan 2026\) Digital Repression During the Three Phases of the Sham Election](#)

independent media to operate under constant fear.³¹ In Mandalay city, junta security personnel harassed foreign journalists covering the sham election and prevented them from filming.³²

The junta also **targeted its own allies**. Security forces raided and placed People’s Pioneer Party (PPP) chair Thet Thet Khine, a former junta minister, under house arrest after she criticized the lack of a level playing field. The UEC threatened to deregister her party and **arrested her and a PPP central executive committee member** for a “secret” meeting with “individuals from an embassy.”³³ Other parties that raised complaints about fraud faced intimidation or legal threats, while the UEC openly warned that **criticizing the USDP was a crime**.³⁴ On Jan 8, People’s Party candidate Lwin Myint was sentenced to one year’s jail with hard labor for using the words “revolution” and “uprising” on social media.³⁵

As the UN Special Rapporteur on Burma, Tom Andrews, stated, this election **deepens the crisis and will only entrench junta rule**.³⁶ It strips millions of their political rights, turns daily survival into a tool of coercion, expands surveillance and future conscription risks, and slams shut any peaceful path to change. The junta has not earned legitimacy through this process; it has exposed its fear of the people.


Sham Election Outcomes

- **Junta-proxy USDP secures unsurprising “win.”**
- **Inclusive of military quota, junta/USDP control 91% of seats in Pyithu Hluttaw (Lower House) and 77% in Amyotha Hluttaw (Upper House).**
- **Of the 13 uncontested seats seized by the USDP, 11 seats (87%) were won by the NLD in 2020.**


Having dissolved parties that won over 90% of seats in the 2020 general election, the junta was able to ensure that their proxy USDP won almost all seats in both Pyithu Hluttaw (Lower House/House of Representatives) and Amyotha Hluttaw (Upper House/House of Nationalities) that form Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (Union Parliament).

In the scam election, USDP secured 13 uncontested seats in the Pyithu Hluttaw and 13 uncontested seats in State and Regional Hluttaws. Out of 13 seats that USDP seized in Pyithu Hluttaw uncontested, **87% or 11 seats were won by the NLD in the 2020 general election**.³⁷ For

Pyithu Hluttaw Seat Distribution



Amyotha Hluttaw Seat Distribution



³¹ [DVB \(25 Jan 2026\) လှိုင်သာယာ ရွေးကောက်ပွဲ၌ သတင်းသမားများကို ဖျက်ဆီး](#)

³² [DVB \(25 Jan 2026\) ရွေးကောက်ပွဲအပိုင်း ၃ ကြည့်ရှုရန် စစ်ခေါင်းဆောင် မန္တလေး](#)

³³ [Irrawaddy \(17 Dec 2025\) ရွေးကောက်ပွဲ “တရားမျှတမှု” ဝင်ပြိုင်မယ့်ပါတီတွေပါ မေးခွန်းထုတ်လာ](#); [Myanmar Now \(15 Jan 2026\) Former junta minister faces legal threat after alleged unauthorised meeting with diplomats](#)

³⁴ [DVB \(6 Jan 2026\) ပြိုင်ဘက်ပါတီကို ပုတ်ခတ်မဲဆွယ်ပါက ပြစ်မှုမြောက်ဟု UEC ဥက္ကဋ္ဌ ခြိမ်းခြောက်](#)

³⁵ [Eleven \(9 Jan 2026\) People’s Party Candidate sentenced to one year in prison over campaign language](#)

³⁶ [DVB \(9 Jan 2026\) စစ်ယကောင်စီ ၏ယရုံးဝေးယကောင်စီ ဝှံ့တရားမဝင်ဟု ကိုလယပ ဝေတ](#)

³⁷ [UEC \(1 Feb 2021\) ပြည်သူ့လွှတ်တော်ကိုယ်စားလှယ်လောင်း တစ်ဦးချင်းစီ၏ ဆန္ဒမဲရရှိမှုအခြေအနေ \(၂၀၂၀ ပြည့်နှစ်၊ အထွေထွေရွေးကောက်ပွဲ\)](#)

more comparative analysis, refer to the [2020 Election Result and 2025 Sham Poll Comparison for Uncontested Constituencies](#).

In the Pyithu Hluttaw, the junta-proxy USDP seized **231 out of 263** seats. Combined with the 110 “constitutional quota” military seats, the junta now controls 340 of 373 seats, which is **91.42%** of all seats (sham election + military quota) in Pyithu Hluttaw. Another junta proxy, the National Unity Party (NUP), was also granted 4 seats. The ethnic parties won spare seats in their states: 7 seats by SNDP, 5 seats by the Pa-O National Organization (PNO), 5 seats by the Mon Unity Party (MUP), 4 seats by the Naga National Party, 6 seats in total by 6 other parties, and 1 independent candidate.

Seats Grabbed	Pyithu Hluttaw (Lower House)	Amyotha Hluttaw (Upper)
USDP	231	108
Others	32	49
Military Quota	110	56
Total seats	373	213
USDP + Military Quota	341	164
Percentage Seized	91.42%	77.00%

In the Amyotha Hluttaw, the junta-proxy USDP seized **108 out of 157** seats. Combined with the 56 “constitutional quota” military seats, the junta now controls **164 of 213** seats, which is **77.00%** of all seats (sham election + military quota) in Amyotha Hluttaw.

Thanks to the Proportional Representation system (PR system) imposed by the junta, another junta proxy, NUP, was also granted 17 seats, while PP occupied 6 seats. The ethnic parties won spare seats in their states: 5 seats by MUP, 3 seats each by Arakan Front Party (AFP), Kayin National Democratic Party (KNDP), and Zomi National Party (ZNP), 2 seats by PNO, and 1 seat each by 11 ethnic parties.



Parties that billed themselves as “pro-democracy,” such as Ko Ko Gyi’s PP and Thet Thet Khine’s PPP, hoped to benefit from the vacuum caused by the NLD and SNLD’s exclusion. However, they gained no seats in Pyithu Hluttaw. However, in Amyotha Hluttaw, PP was granted 6 seats from the PR system, despite not winning in any of the First-Past-The-Post (FPTP) constituencies.

For full results: [view our Sham Election Results Table](#).

Worsening Conflict

- **Conflict continued to increase unabated in the lead-up to, and during, the sham polls.**
- **The regime increased airstrikes, from 91 in 2021 to 2,898 in 2025, to reach civilian targets in resistance-controlled territory.**
- **Since 2021, 62,596 armed clashes and attacks on civilians have killed almost 17,000 civilians in 327 townships (99% of Burma’s territory).**

The conflict in Burma is still increasing after the attempted coup amid the junta’s sham election. ACLED conflict figures clearly show that armed clashes and attacks against civilians continue to increase.



During 1 Feb 2021 - 30 Jan 2026, there were **62,596** armed clashes and attacks against civilians, which killed **16,874 civilians** in **327 townships**.³⁸ This means that conflict has reached **99% of Burma** (327 out of 330 townships) since 2021. In 2025 alone, there were **11,763 armed clashes and attacks** against civilians, which killed **3,397 civilians**.³⁹

While the conflict figures remain high, the junta has intensified aerial attacks using aircraft, jet fighters, gyrocopters, paramotors, surveillance drones, and suicide drones.

During 1 Feb 2021 - 30 Jan 2026, the junta launched **6,433 airstrikes** in **190 townships**, i.e. in **57%** of the 330 townships of Burma. Since 2021, the junta has dramatically increased its number of airstrikes, killing more civilians every year.⁴⁰

Attacks and Airstrikes during the Sham Election

- **Junta violence increased from election Phase 1 - Phase 3, the number of airstrikes worsened from phase to phase, and killed increasing numbers of civilians.**
- **The increased violence and plans for more forced conscription are serious indicators that conflict will not ease in 2026.**
- **During the 6 weeks of the sham election period (20 Dec '25 - 30 Jan '26), 1,288 attacks, including 308 airstrikes, killed 281 civilians.**
- **There was no significant reduction of violence despite the election. During the same period a year prior (20 Dec 2024 - 30 Jan 2025), the junta launched 220 airstrikes (i.e. nearly 30% less). There were 1,384 armed clashes and attacks against civilians, which killed 351 civilians.**⁴¹

Throughout the 3 phases of the sham election, the junta executed **a systematic campaign of terror** to secure polling territory and coerce voter participation. The junta's strategy relied heavily on aerial attacks to compensate for a lack of ground control, with targeted airstrikes on civilian infrastructure, mass arson, and the deliberate displacement of rural populations in resistance-controlled areas.

Phase 1 of the sham election was marked by immediate violence to clear areas for polling. During 20 Dec 2025 - 2 Jan 2026 (Phase 1 voting day on 28 Dec), there were **425 armed clashes and attacks**, including 84 airstrikes, which killed **84 civilians** across 121 townships. Voting was carried out in 102 townships.⁴² On 27 Dec, in Khin-U Township (Sagaing Region), junta air forces **massacred 9 civilians and injured 10 others in a targeted bombing** of a truck rest stop immediately following drone reconnaissance.⁴³ On 30 Dec, in Arakan State's Thandwe Township, a junta airstrike on a house in Ngapali town **killed 9 civilians, including children, and injured at least 10 others.**⁴⁴

During 3 - 16 Jan 2026 (Phase 2 voting day on 11 Jan), violence escalated with **475 attacks on civilians** across 125 townships. Only 100 townships were included in Phase 2 polling. The junta launched **109 airstrikes**, 30% more than in Phase 1, and killed 80 civilians. **On 8 Jan alone**, in Wetlet and Wuntho townships (Sagaing Region), **the junta dropped 60 bombs**, destroying homes and infrastructure in resistance-controlled villages.⁴⁵ On 15 Jan, in Natogyi Township (Mandalay Region), 2 junta fighter jets

³⁸ ACLED (04 Feb 2026) Data Accessed 04 Feb 2026

³⁹ ACLED (04 Feb 2026) Data Accessed 04 Feb 2026

⁴⁰ ACLED (04 Feb 2026) Data Accessed 04 Feb 2026

⁴¹ ACLED (04 Feb 2026) Data Accessed 04 Feb 2026

⁴² ACLED (04 Feb 2026) Data Accessed 04 Feb 2026

⁴³ [Myanmar Now \(28 Dec 2025\) ခင်ဦးမြို့နယ်တွင် စားသောက်ဆိုင်တန်း ဗုံးကြဲပစ်ခတ်ခံရပြီး ဇူဦးသေ](#)

⁴⁴ [BBC Burmese \(30 Dec 2025\) AA ထိန်းချုပ်သံတွဲ ငလလီမြို့ပေါ်လေ the ကြောင်းတိုက်ခံရမှု ဇူဦးတက်မနည်း သေဆုံး](#)

⁴⁵ [DVB \(9 Jan 2026\) ဝက်လက်နှင့် ဝန်းသိုမြို့နယ်တို့ကို စစ်တပ်က ဗုံးအလုံး ၆၀ နီးပါးကြဲချ လူနေအိမ်များမီးလောင်](#)

bombed a Football for Friendship match, killed at least 4 people and injured around 30 others.⁴⁶ The junta had been unable to hold polling in neither Wetlet nor Natogyi township, indicating that the regime targeted civilians to force terrorized residents to flee to junta-controlled areas.

The final phase of the sham election, covering 17 - 30 Jan 2026, saw a **46% increase in civilian fatalities** as the regime punished people outside of voting areas. The regime conducted **155 airstrikes, almost doubling the 84 airstrikes** during Phase 1. **On 22 Jan alone, the regime committed 2 massacres.** In Bhamo Township (Kachin State), the junta conducted airstrikes on residents preparing for a **funeral ceremony**, killed 21 civilians and injured 28 others.⁴⁷ Bhamo was included in Phase 3 polling. On the same day, in Aunglan Township (Magway Region), junta airstrikes on a **wedding reception** killed at least 5 civilians.⁴⁸ Aunglan had already voted during Phase 1 of the sham polls. These incidents clearly showed the junta’s intention to cause mass civilian fatalities.

Throughout its so-called “election”, the regime waged a targeted, violent, and deadly campaign against the civilians of Burma. **With such incriminating evidence of its escalating crimes, there is no chance the regime intends to reduce or de-escalate violence in the post-polling period.**

	Armed clashes & attacks on civilians	Airstrikes	Civilian Fatalities	No. Townships Affected
20 Dec 2025 - 2 Jan 2026 (Phase 1 Vote: 28 Dec)	425	84	84	122
3 Jan 2026 - 16 Jan 2026 (Phase 2 Vote: 11 Jan)	475	109	80	125
17 Jan 2026 - 30 Jan 2026 (Phase 3 Vote: 25 Jan)	388	155	117	102
Total	1,288	308	281	N/A

Resistance to the sham polls

- Resistance across Burma, both peaceful and armed, strongly rejected the sham polls.
- From mass street protests, boycotts, and prison hunger strikes to lone defiance, the people resisted.
- Resistance forces disrupted polling activity nationwide, including targeting junta boss Min Aung Hlaing.

Across all 3 phases of the junta’s sham election, resistance continued despite violence and crackdowns. During the lead-up to, and during each voting phase, the people of Burma, resistance groups, the NLD and other pro-democracy parties, and international stakeholders rejected the sham election through boycotts, protests, and direct disruption of election preparations.

On 28 Dec (Phase 1 voting day), in Hpa-An, Hpapun, and Thaton townships (Karen and Mon states), around **7,500 locals marched** to protest the sham election.⁴⁹ On the same day, political prisoners in Thayarwaddy, Paungde, and Pyay prisons (Bago Region) launched **hunger strikes and silent protests** to oppose the polls.⁵⁰ On 11 Jan 2026, in Kyauktada Township (Yangon Region), a brave, lone protester, 21-year-old Min

⁴⁶ [DVB \(17 Jan 2026\)](#) နွားထိုးကြီးက ချစ်ကြည်ရေးဘောလုံးပွဲကို စစ်တပ်ဗုံးကြဲ ၄ ဦးသေပြီး အများအပြား ဒဏ်ရာရ

⁴⁷ [BBC \(23 Jan 2026\)](#) ဗန်းမော်-ကောင်ဂျာထီးလင်းရွာ လေကြောင်းဗုံးကြဲမှု အယောက် ၂၀ ကျော်သေဆုံး

⁴⁸ [DVB \(23 Jan 2026\)](#) အောင်လံမြို့နယ်၌ မင်္ဂလာဆောင်မဏ္ဍပ်ကို စစ်တပ်ဗုံးကြဲ ၅ ဦးထက်မနည်းသေဆုံးပြီး အများအပြားဒဏ်ရာရ

⁴⁹ [People's Spring via Facebook \(29 Dec 2025\)](#) <https://tinyurl.com/yurd9c7.w>

⁵⁰ [DVB \(28 Dec 2025\)](#) ပဲခူးတိုင်း အကျဉ်းထောင် ၃ ခု၌ နိုင်ငံရေးအကျဉ်းသားများက ရွေးကောက်ပွဲကို ကန့်ကွက် ဆန္ဒပြ

Htet, raised a sign reading “Reject the Illegal Election” outside Yangon City Hall during the junta boss’s visit to “inspect” polling stations. Junta forces swiftly arrested him.⁵¹

Beyond peaceful protests, resistance groups attacked polling stations and pro-junta party offices before polls opened in every phase of the sham election. During 25 Dec 2025 - 30 Jan 2026, there were at least **23** resistance attacks on sham polling infrastructure, including polling stations, UEC convoys, and junta allied party offices.

On 6 Jan, in Myothit Township (Magway Region), the Naypyidaw People’s Defence Force (PDF) ambushed a convoy carrying a top junta UEC official and killed his assistant, a township police chief, and several officers. An election official admitted that the attack had sparked panic within the regime’s election commission.⁵² Shortly after, in Htantabin Township (Bago Region), a resistance group conducted drone strikes on a junta office and killed a UEC assistant director.⁵³

On 27 Jan, in Aungmyaythazan Township (Mandalay Region), joint resistance forces launched a coordinated rocket attack on the **Central Regional Military Command (RMC) targeting coup leader Min Aung Hlaing**. Min Aung Hlaing was staying at the RMC while reportedly performing a superstitious ritual after scrutinizing the polls. It is unknown if there were any casualties.⁵⁴

International Response

- **The international community overwhelmingly rejects the election - Japan calls it “eyewash”, some dismiss it as a “joke.”**
- **ASEAN finally commits to reject the results, and keep the junta at arm's length.**
- **Regime ambiguous on election observers; India publicly denies attendance.**

The Asian Network for Free Elections (ANFREL) concluded that the “**deeply flawed**” process failed to meet even the “minimum requirements for democratic participation or credible electoral processes.” ANFREL joined other international bodies, organizations, and states, including the UN, the EU, FIDH, Human Rights Watch, Japan, and New Zealand, to demand that the international community reject the illegitimate election. The Special Advisory Council for Myanmar (SAC-M) stated that the people of Burma had **overwhelmingly rejected the sham polls** and described the first phase as a “joke.”⁵⁵ Notably, **Japan** publicly dismissed the fraudulent process as “**eyewash**.” Japan had previously bent over backwards to support the junta’s sham election narrative.⁵⁶

⁵¹ [New Day Myanmar \(12 Jan 2026\) မြို့တော်ခန်းမရှေ့မှာ တကိုယ်တော်ဆန္ဒပြသည့် လူငယ်တဦးဖမ်းဆီးခံရ](#)

⁵² [Myanmar Now \(7 Jan 2026\) Myanmar election official escapes ambush near Naypyitaw: several others dead](#)

⁵³ [Irrawaddy \(11 Jan 2026\) Myanmar Junta Election Official Killed as Blasts Rock Bago Region](#)

⁵⁴ [Narinjara \(27 Jan 2026\) မိုလ်ချုပ်မှူးကြီး မင်းအောင်လှိုင်တည်းခိုနေသည့် အလယ်ပိုင်းတိုင်းစစ်ဌာနချုပ် ၁၀၇ မမ ရှော့တိုက်ခုံးများဖြင့် ထပ်မံတိုက်ခိုက်ခံရ](#)

⁵⁵ [BBC Burmese \(11 Jan 2026\) “စစ်တပ်လို ငါ့ယနေ့တွဲသူအတိုအယ ဝေတင်ယရ ငါ့ငေးယကောက် ဝွဲက ဝိဇာ ကံခ င်းရ င်ဖြ ဝိဇန ဝိဇင်င တကော ဝူ တယတောင်းဆ ဝိဇသင်တူ ဝ်” - SAC- M](#)

⁵⁶ [Myanmar Now \(14 Jun 2023\) Japan needs to sack Sasakawa and stand with the people of Myanmar; Irrawaddy via Facebook \(31 Jan 2026\) Japan dismisses Myanmar election as eyewash](#)

While the regime claimed 139 observers from seven countries had observed Phase 1, the regime was unusually ambiguous about who had observed all 3 phases.⁵⁷ In a humiliating U-turn, the **Indian government distanced itself** from its delegation, stating they attended in their personal capacity only.⁵⁸

ASEAN refused to send an association delegation of election observers to Burma, stating that there needed to be a decrease in violence before any reasonable election could be held. However, after the final phase of polling, the ASEAN chair, the Philippine FM Theresa Lazaro, stated that **ASEAN would not recognize the sham polls** as of now. She said it would continue to **not recognize the regime** as the representative of Burma: “Yes, the answer is yes: We do not recognize the military administration.”⁵⁹

Prognosis: What’s Next after the Sham Election

- **Conflict will likely intensify as the junta uses its sham election to offload governance and focus on military campaigns, emboldened by recent recaptures.**
- **Any post-election ceasefire hopes are naive, as history shows the junta breaks agreements and China lacks leverage over most resistance groups.**
- **Forced conscription will persist as the junta desperately seeks hundreds of thousands to replenish its troops.**
- **The plague of scam centers and other transnational crime activities will continue to be a cash cow in the junta’s conflict economy – not a single party in the sham election mentioned scam centers in their campaigns.**
- **The junta may seek to strengthen itself by increasing its cooperation with other “gangster” regimes, such as Russia, Belarus, and Iran.**

Armed conflict is set to continue, even escalate; hope for a post-polling “ceasefire” is naive

Under the baseline scenario, the junta will cede limited administrative functions to those elected/appointed through its sham election, freeing itself to **concentrate fully on military campaigns**. Its recent recapture of townships in northern Shan State and Mandalay Region—enabled by both Chinese pressure and its own forces—has fueled a dangerous confidence. The regime now believes that with a steady stream of forced conscripts, it can reclaim more lost territory.

The USDP-led sham government might **attempt to restart “peace talks”** with a handful of Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) or broker a limited “ceasefire” with groups like the KIA or Arakan Army (AA), using China’s pressure. However, China holds little to no leverage over other Ethnic Resistance Organizations (EROs) or the PDF.

Ongoing military cooperation has ensured the regime can continue its atrocities. The junta has provided custom-made 120mm mortar rounds to Russia for its war on Ukraine.⁶⁰ Russia and the junta have **strengthened military cooperation**, with 4 state visits to Moscow since 2021.⁶¹ The junta’s increasingly cosy relationship with Belarus appears to be under Russian patronage. Additionally, “ghost ships” with suspected links to Iran are secretly supplying the regime with jet fuel for its deadly airstrikes.⁶²

⁵⁷ [BBC Burmese \(27 Dec 2025\) တရုတ်၊ ရိုရှင်းနဲ့အနု ဝုဒ္ဓ ယရ ဝိဝေးယကောက် ဝုဒ္ဓိ ယစောင်ကူတည်ပြီး ဝိဇယုရောက်လော](#)

⁵⁸ [The Wire via Mizzima \(29 Dec 2025\) စစ်တော်မရှင်က အိန္ဒိယကို ရွေးကောက်ပွဲလေ့လာသူအဖြစ် စာရင်းထုတ်ပြန်၊ တရားဝင်အဆင့်အတန်းမဟုတ်ဟု အိန္ဒိယ ပြန်ချေပ](#)

⁵⁹ [Irrawaddy \(30 Jan 2026\) ASEAN Does Not Recognize Myanmar Junta's Election 'As of Now'](#)

⁶⁰ [Military \(26 Jul 2023\) Russia received ammunition manufactured by Myanmar](#)

⁶¹ [RFA \(3 Mar 2025\) Myanmar's military junta chief flies to Russia for meeting with Putin](#)

⁶² [Amnesty International \(25 Jan 2026\) Myanmar: Jet fuel used in deadly air strikes flowing in on 'ghost ships' with suspected links to Iran](#)

The junta will step up forced conscription

Since the 1990s, military leaders, including Sr. Gen. Than Shwe, sought to swell the army to over 500,000 troops, roughly 1% of the 55-56 million population.⁶³ After losing tens of thousands during its attempted 5-year coup, combat troops have shrunk below 100,000,⁶⁴ and require roughly 400,000 new troops to rebuild. Since Feb 2024, the regime has utilized the “People’s Military Service Law” to forcibly enlist about 80,000–100,000 recruits in 20 batches, as of 16 Dec 2025.⁶⁵ To reach its target, the regime must forcibly conscript another **300,000–400,000 people** (2–3% of the 14 million conscription-age population), a process that could take 5–7 years at the current rate.⁶⁶ Junta officials have affirmed **conscription will continue** even after the sham election.⁶⁷ The junta reportedly threatened non-voters with forced conscription throughout all 3 phases of the sham election.⁶⁸

Continuing Crackdowns

It is increasingly likely that the sham election would be used to justify further political and armed crackdowns instead of creating an environment that may be conducive to political openings. In addition to locking up leaders and blocking key dialogue stakeholders from the sham election, junta boss Min Aung Hlaing has flagged that he will replace Aung San Suu Kyi as State Counsellor.⁶⁹

The junta, which arrested a total of 30,397 political prisoners (a tenfold increase since the last sham election in 2010), continues to detain 22,793 under harsh and violent conditions, making this the highest number of political prisoners in Southeast Asia. The junta has imposed the death sentence on 173 people and executed several prisoners, while at least 2,000 have died in custody.⁷⁰ While extremely small numbers of political prisoners have been released at national holidays, the junta has arrested and threatened to arrest higher numbers.

Rohingya between Genocide and Conscription

- **The Rohingya face cyclical persecution and forced displacement, with both the junta and AA posing threats, and no authority ensuring civilian protection or citizenship.**
- **The junta continues to actively promote perpetrators of genocide and reject accountability.**
- **Safe return is impossible under current conditions, as Rohingya would risk forced conscription by the junta or abuse by the AA, leaving them in perpetual peril without recognition or security.**

Rohingya continue to be persecuted and targeted - “new govt” offers no resolution

In northern Arakan State, the junta had **forcibly conscripted Rohingya youth** amid intense 2023-2024 fighting against the AA. During 2024-2025, the renewed conflict and violence forced about **150,000 Rohingya refugees to flee to Bangladesh**.⁷¹ After the AA seized control of the north, Rohingya armed groups—including Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA)—**also forcibly recruited Rohingya**

⁶³ [ISP Myanmar \(20 Feb 2024\) PANDEMONIUM: The Conscription Law and Five Negative Potential Consequences](#)

⁶⁴ [ISP Myanmar \(20 Feb 2024\) PANDEMONIUM: The Conscription Law and Five Negative Potential Consequences](#)

⁶⁵ [SHAN \(23 Jan 2026\) Ward/village administrators collect hundreds of thousands of baht from locals to recruit people for military service](#)

⁶⁶ [VOA \(2 Mar 2024\) Myanmar's Youth Leaders Fear Conscription Law](#)

⁶⁷ [Irrawaddy \(8 Jan 2026\) Forced Conscription Set to Expand After Military-Staged Election, Local Sources Say](#)

⁶⁸ [Irrawaddy \(27 Jan 2026\) Mandalay Residents 'Pressured to Vote' in Myanmar Junta's Election; Myanmar Now \(28 Dec 2025\)](#)

[အကြောက်တရားကြောင့် အချို့တွေ စစ်တပ်ရွေးကောက်ပွဲတွင် မဲတည့်ခဲ့ကြရသည်: BBC Burmese \(28 Dec 2025\) မဲမပေးရင်](#)

[အကျိုးဆက်တွေရှိမယ်ဆိုတဲ့သတင်းတွေ မြို့ကြီးတွေမှာ ထွက်ပေါ်](#)

⁶⁹ [Irrawaddy \(4 Feb 2026\) Myanmar Junta Chief Rushes Through New Consultative Council Law](#)

⁷⁰ [AAPP \(4 Feb 2026\) Daily Briefing in Relation to the Military Coup](#)

⁷¹ [UN News \(11 Jul 2025\) 150,000 Rohingya flee to Bangladesh amid renewed Myanmar violence](#)

refugees in Bangladesh.⁷² Meanwhile, cuts in international aid led **Bangladesh and India to forcibly return Rohingya to Burma**, driving many to pay human traffickers for perilous boat journeys to Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia. In 2025, the junta confirmed 180,000 Rohingya refugees were “eligible to return” from Bangladesh, yet anti-Rohingya rhetoric from both the regime and contesting political parties show that oppressive and violent policies toward Rohingya will remain, regardless of who has territorial control.⁷³



“Safe return” for Rohingya is impossible, regardless of who controls the territory

Any repatriated Rohingya would likely be forcibly **conscripted as “cannon fodder”** to fight the AA.⁷⁴ The AA itself posed a direct threat, as the UN has documented their abuse of the Rohingya, including indiscriminate attacks, killings, sexual violence, and arbitrary arrests.⁷⁵ The *de facto* ruling AA’s **refusal to recognize the “Rohingya”** and referring to them as the derogatory term “Bengali” casts a long, dark shadow over their future in any post-sham election scenario. Their fate remains one of the most perilous and unresolved humanitarian crises, with civilian protection and citizenship farther from reach than ever.

Sham Election - Sham Economics

- There are no significant indicators that the sham election has or will increase economic confidence.
- The junta’s military priorities – pushing resources and revenue into the war with resistance – will overwhelm any agenda to protect or rebuild the economy.
- The fake parliament is not likely to have the capacity nor the power to address the soaring inflation, MMK depreciation, and goods shortages created by the junta.
- The regime will continue to extract more natural resources and impose more arbitrary taxes, feeding transnational crime, corruption, conflict, and displacement.

The junta’s intention of using the sham election to restore international and domestic business confidence has been undermined by its own violence and extortion, which has caused **deep, structural, and accelerating problems**.




Since 2021, **inflation has surged** while the Kyat (MMK) **has collapsed** to historic lows, **depreciating by around 214%** from 1,331 MMK per USD before the coup to about 4,170 MMK per USD by mid-Jan 2026 (see graph). This currency collapse explains both rising prices and the public’s total loss of confidence.

⁷² Irrawaddy (29 May 2024) Rohingya Forced to Fight Alongside Myanmar Army Tormentors
⁷³ Al Jazeera (4 Apr 2025) Myanmar confirms 180,000 Rohingya eligible to return, Bangladesh says
⁷⁴ BROUK (25 Jun 2024) New Report: The Intensifying Rohingya Genocide
⁷⁵ UN General Assembly (25 Oct 2025) Situation of human rights in Myanmar

Basic food prices have moved far out of reach: **premium rice prices rose nearly fourfold** from Jan 2021 to late 2025, while low-quality rice, relied on by poor households, more than doubled. As savings lost value and people no longer dared to take risks in business, many rushed to buy gold to secure their savings.

The **MMK did not stabilize or appreciate during the sham election** period, but gold prices surged by roughly **800%** since Dec 2020, reaching an all-time high of 10.2 million MMK per tical shortly after the second phase of the sham election.



The junta has intensified extraction to fund the war. While people face shortages of food and medicine, the junta has squeezed revenue, especially through **taxation from migrant workers**, collecting **over MMK 1 trillion** in FY 2024–2025 alone, and violating existing double taxation agreements.⁷⁶ At the same time, import crackdowns, electricity shortages, and ongoing conflict have crippled domestic production, while the junta continues to spend shrinking USD reserves on weapons and jet fuel used in attacks on civilians. In the 2024 fiscal year, the junta’s **military expenditures reached an all-time high of MMK 5 billion** (USD 2.7 billion, based on the 2024 exchange rate), which was a quarter of the total budget allocation.⁷⁷

The direction after the sham election is clear: **more resource extraction, more militarized spending, and deeper economic decline**. There will be no recovery under a regime that treats the economy as a war chest and the population as a source of cash.

⁷⁶ [Myanmar Now \(7 Nov 2025\) Myanmar regime's tax revenue surges by a third, largely on the backs of migrant workers](#)

⁷⁷ [RFA \(25 Mar 2025\) Junta chief vows to hike defense budget, seeking to expand global presence](#)

Glossary: Political Parties involved in the Sham Election

1. Arakan Front Party (AFP)
2. Danu National Democracy Party (DNDP)
3. Inn National League Party (INLP)
4. Kachin State People's Party (KSPP)
5. Karen National Democratic Party (KNDP)
6. Kayah State People's Party (KySPP)
7. Mon Unity Party (MUP)
8. Naga National Party (NNP)
9. National Interest Development Party (NIDP)
10. National Unity Party (NUP)
11. Pa-O National Organization (PNO)
12. Pa-O National Unity Party (PNUP)
13. People's Party (PP)
14. People's Pioneer Party (PPP)
15. Phalon-Sawaw Democratic Party (PSDP)
16. Rakhine Nationalities Party (RNP)
17. Shan Nationalities Democratic Party (SNDP)
18. Shan-ni Solidarity Party (SSP)
19. Tai-Leng Nationalities Development Party (TNDP)
20. Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP)
21. Wa National Party (WNP)
22. Zomi Congress for democracy (ZNP)

Independents

Military

Addendum: States and Regions Breakdown

This section provides highlights by State and Region to illustrate that every part of the country had been affected by violence and intimidation linked to the sham election, regardless voting status.

Arakan State

- During 20 Dec - 30 Jan, in Arakan State, there were 89 armed clashes and attacks against civilians in 12 townships, which killed 42 civilians. The junta launched 32 airstrikes in 9 townships.
- The regime was only able to carry out polling in 3 out of 17 Arakan State townships, as the rest remained under strong AA control. Residents reported voter turnout in the 3 townships remained “low.”
- The USDP won 67% of the seats (2 of 3) in Pyithu Hluttaw and 55.56% (5 of 9) in Amyotha Hluttaw.

Ayeyarwady Region

- During 20 Dec - 30 Jan, in Ayeyarwady Region, there were 10 armed clashes and attacks against civilians, which killed 3 civilians in Thabaung and Yegyí townships. The junta launched 1 airstrike in Lemyethna Township.
- In Ayeyarwady Region, the junta held the sham election in all 26 townships. The USDP won 96% of the seats (25 of 26) in Pyithu Hluttaw and 75% (9 of 12) in Amyotha Hluttaw.
- On 24 Jan, in Danubyu Township, junta administrators distributed voter number slips and accused non-voters of supporting resistance forces. Since 23 Jan, junta forces had guarded polling stations and carried out strict checks near voting sites.⁷⁸
- On 25 Jan, in Yegi Township, junta ward administrators waited at polling stations and pressured locals to vote for the USDP.⁷⁹

Bago Region

- During 20 Dec - 30 Jan, in Bago Region, there were 154 armed clashes and attacks against civilians in 24 townships, which killed 26 civilians. The junta launched 20 airstrikes in 7 townships.
- The USDP won 100% of the seats (28 of 28) in Pyithu Hluttaw and 83.33% (10 of 12) in Amyotha Hluttaw.
- On 11 Jan, in Yedashe Township, 1 resident stated she packed an emergency bag before going to the polling station in case fighting broke out. In Minhla Township, the PDF reported that the junta threatened non-voters with a MMK 300,000 fine, 3 years in prison, or forced conscription for youths.⁸⁰
- On 21 - 23 Jan, in Waw Township, junta troops and police coerced villagers in the Sittaung River basin to cast advance votes for the USDP ahead of Phase 3 polling. Junta troops abandoned voting machines for paper ballots and collected them in black plastic bags at designated houses rather than official polling stations. Junta officials explicitly instructed voters to tick the USDP box and permitted 1 representative to cast ballots for their entire household. The junta sealed off village entrances and intensified patrols during the collection process.⁸¹
- On 20 Jan, in Thegon Township, the junta ordered 11 village tracts to cast so-called “advance votes” as “final votes” for security reasons, without informing contesting political parties or the public. Political parties protested to township election officials, and the junta withdrew the plan later that night. On 22 Jan, in Gyobingauk and Okpho townships, the junta opened 9 “advance voting” stations and ordered entire villages to vote at once under heavy security.⁸²

Chin State

- During 20 Dec - 30 Jan, in Chin State, there were 43 armed clashes and attacks against civilians in 6 townships, which killed 5 civilians. The junta launched 18 airstrikes in 5 townships.

⁷⁸ [DVB \(25 Jan 2026\) နေဖြူတွင် မဲမပေးပါက ဖမ်းဆီးအရေးယူမည်ဟု အုပ်ချုပ်ရေးမှူးများက ခြိမ်းခြောက်](#)

⁷⁹ [DVB \(25 Jan 2026\) ရေကြည်တွင် အုပ်ချုပ်ရေးမှူးများက မဲဆွယ်ပြီး ဖိအားပေး မဲထည့်ခိုင်း](#)

⁸⁰ [Myanmar Now \(11 Jan 2026\) ရွေးကောက်ပွဲ အပိုင်း\(၂\)တွင် ပဲခူးတိုင်း စစ်ကော်မရှင်မရှိနှင့် စခန်းများ တိုက်ခိုက်ခံရ](#)

⁸¹ [DVB \(23 Jan 2026\) ဝေါမြို့နယ်၌ စစ်တပ်က ကြိုခိုင်းရေးပါတီအတွက် မဲစာရွက်ပေါ် အမှန်ခြစ်ခိုင်းပြီး မဲမသမာမှုလုပ်](#)

⁸² [Mizzima \(23 Jan 2026\) ပဲခူးရှိ လုံခြုံရေးစိုးရိမ်သည့် နေရာအချို့တွင် ရွေးကောက်ပွဲနေ့မတိုင်ခင် မဲရုံဖွင့်ပြီး မဲကြိုပေးခိုင်း](#)

- The regime was only able to carry out polling in 2 of 9 townships. In those 2 townships, only 17% of voters turned out. Based on the 2025 population of Chin State (estimated using 2014 census data), only 4.9% of eligible voters in Chin State cast a ballot, while over 70% of eligible voters were excluded.
- The USDP won 100% of the seats (2 of 2) in Pyithu Hluttaw and 62.5% (5 of 8) in Amyotha Hluttaw.

Kachin State

- During 20 Dec - 30 Jan, in Kachin State, there were 42 armed clashes and attacks against civilians in 9 townships, which killed 24 civilians. The junta launched 12 airstrikes in 5 townships.
- In Kachin State, the junta held the sham election in 12 out of 18 townships. The USDP won 92% of the seats (11 of 12) in Pyithu Hluttaw and 75% (9 of 12) in Amyotha Hluttaw.

Karen State

- During 20 Dec - 30 Jan, in Karen State, there were 58 armed clashes and attacks against civilians in 7 townships, which killed 3 civilians. The junta launched 15 airstrikes in 6 townships.
- The USDP won 86% of the seats (6 of 7) in Pyithu Hluttaw and 58.33% (7 of 12) in Amyotha Hluttaw.
- On 28 Dec 2025, in Myawaddy Township, junta officials at the Thai-Burma border checkpoint threatened to confiscate Myawaddy residents' Borderpass Cards and ban border crossings to Mae Sot (Thailand) if they did not vote.⁸³
- On 28 Dec, in Thandaunggyi Township, locals reported that the junta allowed only junta members and their families to vote in the sham polls. One local added that the only 2 polling stations in the township were located inside a junta camp.⁸⁴
- On 25 Jan, in Kawkareik and Kyarinseikgyi townships, the junta forced IDPs to return to vote during intensified fighting between KNLA-led resistance forces and junta troops. Junta officials threatened IDPs that if they refused to vote, authorities would deny them compensation or replace land for homes destroyed by fire. In Kyainseikyi Township, polling stations shut down before lunch after no one showed up.⁸⁵

Karenni State

- During 20 Dec - 30 Jan, in Karenni State, there were 21 armed clashes and attacks against civilians in 6 townships, which killed 1 civilian. The junta launched 3 airstrikes in Demoso, Hpasawng, and Hpruso townships.
- The regime held polling in 4 of 7 Karenni townships. Despite strong regime presence in several townships, voter turnout remained low, including in Loikaw, where residents reported under 30% of people voted.
- The USDP won 100% of the seats (4 of 4) in Pyithu Hluttaw and 70% (7 of 10) in Amyotha Hluttaw.

Magway Region

- During 20 Dec - 30 Jan, in Magway Region, there were 263 armed clashes and attacks against civilians in 23 townships, which killed 37 civilians. The junta launched 70 airstrikes in 12 townships.
- In Magway Region, the junta held the sham election in 20 out of 25 townships. The USDP won 85% of the seats (17 of 20) in Pyithu Hluttaw and 83.33% (10 of 12) in Amyotha Hluttaw.

Mandalay Region

- During 20 Dec - 30 Jan, in Mandalay Region, there were 135 armed clashes and attacks against civilians in 15 townships, which killed 22 civilians. The junta launched 16 airstrikes in 6 townships.
- The regime held polling in 25 out of 28 townships. Despite the junta claiming a 63% voter turnout, observers and residents stated that the turnout was low or medium across most townships.
- The USDP won 100% of the seats (25 of 25) in Pyithu Hluttaw and 75% (9 of 12) in Amyotha Hluttaw.

⁸³ [DVB \(28 Dec 2025\) မဲဆောက်ရောက်မြန်မာများ မဲမပေးပါက နယ်စပ်ဖြတ်ခွင့်လက်မှတ် ရုပ်သိမ်းမည်ဟု ခြိမ်းခြောက်ခံရ](#)

⁸⁴ [Mizzima \(28 Dec 2025\) သံတောင်ကြီးတွင် စစ်ကော်မရှင်တပ်နှင့် မိသားစုများသာ မဲပေးခွင့်ရ၊ အရပ်သားများ ချန်လှပ်ခံရ](#)

⁸⁵ [DVB \(25 Jan 2026\) ကော့ကရိတ်နှင့် ကြာအင်းဆိပ်ကြီးတွင် စစ်ရှောင်များကို ခြိမ်းခြောက်မှုများ တက်မဲထည့်ခိုင်း; HRFOM \(25 Jan 2026\) Junta's Phase 3 "Sham Election" Sees Heavy Militarization and Low Turnout in Kawkareik and Kyainseikyi Townships](#)

- On 22 Jan, in Mahlaing Township, junta officials seized numerous civilian and religious vehicles for Phase 3 sham election-related transport and impounded them at the Shwe Muthtaw Pagoda compound. The junta ordered that the vehicles be held until 26 Jan, effectively shutting down local passenger transport services between Mandalay, Pyin Oo Lwin, and Meiktila until after the election. Locals reported that at least 1 commandeered vehicle would be assigned to each polling station.⁸⁶
- On 25 Jan, in Mandalay city, the junta heightened security as the junta boss arrived to observe the Phase 3 polls. Junta forces conducted aggressive stop-and-search operations on pedestrians and motorcyclists, specifically targeting youths. It was reported that security personnel harassed foreign journalists covering the sham election in Mandalay and prevented them from filming.⁸⁷
- On the morning of 25 Jan, in Chanmyathazi Township, a pro-junta news outlet posted a photo showing a man wearing a USDP shirt and cap standing inside a polling station alongside the junta boss. The outlet later deleted the photo. The photo proves that the USDP violated election law, which bans party symbols inside polling stations or within 500 yards (457 meters) of voting sites.⁸⁸

Mon State

- During 20 Dec - 30 Jan, in Mon State, there were 44 armed clashes and attacks against civilians, which killed 7 civilians in Mudon township. The junta launched 2 airstrikes in Bilin and Kyaikto townships.
- The junta claimed a meagre 39% voter turnout across the state's 10 townships.
- The USDP won 50% of the seats (5 of 10) in Pyithu Hluttaw and 41.67% (5 of 12) in Amyotha Hluttaw.
- On 28 Dec, in Mawlamyine Township, youths reported that they voted out of fear in the sham polls because local junta-allied officials threatened to stop them from leaving the country if they did not vote.⁸⁹
- On 1 - 11 Jan, in Paung Township, the junta's Ministry of Immigration and Population executed a special scheme of National Registration Cards (NRCs) replacement to increase the number of eligible voters for the sham election. Residents reported that they obtained ID cards without the usual exorbitant bribes to the junta, which cost between MMK 200,000 and 600,000.⁹⁰
- On 7 Jan, in Kyaikmaraw Township, it was reported that the junta forcibly armed inmates from Kyaikmaraw prison and deployed them as security forces for the sham election. These prisoners were ordered to guard villages, report on resistance activity, and fight alongside soldiers.⁹¹
- On 11 Jan, in Ye Township, junta officials threatened youths with forced conscription if they refused to vote.⁹²

Naypyidaw Region

- During 20 Dec - 30 Jan, in Naypyidaw Region, there were 4 armed clashes and attacks against civilians.
- The USDP won all 8 seats in the Pyithu Hluttaw.

Sagaing Region

- During 20 Dec - 30 Jan, in Sagaing Region, there were 269 armed clashes and attacks against civilians in 30 townships, which killed 96 civilians. The junta launched 107 airstrikes in 24 townships.
- During the election period, junta violence spiraled in Sagaing as it attempted to make the elections possible in the region. The regime was unable to hold polling in 12 of Sagaing's 37 townships.
- Due to mass displacement and overwhelming distrust in the polls, voter turnout in many places, including Kani and Salingyi townships, was extremely low.

⁸⁶ [DVB \(22 Jan 2026\) မလိုင်တွင် ရွေးကောက်ပွဲအတွက် စစ်တပ်က ကားများကိုချော့ဆွဲ၊ စစ်ကြောင်းထိုး](#)

⁸⁷ [DVB \(25 Jan 2026\) ရွေးကောက်ပွဲအပိုင်း ၃ ကြည့်ရှုရန် စစ်ခေါင်းဆောင် မန္တလေးရောက်နေသဖြင့် လုံခြုံရေးတင်းကျပ်](#)

⁸⁸ [Irrawaddy \(25 Jan 2026\) Live Roundup: Growing Unrest, Voter Apathy Mark Final Phase of Myanmar Junta Election](#)

⁸⁹ [DVB \(28 Dec 2025\) မွန်ပြည်နယ်ရှိ မဲမပေးပါက ပြည်ပပေးမထွက်ဟု ခြိမ်းခြောက်မှုကြောင့် လူငယ်များ မဲထည့်နေရ](#)

⁹⁰ [BNI \(13 Jan 2026\) Large Turnout as ID Registration Offered under Special Plan Ahead of Election Phase](#)

⁹¹ [IMNA \(7 Jan 2026\) ရွေးကောက်ပွဲကာလအတွင်း မွန်ပြည်နယ်အကျဉ်းသားအချို့ကို လက်နက်တပ်ဆင်ပေးပြီး လုံခြုံရေးတပ်သားများအဖြစ် အသုံးပြု](#)

⁹² [DVB \(11 Jan 2026\) မွန်ပြည်နယ်ရှိ မဲမထည့်ပါက စစ်မှုထမ်းရမည်ဟု လူငယ်များ ခြိမ်းခြောက် မဲထည့်ခိုင်း](#)

- The USDP won 80% of the seats (20 of 25) in Pyithu Hluttaw and 66.67% (8 of 12) in Amyotha Hluttaw.

Shan State

- During 20 Dec - 30 Jan, in N. Shan State, there were 28 armed clashes and attacks against civilians in 10 townships, which killed 9 civilians. The junta launched 5 airstrikes in Hsipaw, Mabein, Mongmit, and Mongyai townships.
- During 20 Dec - 30 Jan, in S. Shan State, there were 19 armed clashes and attacks against civilians in 6 townships, which killed 1 civilian. The junta launched 1 airstrike in Mawkmai Township.
- In all of Shan State, the junta held the sham election in 38 out of 55 townships. The USDP won 63% of the seats (24 of 38) in Pyithu Hluttaw and 50% (5 of 10) in Amyotha Hluttaw.

Tanintharyi Region

- During 20 Dec - 30 Jan, in Tanintharyi Region, there were 87 armed clashes and attacks against civilians in 8 townships, which killed 3 civilians. The junta launched 6 airstrikes in Dawei, Kyunso, Palaw, and Tanintharyi townships.
- The regime held voting in parts of all 10 townships, though voter turnout was characterized as low or extremely low.
- The USDP won 100% of the seats (10 of 10) in Pyithu Hluttaw and 75% (9 of 12) in Amyotha Hluttaw.

Yangon Region

- During 20 Dec - 30 Jan, in Yangon Region, there were 22 armed clashes and attacks against civilians in 14 townships, which killed 2 civilians.
- Despite intense intimidation, voter turnout in the former capital was cited record low.⁹³ Several townships reportedly had a turnout of about 30-35%, falling far short of the junta's announced 55% national turnout.
- The USDP won 98% of the seats (44 of 45 in Pyithu Hluttaw and 75% (9 of 12) in Amyotha Hluttaw.
- On 11 Jan, it was reported that in Insein Township's Ywama East Ward, junta-appointed ward administrators had conducted "vote-buying" by distributing cash along with voting slips to residents prior to Phase 2 polling. The Ward Administrator confirmed they had distributed the payments, claiming a political party provided the funds as "travel expenses" to ensure voter turnout.⁹⁴
- On 21 Jan, in Mingalartaungnyunt Township, junta personnel ordered vendors at Tat Myo Market to vote and threatened to close their shops if they refused. Similar pressure occurred in Hlaingtharya, Tamwe, and Lanmadaw townships, where junta officials and ward administrators forced both street vendors and market sellers to vote. During 21–25 Jan, junta authorities blocked roads near polling stations, restricted vehicle movement, and ordered nearby vendors to close for 5 days. Ahead of polling, the junta increased security patrols, deployed police vehicles, and used loudspeakers at night to urge residents to vote.⁹⁵
- On 25 Jan, in Hlaingtharya Township, junta officials ordered factories and workshops in the township to shut down, then forced factory managers to make workers vote. Junta ward administrators also pressured hostel owners to push migrant and factory workers living in dormitories to vote. A labor union member said that "workers already know nothing will come out of this election, so they ignored it."⁹⁶

⁹³ [Mizzima \(25 Jan 2026\) Voter participation hits record low in Yangon as final phase of general election concludes](#)

⁹⁴ [Irrawaddy \(11 Jan 2026\) မဲဆန္ဒရှင်တွေကို ပိုက်ဆံကြိုပေးမှု ပေါ်ပေါက် \(ရုပ်/သံ\)](#)

⁹⁵ [Mizzima \(24 Jan 2026\) ရန်ကုန်တွင် မဲ မထည့်လျှင် ဈေးရောင်းခွင့်မပြုဟု စစ်အုပ်စု ခြိမ်းခြောက်](#)

⁹⁶ [DVB \(25 Jan 2026\) စစ်ကောင်စီ အလုပ်သမားဝန်ကြီး အလုပ်သမားများထံမှ မဲရရန် ခက်ခဲ](#)