

VIETNAM: CRACKDOWN ON CIVIL SOCIETY CONTINUES UNABATED

Briefing paper for the 13th EU-Vietnam human rights dialogue (21 July 2025, Hanoi, Vietnam)

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Since the previous EU-Vietnam human rights dialogue, which was held in July 2024, the alarming trend of arrests, unfair trials, and harsh prison sentences against members of civil society, including human rights defenders, bloggers, as well as environmental and worker rights advocates has continued unabated.

Today, Vietnam currently holds more than 200 political prisoners. According to Reporters Without Borders, it is one of the world's largest jailers of journalists and bloggers and ranks near the bottom of the organisation's 2025 World Press Freedom Index (173rd out of 180 countries surveyed).

According to FIDH-VCHR's documentation, between July 2024 and June 2025, at least 21 individuals, (including four women), were arrested on politically motivated charges. During the same period, at least 17 were sentenced to prison terms of up to 12 years on such charges. They include some of Vietnam's most prominent dissidents, including Nguyễn Chi Tuyền (Anh Chí), Nguyễn Vũ Bình, Hoàng Việt Khánh, and Nguyễn Lâm Thắng. Nguyễn Chi Tuyền and his three colleagues were accused of mobilising fellow activists to provide humanitarian assistance to impoverished people in rural areas and victims of natural disasters.

In addition to these arbitrary arrests, over the past year, the government has continued to adopt extensive legislation that limits the exercise of key civil and political rights, in violation of its binding obligations as a state party to the UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).

Crackdown amid consolidation of power

The heightened crackdown on peaceful dissent has been taking place ahead of the 14th Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) Congress, which is scheduled for early 2026. During the Congress, delegates will elect the party's leadership for the next five-year term.

The lead-up to the Congress has been characterized by CPV General Secretary Tô Lâm's move to cement his grip on power and reinforce the CPV's control.

Since becoming CPV General Secretary in August 2024, Tô Lâm – a former Minister of Public Security, has filled high-ranking positions in key security agencies and the CPV with loyalists, including family members and allies from his native Hung Yen Province.¹

Tô Lâm also promoted political reforms aimed at further centralizing power and strengthening the role of the CPV-aligned Vietnam Fatherland Front (VFF). Many aspects of the reforms, approved as part of the amendment of Vietnam's 2013 Constitution, have been classified as "state secrets." The constitutional amendment process was tightly controlled by the CPV's Politburo, rushed through the

¹ RFA, *Party chief Tô Lâm's son promoted to top ranks within Vietnam's police force*, 16 June 2025

National Assembly, and completed in only 43 days, in June 2025.² The public was given approximately one month to provide feedback on the proposed far-reaching reforms.

The CPV's reform of the country's administrative structure resulted in the reduction of Vietnamese provinces from 63 to 34 and the dismantling of district-level administrative divisions.³ The move was accompanied by a reduction in the number of ministries and government agencies from 30 to 22.⁴

These changes significantly reduced the number of delegates at the upcoming Congress, facilitating Tô Lâm's task to control its outcomes. In addition, new provincial leaders were appointed by the CPV under the guidance of a close Tô Lâm's ally.⁵

The increased powers of local CPV leaders are disturbing, in light of another government decree pushed through by Tô Lâm to consolidate power in the CPV's hands. Decree 121 on Lawyers, issued on 11 June 2025, shifts the authority to grant, revoke, and renew law practice licences from the Minister of Justice to chairpersons of provincial CPV authorities. Such move risks further limiting the ability of lawyers to defend clients, especially human rights defenders and dissidents.

Failure to uphold commitments under the EU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement

The grave human rights violations committed by the Vietnamese authorities are particularly disturbing in light of its binding commitments to the European Union (EU) within the framework of the EU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement (EVFTA).

The Vietnamese government has failed to deliver on its promises to implement reforms to increase protection of workers' rights, the environment, and land rights, including through the ratification of several ILO Conventions, the creation of independent trade unions, and the establishment of a Domestic Advisory Group (DAG) of independent civil society representatives to monitor the EVFTA's Trade and Sustainable Development (TSD) chapter.

No steps have been taken to ratify ILO Convention 87 on Freedom of Association and the Right to Organise, promised for 2023. The 2024 amended Trade Union Law contains no provisions for the establishment of independent trade unions, and all union activity remains under the strict control of the CPV. Several members of the Vietnam DAG are para-governmental organisations, not "independent representative organisations" as stipulated in the EVFTA's TSD (Chapter 13, Article 13.15.4), and DAG members who criticise Vietnam's implementation of the TSD chapter risk sanctions and arrest.

In May 2025, FIDH and VCHR published a list of 40 defenders and civil society representatives imprisoned for documenting the negative impacts of investment projects or working on issues of sustainable development, civil society participation, energy transition, or labour conditions.⁶ Among these imprisoned defenders are:

² Vietnamese, *Fast-Tracker: Việt Nam's 2025 Constitutional Amendment Explained*, 19 June 2025

³ RFA, *Vietnam to slash provinces as top leader Tô Lâm seeks to consolidate power*, 16 April 2025; AFP, *Vietnam lawmakers approve merging provinces, slashing nearly 80,000 jobs*, 12 Jun 2025

⁴ AFP, *Vietnam parliament approves radical government cost-cutting drive*, 18 February 2025

⁵ RFA, *Vietnam to slash provinces as top leader Tô Lâm seeks to consolidate power*, 16 April 2025

⁶ FIDH-VCHR-CSW-Global Witness, *Viet Nam's crackdown on human rights defenders working on sustainable development: A non-exhaustive list of defenders and members of civil society organisations who are being arbitrarily detained and must be released immediately*, May 2025,

- **Ngô Thị Tố Nhiên**, CEO of the climate change think tank Vietnam Initiative for Energy Transition Social Enterprise (VIETSE), who was sentenced to three and a half years in prison at a secret trial in Hanoi in June 2024 on charges of “stealing, buying, selling, or destroying the seal or documents of a state agency or organisation” (Article 342 of the Criminal Code). Two of her colleagues, Lê Quốc Anh and Dương Việt Đức, were also arrested and their current situation is unknown. Police raided VIETSE’s offices in Hanoi and later forced the organisation to close down.
- Environmental lawyer **Đặng Đình Bách**, who has been incarcerated since June 2021 and is currently serving a five-year prison sentence on charges of “tax evasion” for advocating the participation of independent civil society in the Vietnam DAG.
- Labour reformists **Nguyễn Văn Bình** and **Vũ Minh Tiến**, who were arrested in April 2024 and are presumably still awaiting trial, since no information on their situation has been published in the official media. Prior to his arrest, Nguyễn Văn Bình was preparing a dossier for the ratification of ILO Convention 87. He was arrested under Article 337 of the Criminal Code for “deliberate disclosure of classified information; appropriation, trading, destruction of classified document.” At the time of his arrest, Vũ Minh Tiến, director of the Institute for Workers and Trade Unions (IWTU) - a member of the Vietnam DAG - was working on amendments to the Trade Union Law that was adopted in November 2024, notably the issue of independent trade unions.

In addition, the Vietnamese government has undermined the DAGs monitoring role of commitments made within EVFTA by refusing to discuss human rights issues during EU-Vietnam DAG meetings. It has also hampered organisation of the Joint Forum of the DAGs and other stakeholders, for example by giving too short notice of its date and providing no agenda. In November 2024, the EU DAG strongly deplored the “proliferation of obstacles” impeding the Joint Forum, and said it was “unacceptable that EU civil society participants were vetted, and certain individuals denied access or silenced.”⁷

Because of the Vietnamese government’s failure to uphold its commitments, in February 2025, FIDH, VCHR, Christian Solidarity Worldwide (CSW), and Global Witness filed a Complaint to the European Commission’s Directorate General for Trade (DG-Trade), charging the Vietnamese government of violating its commitments under the EVFTA. The Complaint is currently under examination by the European Commission’s Single Entry Point.⁸

Repressive “national security” laws: A pretext to suppress human rights

Despite recommendations made at successive EU-Vietnam human rights dialogues, the Vietnamese government has refused to revise or abrogate the vaguely defined “national security” provisions in the Criminal Code that have been widely used to detain persons engaged in the peaceful and legitimate exercise of their human rights. Human rights defenders and civil society activists arrested over the past year were all detained under articles **Article 109** on “activities aimed at overthrowing the people’s administration;” **Article 117** on “making, storing, disseminating information, document, materials, items against the Socialist Republic of Vietnam;” and **Article 331** on “abusing democratic freedoms to infringe upon the interests of the state, the legitimate rights and interests of organisations and/or citizens.” These provisions are totally inconsistent with international human rights law and constitute a major impediment to the enjoyment of human rights in Vietnam.

⁷ Statement from the European Union Domestic Advisory Group under the EU-Viet Nam Free Trade Agreement, Brussels, 29 November 2024

⁸ FIDH-VCHR, *Vietnam’s attack on civil society breaches the free trade agreement with the EU, new complaint argues*, 4 February 2025

Death penalty abolished for eight crimes amid ongoing lack of transparency

Recent amendments to the Criminal Code have resulted in the reduction of offences punishable by death.

On 25 June 2025, the National Assembly approved a proposal submitted by the Ministry of Public Security (MPS) in April 2025 to remove the death penalty for the following eight crimes: 1) activities aimed at overthrowing the people's administration; 2) destruction of state production or technical infrastructure; 3) manufacturing and trading counterfeit medicines; 4) illegal transportation of narcotic substances; 5) acts that destroy peace or provoke aggressive war; 6) espionage; 7) embezzlement of property; and 8) taking bribes.

However, Vietnam retains the death penalty for 10 offenses, most of which do not meet the threshold of "the most serious crimes" under Article 6 of the ICCPR. They include drug-related offenses and political crimes, such as "national security" offenses that make no distinction between violent acts and the peaceful and legitimate exercise of the right to freedom of expression.

Data on the death penalty have continued to be classified as "state secrets." In addition, detention conditions on death row remain particularly inhumane. Prisoners are detained in shackles, which are removed for only 15 minutes per day. Because of the long delays in executions, many death row prisoners have spent years shackled in solitary cells. According to the MPS, many prisoners have been awaiting execution for over 10 years and, as of 2025, at least 17 had been on death row for over 15 years.⁹

Appalling detention conditions, torture, and deaths in custody

Although ill-treatment is specifically forbidden in Vietnam's 2019 Law on Execution of Criminal Judgements (LECJ), detainees have continued to be frequently held in shackles and subjected to prolonged solitary confinement for alleged violations of prison rules.

Authorities have continued to disregard guarantees to protect the "lives, health, assets and dignity" of prisoners enshrined in the LECJ. Whereas the 2019 LECJ provides for solitary confinement in shackles in "disciplinary cells" for up to 10 days, prisoners are often held for much longer.

Political prisoner Nguyễn Đức Hùng has been held in solitary confinement for more than 18 months in Nam Ha Prison in Ha Tinh Province, where he has been serving a five-year sentence since July 2022. A fellow inmate said he was disciplined for receiving noodles from a fellow political prisoner. According to prison rules on disciplined prisoners, Hùng is only allowed a brief visit from his family once every two months.

In October 2024, political prisoners Trịnh Bá Tư and Bùi Văn Thuận went on hunger strike in Prison No. 6 in Nghệ An Province to protest incarceration of political prisoners in "tiger cages" – one square-meter cells with iron bars, separated from the common exercise yard. They ceased their hunger strike after 21 days, when the prison wardens accepted to open the cages for several hours per week.

Authorities have also continued to deny adequate medical care to political prisoners. For example, independent journalist Lê Hữu Minh Tuấn is currently seriously ill in Bo La Prison in Binh Duong Province, where he is serving an 11-year sentence for "anti-state propaganda" (Article 117 of the

⁹ Voice of Vietnam, *Ministry of Public Security: Proposal to reduce death sentence to life imprisonment after statute of limitations expires*, 4 April 2025; <https://vov.vn/phap-luat/bo-cong-an-de-xuat-het-thoi-hieu-thi-hanh-an-tu-hinh-duoc-xuong-an-chung-than-post1189619.vov> [in Vietnamese]

Criminal Code). His condition has worsened significantly over the past year, with severe weight loss, indigestion, chest pain, and difficulty breathing. His family said he is only “skin and bone.” In October 2024, in a phone call to his family, he reported a further decline in his health and his inability to eat solid food. Despite repeated appeals to the prison medical officer, Tuấn’s requests for medical treatment have been denied.

Several political prisoners have died under tragic circumstances. In March 2025, high-ranking Tibetan Buddhist monk Tulku Hungar Dorje died in custody only a few days after his arrest in Ho Chi Minh City in an operation coordinated by Vietnamese police and Chinese secret agents. Dorje had fled China to escape persecution for his support of Tibetan culture. Monks who came to take his body back to Tibet found that he had been secretly cremated.¹⁰

Many political prisoners remain incarcerated in prisons far away from their homes, making it extremely difficult for their families to visit them. This is a deliberate strategy to psychologically abuse prisoners. Cases of political prisoners currently incarcerated in remote facilities include Phạm Đoàn Trang, Nguyễn Tường Thùy, Trương Minh Đức, and Nguyễn Thị Tâm, who are all detained over 1,000 km from their homes.

Disturbingly, some prisoners have been prosecuted on additional politically motivated charges for the exercise of their rights while in detention, in flagrant violation of their right to due process of law. For example, in May 2025, Trịnh Bá Phương was charged for “anti-state propaganda” under Article 117 of the Criminal Code after wardens found a document in his cell in which he wrote “down with communism” and denounced harsh conditions in An Diem Prison, Quang Nam Province, where he is currently detained. Phương is serving a 10-year prison sentence for denouncing violations of land rights, also under Article 117.¹¹

Religions under state control as groups face more arrests

The government has failed to remove bureaucratic and administrative obstacles that hinder the enjoyment of the right to freedom of religion or belief, and to revise the 2016 Law on Belief and Religion to bring it into line with international standards.

In March 2025, three Khmer Krom Buddhists, including one monk, were arrested in Tra Vinh Province and charged with “abusing democratic freedoms” (Article 331 of the Criminal Code) for posting articles on social media accusing the local authorities of “violating human rights.”¹²

Dissent heavily repressed amid tighter media and internet controls

The government has remained intolerant of all forms of dissent and has continued to routinely use repressive provisions of the Criminal Code to arrest, prosecute, and imprison human rights defenders, activists, bloggers, and journalists who criticise the authorities or express support for democracy and human rights.

Citizens who expose instances of corruption have also faced arrest and detention. In December 2024, Trần Cao Long was arrested after he filed complaints of corruption among local police and officials in charge of the City Development Investment Fund in Can Tho Province. Police accused him of

¹⁰ Vietnamese, Tibetan Lama died and was secretly cremated in Vietnam, 22 May 2025

¹¹ RFA, *Imprisoned Vietnam activist charged for writing “down with communism”*, 7 May 2025

¹² RFA, *Four individuals arrested in Tra Vinh for accusing local authorities of violating human rights*, 27 March 2025, <https://www.rfa.org/vietnamese/trong-nuoc/2025/03/27/khmer-viet-nam-bat-giu-nhan-quyen/> [in Vietnamese]

slandering and defaming the honour of others.¹³ In January 2025, Phạm Xuân Thời and Đào Công Hiến were arrested in Dong Nai Province for posting comments on social media about corrupt local officials. They were accused of “abusing the right to complain” and “discrediting the Party, state and officials at all levels.” If convicted, they face seven years in prison under Article 331 of the Criminal Code on “abusing democratic freedoms to infringe upon the interests of the state.”¹⁴

Acts of transnational repression

Transnational repression of exiled Vietnamese political activists and dissidents remains a serious concern.

On 30 October 2024, blogger Dương Văn Thái was sentenced to 12 years in prison and three years probationary detention at a closed trial in Hanoi under Article 117 of the Criminal Code. Dương Văn Thái was abducted in April 2023 by Vietnamese intelligence agents in Bangkok, Thailand, and forcibly returned to Vietnam.

In April 2025, Vietnamese Buddhist monk Thích Minh Tuệ was intercepted by police in Sri Lanka and banned from continuing a barefoot pilgrimage through the country. They had received a letter from Vietnam’s state-sanctioned Buddhist Sangha describing the monk as a “threat to public order and national reputation” because he was not a member of their religious organisation.¹⁵

Montagnard human rights activist Y Quynh Bdap, co-founder of Montagnards Stand for Justice, was arrested by Thai authorities on 11 June 2024 in Bangkok, pursuant to an extradition request from the Vietnamese government.¹⁶ Bdap was convicted in absentia in Vietnam in January 2024 and sentenced to 10 years in prison on politically motivated charges of “terrorism aimed at opposing the people’s administration” under Article 113 of the Criminal Code. On 30 September 2024, the Bangkok Criminal Court ordered the extradition of Y Quynh Bdap to Vietnam, where he faces arbitrary detention and the risk of torture. The extradition’s decision has been appealed by Bdap, who remains detained at the Bangkok Remand Prison.¹⁷ Bdap is a UNHCR-recognised refugee who fled Vietnam to seek refuge in Thailand in 2018.

New restrictions on internet freedom

Internet freedom has continued to be seriously undermined by draconian government censorship and controls, as well as new legislation that criminalises online expression.

In November 2024, the government issued Decree 147/2024/ND-CP, on “Management, provision, and use of internet services and information content online.” Decree 147 seriously impacts internet freedom and the privacy rights of internet users. Provisions include the obligation for social media platforms to: store users’ personal data and provide them to state authorities upon request; monitor and remove “anti-state” content and block users on demand of state authorities within 48 hours; and cooperate with state authorities, in particular the MPS, to block user accounts and community groups that post “infringing” content.

¹³ RFA, *Arrested for slander after denouncing official corruption*, 7 December 2024; <https://www.rfa.org/vietnamese/news/vietnamnews/to-cao-tham-nhung-bi-bat-12072024120636.html> [in Vietnamese]

¹⁴ RFA, *Two men in Dong Nai province arrested under Article 331 for “abusing the right to complain”*, 18 January 2025

¹⁵ RFA, *Vietnamese monk forced to cut short his walk through Sri Lanka, heads to India*, 24 April 2025

¹⁶ FIDH, *Thailand: Arbitrary arrest and imminent risk of extradition of Vietnamese human rights defender Y Quynh Bdap*, 4 July 2024

¹⁷ RFA, *Thai authorities detain 68 Montagnards during raid on funeral service*, 25 February 2025

Little space and no protection for civil society

Despite being guaranteed by the Constitution, the right to freedom of association has continued to be significantly restricted in Vietnam. In the absence of specific legislation, associations have been regulated by a series of decrees that unnecessarily and disproportionately limit associative activity.

In October 2024, the government issued Decree 126/2024/ND-CP ("Decree 126") on "Regulating the organisation, operation and management of associations," which constitutes a grave backslide in protection of the right to freedom of association in Vietnam. Decree 126, which came into effect in November 2024 and replaced Decree 45/2010/ND-CP, not only retains restrictive provisions of the former text, but also imposes stricter conditions for the creation, reporting, and activities of associations, and legalises intrusive state control at every level. Decree 126 grants the authorities broad powers to intervene in all stages of an association's operations, veto membership, impose members of their own choice, and suspend or dissolve NGOs deemed to "violate national interests" – with no clear definition of the term. Under Decree 126, the charter of associations operating nationwide must be approved by the Prime Minister, instead of the Ministry of Home Affairs as before. Associations must have assets to ensure their operations before applying to register and are required not only to observe the Constitution and the law, but also "comply with the Party's policies and guidelines" (Article 5.5), "propagate and popularise the Party's guidelines" (Article 24.6), and have leaders with "good political qualities" (Article 11.4).

Decree 126 also includes 52 pages of annex documents, including 17 different forms that associations must fill in and submit to state authorities, such as Document 17 on Personal Curriculum Vitae which requires all prospective officers of associations to provide information about their ethnicity, religion, degree of political instruction, details on their current and past activities, as well as those of all members of their families (parents, siblings, spouse, children, and spouse's families). Such detailed information was not required under the former regulations on associations (Decree 45/2010/ND-CP). On the basis of this information, the authorities could veto the participation of followers of non-recognised religious groups, activists who have been arrested - even briefly - for their exercise of the rights to freedom of expression, peaceful assembly, and association, former members of the military or administrative personnel of the former Republic of (South) Vietnam, or even persons whose family members have activities in Vietnam or overseas that displease the Vietnamese authorities. Moreover, given the insistence on a "good state of health," persons with disabilities who seek functions in associations may also be liable to be vetoed by the authorities.

Non-genuine elections under CPV's political monopoly

Like previous elections for Vietnam's National Assembly, the next polls to elect representatives in the 500-seat legislative body, which are scheduled for 15 March 2026, will predictably be not free, fair, transparent, or inclusive.

This is because Article 4 of Vietnam's Constitution guarantees the political monopoly of the CPV as the "force leading the state and society." No other political parties are allowed to exist. Under the 2015 Election Law, non-party members and self-nominated candidates are allowed to run for office alongside CPV members. However, the whole electoral process is strictly controlled by the CPV. It is overseen by the National Election Council, which is headed by the National Assembly President, who is a high-ranking CPV member. Candidates are subjected to a stringent vetting process led by the para-governmental mass organisation Vietnam Fatherland Front through several rounds of consultations. This opaque process enables the CPV to review and reject any candidates it deems unfavourable. The independent candidates not only risk disqualification, but also harassment, intimidation, and arrest.

Recommendations

In the context of the upcoming EU-Vietnam human rights dialogue, FIDH and VCHR call on the EU to:

- Demand the Vietnamese government release as a matter of priority environmental lawyer Đặng Đình Bách, writer Phạm Đoan Trang, and independent journalist Phạm Chí Dũng, and provide information on the current status of detained labour reformists Nguyễn Văn Bình and Vũ Minh Tiến, as well as VIETSE consultants Lê Quốc Anh and Dương Việt Đức.
- Urge the Vietnamese authorities to provide access to data concerning the current use of the death penalty.
- Call on the Vietnamese authorities to ensure that EU officials and representatives are allowed to visit prisoners and observe trials.
- Issue a unilateral statement at the conclusion of the human rights dialogue that comprehensively addresses the EU's key concerns, including relating to individual cases, and that clearly indicates what reforms or other measures have been agreed upon by both parties during the dialogue.

More generally, FIDH and VCHR calls on the EU to recommend the Vietnamese government take all the necessary steps to:

- Immediately and unconditionally release all persons detained for the peaceful and legitimate exercise of their rights to freedom of expression, peaceful assembly, association, and freedom of religion or belief.
- Cease arbitrary arrests and other attacks and acts of harassment of human rights defenders, bloggers, government critics, religious followers, and environmental and labour rights advocates.
- Undertake a thorough reform of the Criminal Code within a determined timeframe. This entails amending the vaguely worded "national security" provisions to bring them into line with international standards and ensure that they are not used to arbitrarily arrest and imprison peaceful dissidents.
- Commit to a timeframe for implementing a moratorium on the death penalty and decriminalising remaining offences punishable by death.
- Repeal Decree 126 and adopt a law on associations that guarantees the right to freedom of association in line with Article 22 of the ICCPR.
- Urgently reform the complex tax laws to ensure that all registered NGOs can readily comply with them and ensure that they are not used to target environmental leaders and human rights defenders.
- Ensure human rights defenders and civil society organisations have access to funds, including from foreign sources, for the purpose of defending environmental and human rights.
- Ratify ILO Convention 87 on Freedom of Association and the Right to Organize
- Revise the Labour Code to bring it into line with core ILO standards and ensure that local level representative organisations are allowed to operate independently, including to petition their employers on issues of worker rights without fear of reprisals through the use "national security" provisions in the Criminal Code.
- Revise the Law on Belief and Religion to bring it into line with Article 18 of the ICCPR and repeal provisions in all domestic legislation which conditions the exercise of rights and freedoms on the interests of the Communist Party of Vietnam and the state.
- Ensure that all persons deprived of their liberty have the right to a fair trial, including the right to communicate in a timely manner with a defense counsel of their own choosing, in conformity with Articles 9 and 14 of the ICCPR.

- Improve detention conditions in conformity with the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (“Nelson Mandela Rules”).
- Thoroughly investigate all allegations of torture and ill-treatment and ensure that perpetrators are held accountable and that families of the victims receive reparation.
- Take measures to ensure competitive general elections that allow the registration and participation of other political parties and independent candidates.
- Establish an independent body tasked with the management of all electoral processes.

Concerning the EU-Vietnam Trade Agreement (EVFTA), FIDH and VCHR urge the EU to:

- Strongly condemn the arbitrary detention of human rights defenders and civil society representatives and actively seek to obtain their immediate release.
- Stress the importance of civil society in the implementation of EVFTA, and work closely with Vietnam to ensure civil society can act freely, participate in public affairs, and monitor and document the implementation of the EVFTA.
- Raise concerns about violations of EVFTA commitments, including those laid out in the Trade and Sustainable Development chapter and in the essential elements clause of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, in conjunction with Articles 17.18 and 17.22 of the EVFTA, and inform the Vietnamese government of complaints filed by civil society organisations to the European Commission’s Directorate General for Trade in relation to such concerns.
- Impress upon the Vietnamese government that the EU is ready to mobilise the human rights clause, envisaging dedicated conditionality and adequate measure on this basis, including the setting up of a dedicated human rights monitoring body to assess the respect of human rights commitments under the EVFTA - as requested by the European Parliament in 2020 when it consented to the ratification of EVFTA.

The above recommendations should be used to develop a precise and measurable set of deliverables for the EU ahead of the human rights dialogue with Vietnam.