La Lettre

FIDH Newsletter

Will the fourth intergovernmental Euro-Mediterranean conference in Marseilles in November 2000 be the opportunity to give renewed impetus to the partnership that was launched in Barcelona five years ago? Nothing is less certain, in spite of the fact that governments and members of the European Parliament, with its French presidency, the Commission and representatives of civil society all agree that this strategic project is taking too long and hope, each in his own way, to proceed to a new stage. The enormous efforts being made are largely due to the scale of the political crisis on the Southern shores of the Mediterranean, a crisis which has resulted in continuing, if not worsening, human rights violations and violations of the rights of peoples in the region by the States, which are implementing a kind of convergence strategy in their establishment of authoritarian practices, and also by non-State agents. The few rays of democracy that some countries emit cannot erase the memory of the occupation of Syrian territory, the continuous and ongoing denial of the rights of the Palestinian people, the prevention by numerous countries of any peaceful change of government, internal armed conflicts which have devastated societies, and discrimination against women, inscribed in laws and in people's minds ...

Even if all the regional plans for horizontal integration (Union of North West Arab States, the League of Arab States) seem to be in a state of paralysis, the peoples of the region have enduring memories of the suffering of those to whom they feel historically and culturally close. The Euro-Mediterranean partnership cannot ignore the long-term consequences of the Gulf War, or the embargo against Libya, and act as if the peoples of this region should somehow mentally dissociate themselves from these events. This is what is probably going to generate a new breath of air for the Partnership: understanding the environment as a whole and the profound solidarity societies feel towards one another.

The spirit of the plans designed in Barcelona went hand in hand with three postures adopted by Europe in its policies concerning the region - selective interference, with intervention, including armed, in certain conflicts and a reprehensible inertia in others; acting like a submissive partner, in particular in the Middle East with the acceptance at Oslo of a sharing of roles (the United States looking to the politics and Europe the economics); a twofold obsession with security, caused by a fear that the region's instability could disturb Europe's tranquillity and a pathological terror of moving populations. For new winds to blow in the Mediterranean it is not just financial commitments that are required - there has to be political will and vision.

Patrick Baudouin, President of the FIDH
Driss El Yazami, Joint Secretary General of the FIDH

SPECIAL SUPPLEMENT
State of Law and Democracy in the Mediterranean
The Euro-Mediterranean partnership
PARADOXES OF THE PARTNERSHIP
Human rights :
"a major concern for the EU"
The Marseilles civil forum
Freedom of Association:
let's have done with ruses
WHERE ARE THEY?
For Truth and Justice in Algeria

SPECIAL SUPPLEMENT:

State of Law and Democracy
in the Mediterranean Region

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The Values of the Partnership

In the beginning it was an ambition - to build a space "for peace, stability and prosperity" in the Euro-Mediterranean region by forging a close partnership founded on objectives filled with promise:

* to work simultaneously on three areas - political, economic and "humanity" - now seen as inseparable;

* to turn the commitments of those countries concerned into legal obligations, freely subscribed to, with the conclusion of bilateral association agreements between the European Union and the States around the Mediterranean;

* to make it the partnership's central goal to achieve the consolidation of the Rule of Law, of Democracy and of respect for Human Rights

* to prescribe the tools necessary to achieve this goal - "human rights clauses", which qualify these rights as essential elements of the association agreements, constituting in this way, if they were to be violated, a legitimate reason to suspend the execution of the agreement; and finance, with the creation of a line of credit called "MEDA democracy" in the European Union budget;

* to view civil society as playing an integral part in the relations traditionally limited to the States alone.

It is now five years since the 15 countries of the European Union and 12 States of the South and East Mediterranean adopted the so-called Barcelona Declaration, which constitutes, along with the association agreements which complete it, the basis of this partnership. On the 16 and 17 November, the fourth intergovernmental Barcelona follow-up conference, which will take place in Marseilles, will be a time to take stock. We expect it to be candid and exhaustive (put in jeopardy by the crisis in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, the balance of the partnership was also altered by the priority given to its economic dimension which Leila Shahid in this issue calls Europe's "political abdication").

But the partnership has nonetheless made a hole in the oppressive wall of arbitrariness and has given rise to the hope that it will bring it down altogether. Associations have emerged demanding equality for women or justice for the disappeared and their families. They are declaring their independence from the governments in power, and have made enough noise that for the last two years, these governments have been doing everything in their power to stop them. We welcome the meeting in Marseilles in the wake of the responses made to these governments, which can only serve as a new impulse - a political one - for the partnership, based on the values embodied in human rights.

Antoine Bernard
Executive Director of the FIDH

A new regional association which is taking a long time to produce results

>>As an initiative equivalent to the realisation of a free trade area on a small scale, can the construction of a Euro Mediterranean area result in the emergence of a true partnership and a "contractual sharing of risks" which would make the Euro-Mediterranean partnership (PEM) a medium for development, a decisive factor for peace and stability but also an incentive for far-reaching institutional and political change? The challenge is particularly daring - and fraught with hazards - since the process which arose from the limbo at Barcelona in November 1995, appears to be marking time and requires fresh enthusiasm to make it more dynamic and effective.

On the eve of the 4th Euro-Mediterranean conference (16th and 17th November 2000) , it is worth recalling the stages which marked the first five years of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership, which was launched formally in Barcelona, (Catalonia, Spain) in November 1995 and which must now be revitalised.

Several institutions and publications have taken initiatives on these lines and the document "Common European Union strategy on the Mediterranean region", adopted by the Santa Maria da Feira (Portugal) European Council on the 19th and 20th June 2000, asked the European Council to undertake "to re-examine completely the Barcelona process in cooperation with its Mediterranean partners in order to instill into it fresh enthusiasm and make it more dynamic and effective".

This common strategy document was conceived and adopted in parallel with the finalising - apparently more laborious and opaque - of the well-known "Euro-Mediterranean Charter for Peace and Security" which committed the EU and its partners, known as "third world Mediterranean countries" and which the French Presidency would like to be able to have adopted by the Marseilles conference. At this level also a major central point of the discussions and negotiations in progress is the outline of a report of the difficulties confronting the Barcelona process.

For its part, since March 2000 the European Parliament has adopted an important "resolution on Mediterranean policy" which starts with the acknowledgement "the Barcelona process is taking a long time to produce results, the reasons for the delay being not only technical, i.e. the cumbersome nature of administrative procedures and the methods of applying the programme, but also political, i.e. difficulties of the peace process in the Middle East, the Balkans crisis and the European crisis".

Barcelona 1995 and the new Euro-Mediterranean association

Let us first recall for the record that since the Sixties the European Community has tried to institute a Mediterranean policy under the form of, first, commercial concessions, then bilateral financial cooperation based on a traditional aid project, followed by the institution of four financial protocols and, finally, the initiative known as the renewed Mediterranean policy introduced soon after the Gulf War. In parallel with these policies and programmes, the Seventies and Eighties were marked by the commencement and aborting of the Euro-Arab dialogue followed at the beginning of the Nineties by the Summit at Western Mediterranean level, known as the 5 + 5, and of the project, which also was aborted, of a conference on security and co-operation in the Mediterranean which endeavoured to organise the Mediterranean area in a manner inspired by the CSCE/OSCE experience.

It was under these conditions that in Barcelona on the 27th and 28th November 1995 the Euro-Mediterranean partnership (PEM) - an initiative common to the 15 EU member States, the European Commission and the 12 Mediterranean countries outside the EU - was presented by its promoters as "the first attempt to create solid lasting links between the countries bordering on the Mediterranean".

The Barcelona Declaration proposes to make the Mediterranean basin "an area of dialogue, trade and co-operation to guarantee peace, stability and prosperity". On this basis, it states the principles required to govern the institution of "a global partnership through increased regular political dialogue, the development of economic and financial cooperation and upgrading of social, cultural and human development".

The three parts of the PEM are thus clearly determined. Although the first part, political and security, and the third, social cultural and human, are clearly affirmed, the economic and financial part however constitutes the major motivation for this new association, the cornerstone of which is the gradual institution of a Mediterranean free trade area by 2010.

Since it is within the framework of the vast globalisation movement of economic and financial exchanges, according to its promoters the dismantling of customs barriers has three objectives. They consider that it amounts "to containing the deterioration of the situation of the Mediterranean third world countries and the marginalisation of the whole Mediterranean in the world economy", thus reducing "the migratory pressure and rise of radical political movements", while warding off "the threat of manifestation of internal conflict and regional excesses" .

The relevance and validity of this approach and these objectives are legitimately the object of controversy and objection among civilians in the countries concerned, especially because of the economic and social tensions which they could cause. But the fact remains that the Barcelona Conference has, four years after the crisis caused by the Gulf War, established a situation characterised by a convergence of interests.

The European Union may in fact have a true economic interest in creating a vast trading area in the Mediterranean by counting on the "anticipated effects of the creation of financially viable demand in the south and east of the Mediterranean, on the dynamics of the economies concerned and, as a result, on the growth of European exports". For their part, the Mediterranean third world countries expect to obtain substantial economic and political advantage from being connected to the European centre and from the institution of new joint development strategies.

Added to this is the fact that for the Mediterranean countries concerned PEM would permit the restoration of the balance of Europe towards the south when the prospect of enlargement of the EU is stated to be towards the East in the direction of the Central and Eastern European countries.

Finally, it is clear that after the Oslo accords the Middle East peace process constituted a significant incentive for committing Europe towards the global Euro-Mediterranean approach. PEM was in fact able to promote regional political dialogue, even if, on the other hand, the vicissitudes of the peace process have had an adverse effect on its development by tarnishing the activities conducted under the Barcelona process. Hence the importance of the efforts which were expressed, especially in the Berlin European Declaration.

The PEM and its bilateral and multilateral dimensions

The Barcelona Declaration refers to the multilateral aspect of Euro-Mediterranean relationships and association accords by expressing the bilateral aspect. Since the partnership must draw its synergy from these two approaches, it will be observed that so far no model of multilateral accord has been submitted for discussion. Since it is gradually replacing other forms of EU financial intervention in the region, the MEDA programme of assistance therefore constitutes a decisive PEM financial tool (base amount: 3,424.5 million ecus before the 1995 - 1999 period).

Administration of this programme has brought difficulties, irregularities (especially relating to decentralised cooperation) and malfunctions which can seriously damage the future of the PEM

Since structural adjustment policies are given preference, EU intervention has abandoned certain priorities accepted as such in the global approach defined at Barcelona, especially support for investment and employment.

The Barcelona commitments have taken a long time to produce results, especially as under these conditions the association accords have revealed serious delays in being established.

Human rights and the rule of law dimension of the PEM

The commitments relating to human rights and rule of law undertaken at Barcelona and reaffirmed in the document of "common EU strategy in respect of the Mediterranean region" introduce a new spirit into the relationship of Europe with its Mediterranean partners.
It is precisely at this level that there is difficulty because it takes time for this new spirit to be put into practice consistently and coherently.

Three themes may be considered to illustrate the difficulties of a step of this nature.

First, the procedures for implementing the well-known Article 2 of the Association Accords making respect of human rights and democratic principles an "essential element" of the accords.

These procedures are only in the embryo stage and the aim of the majority of countries in the south and east of the Mediterranean is to explicitly or implicitly avoid their consequences and the new significance. Countries along the north of the Mediterranean have not shown sufficient desire to implement the rights of Man clauses.

This is a major challenge to which NGOs must give priority.

The second illustration relates to the right of women to have effective equality and true citizenship. The reluctance of the Barcelona Declaration on this point has during the last five years led to strong protests which have undeniably been echoed in the European Parliament;but the repercussions in terms of programmes and priority projects are still limited.

The third illustration concerns the nagging question of migration and asylum which causes severe tension on both sides on the Mediterranean. On this point a development was initiated by the Tampere (Finland) European Council on the 15th and 16th October 1999, with the accent on the desire "to develop a common European policy relating to asylum and migration".

These are only a few of the many illustrations which could be given. They range from the often eluded acknowledgement of the marginality of south to south trade to the difficulties of attempts at sub-regional integration, including the efforts to restructure the debt and associate these questions with joint development policies. The prevention and settlement of disputes moreover call for the introduction of effective mechanisms which take a long time to take shape. The EU is thus asked to state its approach to the partnership in order to show that the partnership is not restricted to the free trade area but that "it implies a contractual sharing of the risk with the countries who are firmly committed to it" so that the Euro-Mediterranean partnership is not only a vehicle for development but also an incentive for far-reaching institutional and policy change.

In 1992 Eric Orsenna, writer and one of the architects of the development of the Mediterranean policy which was being introduced at the time, stressed the fact that countries to the south of the Mediterranean had to find ways of lasting development. "It is obvious that it also benefits Europe, he added". So cooperation for development, he concluded, "development together with liberty, tolerance, democracy, collective security and peace, with the absolutely essential element of the rights of individuals and of peoples".

Eight years later, from the point of view of both the Marseilles Intergovernmental Conference and the "Euromed Civil Forum", these apparently obvious established facts nevertheless retain all their topical nature.

Kéhmaïs Chammari

>>In November 1995 at the Barcelona Conference, human rights could do no more than support the objectives set out by the States in the region on the respect for human rights. Five years later, what progress can be measured from their investment in the Euro-Mediterranean partnership? Has the partnership resulted in any significant improvement in the respect for rights and fundamental liberties?

The results are fairly mixed, if one considers the number of violations that still go on: arbitrary arrests and unfair trials; almost universal practice of torture, breaches of womens' rights and forced disappearances, falsified elections and summary executions, occupations and refusal of the right of self-determination…….. this is in fact the lot of civil populations in the region, despite the noble speeches. Behind the flights of fancy about civil society, one can hear if one listens carefully the cry of suppliants around the Mediterranean.

The result is even worse when one remembers the reservations made by some important countries in the partnership (Egypt, Algeria, Jordan…..) in December 1998 when the UN adopted the Declaration on Human Rights Defenders, the defamatory press campaigns against these defenders, and the harrassment which they suffered, the entry into force of the Arab Convention against Terrorism with its ragbag of charges etc.

Even if you only take into account these elements - there are many other black marks - you can easily conclude that we made a mistake in investing in the Euro-Mediterranean partnership - which in the end is only a make-up on old colonial relationships.

But during these same years the activity of movements and associations of human rights has never been so intense, and the partnership in some ways facilitated this dynamism. Taking advantage of the human rights clause in the Barcelona Declaration and the Asssociation Agreements, defenders have widened the scope of their activities, working together national action, intervention in UN mechanisms and involving the partnership authorities. At the same time they also reinforced horizontal solidarity. All the meetings organised since December 1995 (training seminars, civil forums, thematic meetings) in fact not only enabled the re-inforcement of relationships between the Northern and Southern shores, but also within each geographical region. It is particularly evident for defenders of the South who were able to get round the many obstacles put in the way of their co-ordination by "brother States"

This advance over the last five years cannot of course override the deficiencies, the failures to observe undertakings and missed opportunities One only has to see the political absence of the European Union in the Middle East or the continued inaction over the Algerian crisis. In fact one could multiply the examples and fairly easily show that the reference made to human rights in texts and speeches is at best only a cover-up for political impotence in the States of the Partnership, and at worst the fig-leaf for cold cynical policies. One could even argue that the Partnership has been a failure from the start, as the differences between the two groupings are so strong - even irreversible.

On the one hand we have Europe, apparently united in spite of its difficulties, and on the other hand States of the South which each negotiate separately without a common strategy. In the North there are developed democratic countries and in the South poor countries with authoritarian or despotic systems. One figure alone summarises the disparities: the average annual income per inhabitant is 700 dollars in the South against 18 000 dollars in the North. Finally while immigration enriches Europe as a whole and shows its diversity, the partners in the South have more and more difficulties to maintain their pluralism and to manage democratically their cultural and religious diversity. L:ooked at over a long period, from colonialisation to today, the histories of the two shores are marked by movements exactly parallel, but in opposite directions: on the one hand societies which are diversifying, and on the other countries where pluralism is starved. In the North, countries where diversity is stressed, even though it survives through moments of crisis and confrontation, and opposite groups which draw blood, as if affected by a slow human bleeding.: historic minorities who have always lived there have often disappeared for ever or view their future less and less where they are; legitimate claims are still ignored - like the Amazigh question or the problem of the Copts.

However it is because of the extent of these challenges that we must constantly press this crucial part of the Partnership. At a time of globalisation, no country of the South can face alone all the problems which attack it. Unless there is not at least in the near future a reasonable chance of economic and politically horizontal integration, the connection of countrie s of the South to a democratic grouping, developed and integrated like the European Union, might constitute a credible alternative. This reasoned challenge does not exclude other objectives, a Maghreb Union, nor event the consideration of other Utopian possibilities. So while the dream of Arab unity as crystallised over recent decades, have not been a success, one cannot ignore the historic, cultural an natural unity for which these societies have been struggling, nor the geographical p[roximity and solidarity. So despite the paradoxes, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership could still enable the resumption of other reconstruction on a universalist basis.

Driss El Yazami

INTERVIEW

'Europe mustn't act like the rich man who thinks he always knows best'

Michel Rocard conducted a mission on the Palestinian Authority mandated by the Council on Foreign Relations, the report of which was published in May 1999. The report dealt with the establishment of institutions for a future Palestinian state in the framework of the peace process. In an exclusive interview for La Lettre, he talks about the peace process in the context of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership.

By signing the Barcelona Declaration in 1995, the states of the Mediterranean rim dedided to turn the Mediterranean into an area of peace and stability. Do you think that by participating in this project, the European Union can strengthen its role in the peace process?

The construction of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership is the centre-piece of the Barcelona Declaration and it cannot be reached as long as the Israeli-Palestinian peace process has not been successful. But the peace process does not depend on the progress of the partnership. Today, negotiations take place between the partners directly and if there is an arbiter, it is not the European Union, it is the United States. The European Union has a strategic interest in the success of the peace process, given the geographical proximity of the conflict. Its contribution to the peace process is rather an economic contribution, and I am not in favour of a strengthening of the role of the EU in the negotiations. That would only be a further obstacle, which does not prevent the United States from being too lenient when Israel closes the borders and thus deprives thousands of Palestinians of staple goods. On the other hand, the whole area needs support for its economic development to better organise production and promote the emergence of state institutions. I would like to remind you of the fact that among the Arab peoples, it is the Palestinians who have the highest proportion of graduates from well-known Western universities. Europe has to support that trend. Once peace has been obtained, the Americans will want to be less involved with Palestine simply because is not in their immediate neighbourhood. One can already see that there is twice as much trade between Israel and Europe as with the United States, although the Israeli elite is clearly more 'US-oriented' than 'EU-oriented'.

In the wake of the launch of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership,the European Union signed bilateral membership agreements with the Palestinian Authority and with Israel. These agreements contain a human rights clause. The question is how to make use of it to encourage countries to respect their international human rights commitments.

One of the problems today is that neither Israeli nor Palestinian leaders have enough popular support to get their own people to accept the sacrifices imposed by the present situation. This is particularly true as far as the right of Palestinian refugees to return is concerned, and the same goes for the situation of Jerusalem. One of the consequences is that there is still a fear in public opinion about security. In this context, the European Union cannot come parading in like some rich man who wants to lecture them how things ought to be done. The Palestinian Authority is the only country in the Arab world that is gradually heading towards a respected legislative power and a concept that one may call secular authority, bearing in mind the religious diversity of its population. This is perceived as frigthening by the neighbouring countries. If Palestinian society settles in such a 'secular' system with a genuine freedom of association, as we hope that it will, the rift between Palestine and the rest of the Arab world will grow deeper. The human rights clauses must enable the Union to go along with the progress made rather than link its relationship with the Palestinian Authority to full respect for human rights. In other words, I believe that the human rights clauses must be part of the dialogue, even if it is true that, officially and in legal terms, they allow one of the parties to the agreement to unilaterally suspend the implementation of the membership agreement in the case of human rights violations. By acting in that way, I am worried that, in practice, and as we have seen in Africa, Europe might try to come across as holier than thou, and that would be counter-productive. On the other hand, any interference by the Union outside the economic sphere would be a blow to the peace process.

'What does supporting the Palestinian Authority entail?

There are two aspects to supporting the Palestinian Authority. What is needed on the one hand is a strong state with solid structures, i.e. a genuine tax system, genuine control over resources, no corruption; in short, a social structure which is very well organised, while this structure must also allow an independent legal system, introduce freedom of association and allow for the fight against corruption and respect for human rights. These two aspects are necessary and complement each other. Our struggle combines the two aspects while giving precedence to neither one nor the other, and by taking into account the sociological dimension of the situation, which is that of the construction of a Palestinian state.

Antoine Bernard and Sara Guillet

Presentation

Human rights: "a major concern for the EU"

Conversation with the French Ambassador, Jean-Pierre Courtois

France holds the presidency of the European Union from 1st July to 31st December 2000. In this capacity, it is co-ordinating the Euro-Mediterranean partnership which the EU and 12 countries to the south and east of the Mediterranean undertook to build by signing the "Barcelona Declaration". What positions does France defend in order to place human rights at the heart of the partnership, as the 27 signatories to the declaration committed themselves to do? French Ambassador Jean-Pierre Courtois is in charge of the Barcelona process.

The political commitment of Barcelona was given its legal counterpart when the EU and the Mediterranean countries signed association agreements, including a human rights clause. What role is being played by France, during its presidency of the EU, to ensure that this clause is applied?

Respect for human rights and the promotion of the rule of law are rightly included in the commitments made by the 27 partners in the Euro-Mediterranean process. Their importance is not being neglected. In fact, this issue is, and will remain, a major preoccupation for the 15 states of the European Union, including of course France. However, we should not hide from the fact that progress will only be possible if we manage to reconcile our demands with an approach based on dialogue and co-operation, which is particularly necessary for Mediterranean countries. This is why, during our presidency and if possible at Marseilles, we will propose to all our partners that Euro-Mediterranean co-operation be further developed in the area of justice and internal affairs, with particular emphasis on reinforcing the rule of law.

Countries in the region are currently negotiating a peace and stability charter. How will this reconcile their concerns in terms of anti-terrorism and immigration control with the ambition asserted at Barcelona of bolstering human exchanges and combating arbitrary decisions?

Those are two distinct issues that cover very different realities and concerns but which nevertheless, in many respects, fall within what is called the human dimension of the partnership. We have shown that we were aware of their importance by proposing to our partners from the South that we should engage in a specific dialogue on each of them; this was initiated in 1997 and had continued ever since. The main aim of the dialogue is to foster understanding in the immediate future and then try to harmonise positions on issues that are by nature very sensitive and difficult. As for the stability charter, it is designed, in a more general way, to enhance political dialogue between the 27 partners.

Has the Euro-Mediterranean partnership helped the peace process?

I believe that it has undeniably helped create a climate favourable to the peace process, even if its contribution was only indirect, as Barcelona, in parallel with the peace process, has maintained a framework for dialogue and co-operation between all the partners. I would add that this should not make us any less aware of the major role that the Euro-Mediterranean partnership will have to play in future, in the post-peace-process phase, to develop stability in the region.

What do you expect from Marseilles?

We are both ambitious and realistic. As demonstrated by our initiative to host the conference in Marseilles during our presidency, we will do everything possible to ensure that it leads to a revival of the Barcelona process at a time when it faces its main challenges: firstly, to make Euro-Mediterranean co-operation more effective and more visible within the framework of MEDA; secondly, we hope to get the draft charter approved on this occasion, if the context permits. At the same time, we are well aware that this can only be one step along the way, however important it may be, and that, to succeed, the process will obviously require an effort from the presidencies that follow us.

Interview by S.G.

The Marseilles civil forum

the commitments they made in Barcelona on key issues such as human rights, democracy, culture and the environment. Alongside the NGOs' civil forum, there will also be a trades union forum and a local authority forum.

An NGO collective to prepare for the civil forum

Several NGOs, which participated at the previous civil forum in the margin of the third ministerial follow-up summit to Barcelona, held in Stuttgart in April 1999, formed a collective in autumn 1999 with the aim of preparing for the Marseilles civil forum. They agreed to use the forum to emphasise the following four themes: rule of law and democracy; peace and conflict prevention; environment and local development; culture and human exchanges. FIDH and the European human rights network (REMDH) are co-ordinating the organisation of the "rule of law and democracy" part of the forum. The NGO meeting will bring together around 300 persons, around half from the Southern Mediterranean and half from Europe. However, the really innovative feature of the summit will be the mobilisation it will generate.

FIDH and REMDH have organised several activities in preparation for the summit, bringing together many of the region's human rights defenders. The activities have included the first Euro-Mediterranean meeting between families of the disappeared in February 2000, a seminar on freedom of association in Casablanca from 5th to 7th October and a conference entitled "women of the Mediterranean, between physical violence and symbolic violence" in Marseilles on 27th and 28th October.

NGOs mobilised to construct a Euro-Mediterranean partnership founded on human rights

The human rights movement in the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean has seen unprecedented growth in recent years. Several human rights NGOs have been created and, though most of them work in very difficult conditions (with the authorities refusing to grant them legal authorisation, their members suffering harassment, bans on financial assistance from abroad, etc), they have boosted awareness and made human rights one of the key issues of the region.

The Euro-Mediterranean human rights network and FIDH now represent over 80 non governmental organisations, institutions and individual interlocutors, in all the countries of the region. With their members, they are helping to build a Euro-Mediterranean partnership founded on the respect of human rights by developing training, information and awareness-raising activities for the various players in the Barcelona process – human rights defenders and government representatives – concerning the place of human rights in the Euro-Mediterranean partnership, and by calling on the states and the European institutions to translate into reality the undertakings they have made in terms of human rights. FIDH and REMDH took part in the three previous follow-up conferences to Barcelona, the last of which, in Stuttgart, saw a real turning point, with a forum on human rights and citizenship which, together with the other forums (environment, unions) was able to transmit its recommendations directly to the representatives of the states at the end of their official summit. Thus, for the first time, it was possible to establish a direct link between civil society and the official summit.

A key subject of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership, human rights will be at the centre of discussions during the Marseilles civil forum, which will bring together a large number of NGOs from the region, active in the various sectors, notably the environment, peace and conflict prevention, youth and culture. A number of meetings have already been held or are being prepared, putting the emphasis on key questions in the area of human rights in the region, the results of which will be transmitted to participants in the civil forum. As human rights network heads of the civil forum, FIDH and REMDH have set themselves the following main objectives: - To raise the awareness of Euro-Mediterranean partners to the human rights situation in the countries of the region and to evaluate the development of the human rights dimension of the Barcelona process since November 1995. - To call upon the states to act in accordance with the commitments made in the Barcelona Declaration. - To make the Marseilles meeting a space for information exchange, discussion and experience sharing for human rights defenders in the region. - To involve human rights defenders as much as possible in preparations for the civil forum.

In concrete terms, FIDH and REMDH propose to hold workshops on human rights, with emphasis on: - The important role of the respect of human rights in conflict resolution in the region. - The reform of legislation and the development of practice with a view to promoting the full participation of civil society in the Barcelona process, particularly for human rights defenders. - The key role of respecting the human rights of migrants and refugees in human exchanges and mutual understanding. - The essential indivisibility and universality of human rights in the construction of the rule of law.

Marseilles: a tribune for the region's human rights defenders

At the civil forum, FIDH and REMDH will hold a series of human rights workshops, which will be attended by their members and several international human rights NGOs active in the region. This will provide the human rights defenders of the region with a tribune with which to disseminate and share information and testimony on the state of human rights and freedoms around the Mediterranean rim. The workshops will be an opportunity to review the past five years and to formulate proposals for the future, based on the benchmark texts of the Barcelona process (Barcelona Declaration, European Parliament resolutions, document on the joint strategy of the European Union with regard to the Mediterranean region) and in the context of negotiations on the Euro-Mediterranean charter on security and stability, the adoption of which should be one of the key points of the intergovernmental summit in Marseilles. The recommendations adopted will be transmitted to the 27 states concerned and to the European Union.

S.G.

Freedom of Association : let's have done with ruses

>> A civil society that is emancipated and liberated from all shackles of the state is by far the best indicator of a progressive democracy. To satisfy the demands of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and international instruments, it is not enough merely to proclaim freedom of association in a Constitution or a law. For the most part, those countries which are signatories to the Barcelona Declaration officially recognise this freedom as fundamental in their legislation. So appearances seem to have been saved

However, in the majority of these same countries, this freedom is limited. Founding an association is often like tackling an obstacle course: the obstacles and administrative constraints are in place to discourage all thought of such associations. Consent is never obtained without there having first been a refusal. The vagueness of an association's legal status, which is never actually approved, but whose existence and activities are finally tolerated, allows the powers that be at any moment to tighten the noose and invoke the lack of approval to place the association in the wrong, if ever it should constitute a threat to those powers. So this is what happens when an association seems likely, through its activities, to endow its members with too great a freedom of action and speech regarding the life of the city, or even to weaken an autocratic power which has no desire to allow a political alternative to develop for which a strong lay group would be an ideal breeding ground. In the case of Tunisia, that's an understatement, because there associations defending human rights are literally gagged by all available means. Their offices are placed under close surveillance while their organisers are regularly dragged before tribunals and condemned to heavy prison sentences, merely on account of their campaigning activities. The security machinery put in place by President Ben Ali is a continual reminder that the margin of freedom permitted to lay people only exists in as far as it serves the int! erests of the regime. In Egypt the government fears the increasing influence of lay groups which organise themselves, think and raise problems; after having brought to their knees most of the opposition parties either by banning them or arresting the activists, and muzzling the independent press, the government then focussed its coercive measures on associations defending human rights, organs which are the last bastion of free speech. After having thus gained the upper hand, the Egyptian authorities intended to get across to lay people, whom they regarded as far too rebellious and openly critical of the government, that their hour of freedom had not yet come: their methods for achieving this range from the more innocuous like a legal reform which blocks the right to form associations or reduces the freedom of the press, to the more brutal like the arrest of the general secretary of a human rights organisation (OEDH/ EODH??) on the day before the 50th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the initiation of an investigation concerning an offence against national security by publishing a report about attacks on the rights of one of the religious minorities, in this case the Coptic minority. By doing this, the Egyptian government risks being called to account by the whole international community. In it defence, it would have no qualms about hastily den- ouncing interference, invoking a state of emergency and the threat which hangs over the country to justify its actions, emphasising that ever convenient difference in cultures, in order to try to legitimise exceptions to universal principles……. If rights are universal and, in order not to lose their impact, are unaffected by cultural relativism, whether the country is in the South, East, North or West, where democracy does not exist or is still faltering, or where it is looked upon unfavourably for lay people to have too great an influence on the life of the city, the methods of restricting those rights are always the same. Some associations are more exposed than others by the nature of their activities. Defenders of human rights, lawyers, doctors, being the best placed spectators and the best informed about violations of rights and fundament- al liberties, are also the prime targets for governments who are uncomfortable with the idea of emancipation for the common people. The case of Turkey is a good example of the blunders of a government which has become used to the idea of a strong lay society, but which tenses the moment the ideological foundations of the Turkish nation, conceived on the Jacobine model, (that is one, secular and indivisible), is at risk of being shaken or challenged. Lay society in Turkey exists and has expanded rapidly since the beginning of the 90's. Before his incarceration, Akin Birdal, the Honorary President of the Turkish Association of Human Rights (IHD??), at this moment in prison in Ankara where he is serving a 10 months' prison sentence for holding unacceptable opinions, was certainly the most sought out personality by foreign delegations, both governmental and non-governmental. This greatly displeased the authorities, exasperated by his growing popularity, especially since the assassination attempt which nearly cost him his life in May 1998. Notwithstanding, by reason of the position he adopts and his speeches in favour of a peaceful solution to the Kurdish question, Akin Birdal is the object of real legal harassment which ends up behind bars. In the same way, the South-Eastern sections of the IDH (??) regularly witness their organisers handed over to special tribunals and their offices ordered to be closed. For two years it has been the turn of the members of the Turkish Foundation of Human Rights to be handed over, on a variety of pretexts, to common law criminal tribunals or special tribunals. The Foundation dedicates itself to the psyc! hological and social rehabilitation of victims of torture, which is practised on a large scale in Turkish police stations, and whose perpetrators continue to benefit from an unacceptable impunity. The Federation's audience abroad irritates Ankara and it was not long before its work, which is nevertheless indispensable, was being blamed for Turkey's deteriorating image. And yet freedom of association is still being proclaimed here as in the other countries of the region. Its exercise becomes perilous when it touches on questions damaging to an authoritarian regime. …. Here as elsewhere, democracy will truly exist when the State stops playing tricks, once and for all, with the universal principles it proclaims.

Benedicte Chesnelong

WHERE ARE THEY?

>> At least 20,000 'disappeared' in Mediterranean countries. At least 20,000 cases of forced disappearance are registered to date in the Mediterran- ean region. If the situations and the contexts are different from one country to another, each time the families of the disappeared experience the same pain and the same desire to know the truth.

In February 2000, at the "first euro-mediterranean meeting of the families of missing persons", a gathering initiated by the FIDH enabled the families of the whole region to get to know each other and testify to the situation which they are experiencing. A breach has been opened in the wall of silence surrounding them. During the 80's, it was the determination of the Latin American families which made it possible for this phenomenon to be recognised at international level. In 1980, under pressure from these families, UNO's Commission on Human Rights formed a forced disappearances working group responsible for investigating cases and undertaking visits to some countries. In 1992 the United Nations adopted the Declaration on the Protection of all Persons against Forced Disappearances which recognises for the first time that forced disappearances, can - in certain cases – be categorised as crimes against humanity. In 1998, this approach was taken up again in the statutes of the International Criminal Court. This constituted so many victories in the legal field for the families of the disappeared. But in practice, much remains to be done, in particular around the Mediterranean where most of the countries continue to deny the existence of the problem; others have recognised it but are trying to brush it under the carpet without first having considered it, while the families are tireless in their request for truth and justice. In Algeria the number of the disappeared was first estimated to be at least 4000. But that was without counting the many families who dared not speak and who, gradually, are reporting new cases, thanks to the work of the associations of the disappeared. But the authorities have made no commitment, and the families are still waiting for a satisfactory reply (see the interview with Mohamed Tahri, the lawyer for the families of the disappeared). In Morocco, the latest developments have led to the creation by the authorities of a commission for compensation to provide redress for the families. An NGO - The Truth and Justice Forum – has also been formed to provide support for the families, co-ordinate their reactions and put pressure on the authorities to persuade them to do more than just offer financial redress to bereaved families and survivors. The Forum is asking for a National Commission for Truth and Justice to be created. In Turkey, it is the suppression of terrorism – and, in fact, of any person suspected of belonging to the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) -, which is the main cause of disappearances. The mothers of the disappeared have organised themselves and hold 'sit-ins' to try to obtain a thorough enquiry into the fate of their relatives. The only response from the authorities has been harassment, short periods of detention and withholding of passports. In Lebanon, at the end of a procedure which was an enquiry in name only, the author- ities maintained that the 17,000 Lebanese who had disappeared during the war were all dead. This was an expeditious way of suppressing the past. Furthermore several hundred Lebanese are still in arbitrary detention in Syria, which refuses to acknow- ledge this fact and only rarely grants visiting rights to families. Many have been secretly detained for 10 years. A few releases in dribs and drabs occasionally raise the families' hopes, but no overall solution seems to be taking shape. Finally, whereas the 160 Lebanese detained in Khiam prison by the Israeli authorities were recently freed following the closure of the detention centre, about 20 Lebanese still remain in Israeli prisons. In Syria about 3000 people have disappeared. Probably only 400 are still alive today. The problem has existed for about 20 years, but the authorities have taken no effective steps to deal with it. As the regime bans all non-governmental organisations for the Defence of Human Rights from its territory, it is particularly difficult to mobilise and coordinate the families. In Egypt, the authorities deny outright the existence of the phenomenon, whereas about 20 disappearances have been reported. What is more, the organisations for the defence of Human Rights regularly report cases of 'temporary disappearances': the families know that their relative is detained, without being able to establish for what motive or at which location (why or where?) until the person is suddenly freed. About 20 cases have been registered in Lybia. This being so, with the country closed to international organisations for the Defence of Human Rights, the families can only mobilise themselves in exile: within the country any action on their part would be immediately stifled. This makes it impossible to have an idea of the precise number of disappearances. (This makes it impossible to make a precise estimate of the scale of the problem). In total, at least 20,000 people……without counting those cases unregistered because the family has failed to lodge a complaint. Where are they? That is the question the representatives of the families – relatives or NGO's – will be asking the States of the region in November in Marseilles. The objective will be to evaluate the ground covered in the construction of a euro-mediterranean partnership based on respect for human rights, which should lead in 2010 to the creation of a free-exchange zone in the Mediterranean. Today, the Mediterranean is a zone haunted by the memory of its disappeared. No lasting partnership will be built there while the citizens have not been able to slake their thirst for truth and justice. As they wait for November, the different associations concerned continue to raise public awareness of the problem so that their missing loved ones are not forgotten by this fourth summit.

L.C & S.G

Interview with Mohamed Tahri.

Mohamed Tahri is a lawyer and an active member of the Algerian League of Human Rights. In an interview with La Lettre he reviews the missing persons situation in his country. He serves as legal counsel to the families of thos e who have disappeared. How has the situation on forced disappearances changed since the first Euro-Mediterranean meeting on the issue was held by the FIDH in February 2000?

That meeting, which brought a number Algerian families together, helped to build a much needed network among victims in Mediterranean countries. In particular it helped to put the case back into regional focus. By working together we are better able to coordinate our efforts and thereby increase our chances of obtaining answers from governments so that the truth may be told and justice administered. Thanks to the courageous resistance of the families, efforts made by the authorities to close cases have failed. Thus statements made by the National Observatory of Human Rights claiming that missing persons had gone underground or abroad have become obsolete. Nobody accepts them anymore. The families are preventing the law from "settling" th e case by filing class action suits to express their categorical refusal of an y procedure involving official declarations of death about which they have not been formally consulted. They organise sit-ins and public demonstrations an d relentlessly question the authorities, who continue to reply with either silence, beatings or legal proceedings in the courts. In this fight however, it can be said that the balance of power is with the families who, in spite of being overpowered by the state, have succeeded in preventing any of their cases from "disappearing" from court backlogs for judiciary, administrative or political reasons. How are the families organised? Increasingly, families are grouping together within associations. The Algerian Human Rights League has created an "SOS Missing Persons Committee" within its ranks. Several other associations, who are not recognised by the government even though they have presented their demands for approval in the correct form, are also involved. This is the case with the National Association of Families of Missing Persons. With the support of lawyers, these associations provide families with legal advice and help to process th e files on every case registered in order to pass them on to national and international authorities. What are your objectives? Still the same - truth and justice. The families want to know the truth - why? How? Who are the perpetrators? Who is responsible? Who are the decision-makers? Within this context they are hoping that the United Nations Working Group on forced and involuntary disappearances will visit Algeria to conduct an on site enquiry and cherish the hope that a commission of international enquiry will come. But we also want to see justice done. As a crime cannot exist without a perpetrator, so equally a crime cannot exist without punishment. It is imperative that the accountability of the perpetrators be established and no matter what their position or responsibilities they must answer for their actions before the international authorities since they refuse to be tried under a local and independent lega l system. In addition to truth and justice the families are demanding the liberation, repatriation and rehabilitation of the survivors and the compensation of the relatives of dead victims. They are determined.

L.C.

Mediterranean Women
Between physical and symbolical violence.

>>Forced marriage, intimidation at work, exploitation, crimes of honour, genital mutilation, conjugal violence, sexual harassment, trafficking, prostitution, unequal pay, discrimination, slavery, rape: women throughout the world are the victims of so many different forms of violence that the list is endless. Whether it is physical, sexual or psychological violence, the underlying cause remains the same for each offender - the supposed inequality of men and women.

The offenders are very different but can be grouped into three main categories according to the United Nations Declaration on the elimination of violence against women. The family is the first category where violence linked to dowries, conjugal rape, genital mutilation and other traditional practices detrimental to women, and non-conjugal violence and violence linke d to exploitation have been recorded. The second category is the community, where women are victims of rape, sexual services, sexual harassment and intimidation at work, in education and elsewhere, of procurement and forced prostitution. Finally the third category is the state - for violence it has either carried out directly or has tolerated. This category incorporates violence generated by the legislation of a given state. No region in the world is a haven of peace for women and whilst each region has its own peculiarities, these three categories are encountered everywhere. They have as a common denominator policies developed by the authorities which are unable to prevent this violence or punish the perpetrators. Commitment is no t lacking however. The governments who met at Barcelona in 1995 to lay the foundations of a Euro-Mediterranean partnership (the fifteen EU countries an d the twelve Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries) asserted that this partnership between the two shores could not be built without strengthening democracy and respect for human rights as they are universally recognised. O f course among these universally recognised rights women's rights appear as fundamental human rights, "women's rights are human rights", as stated that same year by the world conference on women in Beijing. This "Barcelona declaration" however only touches on the situation of women in the region in an incidental manner by underlining their role in economic development only. The building of a Euro-Mediterranean partnership cannot be conceived however without the full participation of Mediterranean women in the economic, social, cultural and political life of their respective societies. Today this participation is being hindered and in certain cases solemnly signed away because inequalities between men and women are found enshrined either in law or in thought processes and because the governments of each region lack the political drive to improve the situation. All of the countries in this region - with the exception of Syria - have ratified the Convention for the elimination of every form of discrimination against women (CEDAW). Upon closer inspection however these international commitments are often limited because they are accompanied by several reservations that r

emove the substance from the main points of this convention. These reservations are generally founded on the Sharia resulting in the legalisation of inequalities between men and women in questions relating to the personal status of women - a designation involving a variety of rules, which vary according to each piece of legislation including those relating t o civil status, affiliation, nationality, legal entitlement, marriage settlement etc. 1 Faced with this situation, Mediterranean women are organising themselves to denounce violence in its various forms and to claim equality, the end of legal discrimination, the fight against negative representations and retrograde social practices. Dozens of women's associations have sprung up i n recent years. Here and there transnational networks have been established whilst thousands of women are putting a lot of effort into non-specialised rights defence associations. Some examples are the "Collectif 95 Maghreb EgalitE9" which gathers together women's rights defenders in Algeria, Moroc co and Tunisia and was established before the world conference in Beijing on women's rights; the "Aisha" network - a forum for Arab women; the Arab NGO network for women in Palestine, Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, Sudan, Yemen and Algeria created in 1992 to promote women's rights and to demand equality in the region and the Arab court for violence committed against women created in 1995 to break down the wall of silence surrounding the victims of violence by allowing them to go and testify. Many local or national associations are themselves members of these networks. On 27th and 28th October 2000, about a hundred women representing these loca l associations and regional networks from the EU and the twelve Southern and Eastern Mediterranean partner countries will meet together with officials from national and international NGOs as well as with political government officials and elected representatives at Marseilles. This is the first time such a meeting has taken place and is on the initiative of the International Federation for Human Rights Leagues (FIDH) and the Euro-Mediterranean Network of Human Rights (REMDH), together with the French Human Rights League. Together they will establish an inventory of the main types of violence perpetrated against women in the region. They will assess those government policies that have been adopted to counter discrimination against women as well as the initiatives taken by the women's associations in the region to combat these discriminations. The organisers' objective (the preparation ha s been coordinated by a piloting committee consisting of about fifteen men and women across 10 different nationalities) is to strengthen the implementation and coordination of the initiatives, giving particular consideration to linking them up with other initiatives currently underway. In order to explain the type of work they carry out the participants will bring differen t testimonies with them - whether testifying to violence suffered personally ( a militant of the Tunisian communist working party forbidden in that country, will tell of torture suffered in detention), or sharing experiences of mobilisation - how they have launched and coordinated campaigns against the crimes of honour in Jordan, in favour of civilian weddings in Lebanon, against the personal code of status in Egypt and in support of a plan to integrate women in Morocco's development etc. Several representatives from the European Institutions (Commission, Council, Parliament) and from various governments are also to be present including France in its capacity as the current president of the European Union. At the close of the conference, the participants will draw up recommendation s for the 27 signatory States of the Barcelona Declaration who will meet fifteen days later, also at Marseilles, for the fourth interdepartmental summit follow-up to this Declaration. They will be called upon to eradicate violence committed against women and to put equality onto the Euro-Mediterranean partnership calendar.

Driss El Yazami Sara Guillet

Notes 1. (See "Un texte vide de sa substance? Bilan des reserves de la Convention" , La Lettre no.11, 25 February 1999, p.89)