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#41
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september
2000
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La Lettre FIDH Newsletter |
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Editorial Chile: The historical decision of the Supreme Court Santiago, September 1973. Who would have thought that 27 years later Augusto Pinochet, who had just seized power following a military coup d'etat, would have to account for his actions before Chilean Justice for the crimes committed during the 17 years of his dictatorship? Certainly not the thousands of people held and tortured in the Santiago Stadium, the corpses floating in the Rio Mapocho which flows through the Chilean capital or Victor Jara the singer whose hands were cut off. So many images came back to us when the Supreme Court of Chile made an historical decision by confirming the terms of the order of the Santiago Court of Appeal which lifted parliamentary immunity of Augusto Pinochet. This decision was in some way a form of posthumous judicial homage to these thousands of victims, which was made possible principally as a result of the persistent and tireless work of the Chilean organisations for the protection of human rights, to which due praise must be given. These organisations were accompanied in their fight by the international community for the protection of the rights of Man. Consequently, a new particularly encouraging page can be written in the history of the legal fight against impunity, the result of complementarity between international criminal justice and Chilean justice. It was after a decision by the UK House of Lords - an essential stage in the affirmation of the principal of universal competence and the fight against impunity at international level - that at the beginning of 1999 Chilean judges were considered authorised to initiate the national judicial process of arresting, detaining and trying many senior officers and Chilean servicemen responsible for crimes, assassinations and torture. Since this judicial process has been initiated in this way, it was no longer possible for Chilean justice to exempt Augusto Pinochet, the principle person responsible, as the decision of the Supreme Court of Santiago testified. Finally, the judgement of the highest Court in the land constitutes further proof of maturity of Chilean society in its delicate transition to democracy. However, the democratic evolution of Chile must no longer be limited to a simple compromise between the military and civil authorities as was the case after 1989 and today's leaders should be encouraged to pursue this work of democratisation by drawing up a new constitution replacing the current one prepared by Augusto Pinochet in 1980 with the sole object of perpetuating his dictatorship. Claude
Katz |
Contents CURRENT
EVENTS
SPECIAL
SUPPLEMENT |
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>> The Democratic Republic of the Congo |
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It is not easy to unravel the tangled threads of the Congolese problem. The Congo, the underbelly of the African continent, is a country with immense mineral and forest wealth and a geographical situation which should have made it one of the driving forces of the continent. The former Zaire has been ravaged by independence achieved through violence and asphyxiated by 32 years of totalitarian rule by Mobutu, followed by three years of dictatorship under Laurent Désiré Kabila. The Democratic Republic of the Congo (RDC) is today a badly leaking ship which every day sinks further into the abysses of poverty and strife. Kabila came to power in 1997 as a result of the largely armed support from the Rwandan and Ugandan authorities. Today he is supported by the Zimbabwean, Angolan and Namibian forces but on his eastern flank is an armed rebellion led by his former allies. These movements are however themselves divided. The Rwandans are now opposed to Kabila and to the Ugandans, while at the same time they are still fighting their own opponents; they control approximately the South East part of the country. The Ugandans themselves control the North East part of the RDC and now support three armed movements. The objective of one is to "overturn" Kabila, another is to protect the Ugandan frontiers from armed movements opposed to Museveni - and against certain threats from Rwanda -, and the third to appropriate the wealth of the region. Finally, each of these rebel groups is threatened by partition. To this confused situation should be added a "transverse" movement by traditional fighters -- the Mau Mau . Although at present the last are still isolated, they must without doubt be reckoned with in the near future. Report prepared by Gregoire Lechat Russian puppets à la Congolese The former Zaire is breaking up more every day. Since 1998 2 rebellions, one an armed uprising by Rwanda, the other by Uganda, have divided up more than half the country. The territories which they occupy are however themselves divided. The Congolese Group for Democracy (Goma RCD), which is supplied with arms by Rwanda, only has real control over the principal towns in the east of the RDC. In the case of the three movements supplied with arms by Uganda, in the North and the North-East of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, each apparently has different objectives. The Congolese Liberation Movement (MLC) of Jean-Pierre Bemba, the headquarters of which are based on Gbadolite in the north of the RDC, is the only one of the three which is still fighting the loyalist army of President Kabila. The young National RCD of Roger Lumbala, which has been in the Bafwasende region for two months, apparently allows Uganda to claim the town of Kisangani and to mine diamonds. Finally, the RCD Liberation Movement of Wamba dia Wamba, which occupies the North-East, now appears to serve as the buffer area to the Ugandan frontier. Since the Goma RCD took Kisangani two months ago, the leaders of the principal rival rebel movement, the RCD Liberation Movement, have felt somewhat isolated in the North-East of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. By losing Kisangani they had in fact also lost the possibility of influencing the future of the country. Hemmed in between the regions held by Rwanda and those held in the North by the Congolese Liberation Movement of Jean-Pierre Bemba, the RCD ML is now more concerned with ensuring the safety of its Ugandan neighbour than fighting the Kinshasa regime. With the support of the Ugandan forces, it forestalls the threats of attack by the Goma RCD and fights the movements opposed to the Museveni regime which are based in the Mountains of the Moon to the east of Butembo. One of the most important military RCD ML positions is consequently at the frontier between the two rebel movements in North Kivu 15 km to the South of Kanya-Bayunga where, fearing an invasion by the Rwandan Army, two months ago the Ugandans brought up tanks, anti-aircraft batteries and a considerable amount of heavy artillery.
The loss of credibility by the RCD Liberation Movement at national level resulting from the military support by Uganda has been further accentuated by the division which has increased within this movement. Thus, on 10 August last Professor Wamba dia Wamba dismissed two of his principal assistants, Mbusa Nyamwisi and John Tibasima Mbongemu accusing them of having organised a mutiny of an ethnic nature at Bunia. Later Mbusa Nyamwisi considered withdrawing with Tibasima into his own stronghold in North Kivu where he had an army but at the same time appealed for calm; "I think we will find solutions to our problems which will enable everyone to come together", he explained. "Not only Professor Wamba, Tibasima and me but many other units which have fought to bring this Movement to the forefront so that we can consider the possibility of coordinating our efforts with other liberation movements fighting in the Congo at the same time as we are. It is not desirable for a rebel faction to arrive at Kinshasa on its own. What would the other factions do then? Those who want to free the Congolese people must first understand." It is not easy to get Mbusa Nyamwisi's message to North Kivu; its citizens are so hostile to the Rwandan and Ugandan armies that they are considered to be forces of occupation. Mbusa Nyamwisi is therefore making every effort to convince his fellow citizens that unification between the three armed movements opposed to Kabila is essential to make the latter abide by the Lusaka agreements again and find a national solution in a Democratic Congo Republic. The reason is that isolation of Wamba dia Wamba finally threatens to lead to a further division of the territories occupied by Uganda to the East of the RDC. Wamba dia Wamba has no other army apart from the Ugandan Army. Contrary to most Congolese politicians he has no followers. Apart from his Bunia headquarters, the territories under his control have been transformed into an enormous no man's land in the hands of the militia, his rivals and bands of deserters.
The Mau Mau control the countryside Among the factions in league, the Mau Mau must also be reckoned with. They are classified as undesirable forces under the Lusaka agreements and as such are deprived by the signatories of these agreements of any legitimacy to participate in the future direction of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. However, Mau Mau fighters who were formerly dispersed have been restructured with the object of driving out the Ugandan Army which holds a quarter of the Congolese territory and of supporting democracy in the future. Kibancha Louairé, who has been encountered in Kampala then in Béni in North Kivu, is spokesman for Padire, one of the principal Mau Mau chiefs: "We have informers in Europe, here in Africa and even in America. Military action is threatened by Padire, the chief of staff, and he has installed informers everywhere in the country. We occupy a large part of North Kivu and South Kivu. We will also soon be in Kisingani." Contrary to the other armed movements in the RDC, the Mau Mau resistance movement does not have international support. It therefore does not have sufficient funds to purchase arms. Some Congolese resistance groups have decided to ally themselves with the RCD Liberation Movement which has set up a training camp at Lubero in North Kivu for them and has already trained a thousand Mau Mau guerillas. In order to drive out the foreign armies occupying their territories, the Mau Mau state that they are prepared for new alliances, with the exception of members of the Goma RCD which they consider to be those "who bring foreigners (to them) who are engaged in killing people on the spot." Congolese resistance expressed within the Mau Mau movement has become an essential force in the negotiations in progress between the three movements armed by Uganda and Rwanda in order to unify them military against Kabila. Without the Mau Mau, who are said to number some 30,000 men, none of these movements can attempt to control anything other than the principal towns. Extract
from
articles
by
Gabriel
Kahn,
Eric Plouvier is a lawyer in charge of the FIDA Mission. He recently went to the Grand Lacs region in this capacity. On his return to Kisingani he gave his first impressions to The Letter. How
can
the
presence
of
Rwandans
and
Ugandans
in
the
east
of
the
RDC
be
explained? What
is
the
human
cost
of
these
two
years
of
war? Finally, among the disastrous consequences of this conflict are the child soldiers armed and trained by the rebel movements. Children from 10 to 15 can be seen carrying arms. And when those responsible are asked the reason for their presence, the reply is: "when a child is seen with a gun nobody asks his age; if he has a weapon it is because he is old enough to carry it!" |
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Reforming the International Financial Institutions --------------------------------------- |
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Presentation |
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The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) sprang from the Bretton Woods international conference in 1944 and form the hard core of the international financial institutions (IFI)
According
to
its
statues,
the
role
of
the
IMF
is
to
insure
the
stability
of
international
monetary
relations.
With
the
end
of
the
fixed
exchange
system
based
on
the
convertibility
of
the
American
dollar
into
gold
(1971),
the
IMF
was
forced
to
redefine
its
mission.
Since
the
beginning
of
the
1980's
it
has
played
a
leading
role
in
the
restructuring
of
the
foreign
debts
of
countries
experiencing
difficulty
paying,
and
with
which
it
negotiates
the
setting
up
of
structural
adjustment
programmes.
As
for
the
IBRD,
in
1960
it
was
amalgamated
with
the
International
Development
Association
(IDA?)
and
together
they
form
what
is
now
known
as
the
World
Bank.
Its
president
is
appointed
by
the
United
States
(Mr.
Wolfensohn
at
present).
According
to
its
latest
annual
report,
the
Bank's
fundamental
objective,
complementing
that
of
the
IMF,is
The IBRD's funds come from the international capitals market. It borrows at advant- ageous rates because the loans are guaranteed by the stability of governments which are shareholders in the IBRD, and then redistributes the money to its members, while deriving a profit which allows it to cover the administrative charges and build up reserves. So the countries benefiting from its assistance have access to more advantageous rates than they would have if borrowing directly on the market. However, functioning in the same way as a normal bank, the IBRD only selects suf- ficiently profitable projects. It only grants loans to middle-income countries as the fixed interest rates are too high for low-income States.
At present (1988) the IBRD has 181 member States which, in accordance with its statutes, must all belong to the International Monetary Fund. It is run by a Board of governors and administrators. Theoretically
the
Board
of
governors
is
the
supreme
authority.
Its
general
assembly
meets
once
a
year. In
reality,
the
IBRD's
most
influential
authority
is
the
Administrative
Board.
In
fact
the
Board
of
Governors
delegates
most
of
its
powers
to
the
Administrative
Board
whose
24
participants
are
permanently
in
session
in
Washington.
They
deal
with
the
daily
running
of
the
Bank,
ratify
the
loans
and
policies,
control
the
operation
and
per- Officially IDA is a structure legally and financially independent of the IBRD. However, it is pretty obvious that the two institutions overlap considerably. The IDA is designed in a way enabling it to be administered by the IBRD. They have the same president (James Wolfensohn), share the same employees and, by and large, bring together the same countries: 160 countries belong to the IBRD have, to date, belonged to the IDA. That is why they are grouped together today under the name World Bank, a term which originally only applied to the IBRD. As an association the IDA has no capital realised from shares but it does benefit from sources of finance: transfers of disposable income from the IBRD, repayments of credit made (low profit margin) and voluntary contributions form the member States. Its vocation is the financing of programmes to fight against poverty by granting long term credit (35 to 40 years), at a very low interest rate and where the repayments may be made in local currency. Mainly, for States benefiting from loans in 1998, this concerns countries whose revenue did not exceed 925$ per head per annum in 1996 (about 80 States in all). Certain countries receive loans from the IBRD as well as the IDA. Whereas the latter grants credit with less rigorous conditions that those of the IBRD, nevertheless the projects must be economically viable.
The
International
Monetary
Fund As the commercial banks had become distrustful with regard to the developing countries because of the debt crisis, from now on the IMF undertakes to function as lender of last resort and sees its vocation as bailing out economies in difficulty in order to restore confidence in the private sector. Conditions are attached to the loans which are subject to the setting up of structural adjustment programmes (SAP), or more recently to strategic frameworks for the fight against poverty (SPFP), which impose the easing of economic restrictions. The International Monetary Fund - which has 182 member States Ð is organised around three principal structures: the Board of Governors, the acting Committee and the Administrative Board. Theoretically
the
Board
of
Governors
is
the
supreme
authority.
The
general
assembly
meets
once
a
year,
two
consecutive
years
in
Washington
and
the
third
year
on
a
mem-
ber
country's
territory.
Each
member
country
has
its
representative
(most
often
the
Chancellor
of
the
Exchequer
or
the
manager
of
the
central
bank,
as
with
the
IBRD). In 1974 the Board voted to set up an acting committee. This committee, made up of 24 members (with the same distribution criteria as the Administrative Board), meets twice a year, oversees the management and functioning of the international monetary system and advises the Board of governors. The Administrative Board is chaired by a General Director, elected for 5 years and without a vote except in the case of a tie. He has always been European; at the moment it is Horst Kohler. Within the Administrative Board, which meets several times a week, the seats are allocated according to the same criteria as for the IBRD. Article taken from Agir Ici's internet site
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Analysis |
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If governments spent more time walking around the suburbs where their citizens live, they would have a better perception of the new tendencies which are becoming firmly established in the lives of those who have not reaped the fruits of globilisation. They would see a lot of walls on which the poor, with nothing left to lose, have started writing, in graffiti, the preamble to a new Declaration of Independence for Latin America: "When hunger is law, rebellion is justice". The protest is justified since, in spite of the progress made in macro-economics in the 1990s which lead to recovery in Latin America after a decade of stagnation, poverty remains a characteristic trait of the region. Thus, at the end of the 1990s and despite several years of economic growth, the level of poverty in the region still peaks at an average of 35%. In real terms, the number of poor is growing steadily. More than a third of Latin Americans live in poverty. Official statistics highlight a reduction in the number of poor in urban areas in percentage terms, but are discreet about the increase in real terms of poor people living in urban and rural areas. The general level of poverty that prevails today in the region can be explained by the worsening trading terms for our main export products, by the increasing burden of our external debt which cannot be paid, as well as by the effects of deregulated investments. We also need to point out the deep impact on economic, social and cultural rights (ESCR) of the Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) imposed by multilateral financial bodies such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB) to ensure our economies become subordinated into an international division of labour, dominated by the interests of financial capital and transnational organisations. The measures that have been taken over the last 25 years for liberation, under the aegis of the SAPs, have led to radical changes in economic and social policies in the region. Free market economy, although not eliminating it, has minimised the state's role as regulator and distributor of revenue; it has privatised state companies and deregulated almost all the markets. The policies on structural adjustment imposed by the IMF and WB have thus set new conditions to encourage foreign investment, which in turn has generated substantial profits at the expense of our countries' human and natural resources. The rise in trade and foreign investment coincided with the increasing gap in income between rich and poor, to such an extent that Latin America now has the worst structure of income distribution in the world. This phenomenon can be seen not only in the countries of Latin America that were the most willing to undergo this process of liberalisation, but also at the heart of the industrialised economies of the United States and Canada. Even though the multilateral financial bodies assured us that things would improve after a period of lean years, the results have not confirmed the predictions of the bureaucrats working for the international financial investors. They have neither resolved the problem of external debt, nor improved the population's living standards by opening up the economy. The more we pay, the more we become debtors. Between 1980 and 1990, we have transferred in interest and redemption payments to rich countries 415 billion dollars. However, the debt has not stopped growing, from 443 billion in 1990 to more than 660 billion today. The situation strongly contravenes both the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which aims to promote and protect human rights and basic freedoms, and the various international tools related to the protection of economic and social rights. There is a direct correlation between the state of social deprivation in which most of the population lives and the Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) which are meant to guarantee the repayment of external debt. This is why SAPs must take account, both at national and at international level, of the framework and consultation mechanisms in place to ensure all sectors of society effectively participate in policy elaboration, planning and evaluation. The same applies for economic and social development policies and programmes, as well as for monitoring and overseeing the SAPs. The IMF and WB policies must also adapt to the international standards on protection and promotion of human rights, democratise its structures, and be subjected to the Economic and Social Council's control and direction as well as to the United Nations General Assembly's orders. The situation indebted countries is in calls for an urgent radical transformation from the current international economic disorder to an orderliness with a need to respect international human rights' standards. Furthermore, this forces us to acknowledge that there is a state of need in indebted countries, to be able to justify non-payment of external debt: in the same light, we have to consider the duty to compensate the victims of "bad management" of the debt crisis by the rich countries and the intergovernmental financial bodies. The Bretton Woods institutions need to be shaken down to the roots. A substantial reform in economic relations and international policies encouraged by these institutions as much as by the World Trade Organisation (WTO) needs to be undertaken. As was stressed during the Permanent Peoples' Tribunal on external debt and structural adjustment (Berlin 1989) and the recent international conference "a continent against debt" (Quito 2000), all initiatives that aim to cancel debt must be seriously considered. We must not forget that many situations in the past when industrialised countries were in debt were resolved by cancelling unsustainable debts. All these cases were based on the postulation that a State is exempt of its international responsibility if it defers on repaying its financial obligations when the well-being of its people is severely affected by having to strictly fulfil these obligations. The strategy and measures adopted for external debt, which aim to regulate the actions of states and other international bodies, must adapt to international legal standards on human rights and development. If we refer to these standards the IMF and the World Bank are guilty of severe violations of international law, especially in terms of non-conformance to their respective constitutions. Thus, for example, Article 1 of the IMF's Articles on Agreement states the institution's objective to be: "To give confidence to members by making the general resources of the Fund temporarily available to them under adequate safeguards, thus providing them with opportunity to correct maladjustements in their balance of payments without resorting to measures destructive of national and international prosperity". As for the World Bank, Article 1 iii of its Charter states that one of its objectives is "to help increase
productivity, raise the standard of living and improve working conditions in Member states". But the reality is that the policies put into practice hinder the very achievement of these objectives. The IMF and World Bank strongly undermine international law when they impose SAPs on our countries which force them to blatantly contradict other international obligations fulfilled in other areas within the United Nations' system (ILO, UNICEF, OAA, WTO, etc), the regional system to which they belong (Optional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights) or originating from other international human rights' tools. It is a recognised fact that these policies have negative repercussions on the indebted countries' capacities to adjust their behaviour to fulfil human rights' requirements set by international standards and usual international laws. On the strength of this, both the United Nations General Assembly and the specialist bodies within it could appeal to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) for consultative advice, in accordance with Article 96 of the Charter. This would determine whether the IMF and the World Bank are under the obligation of adapting their policies to Article 1.3 of the Charter and, if this is the case, whether the IMF's and WB's policies meet these requirements. There is also a need to determine whether United Nations member States are under the obligation of not applying the structural policies that are in breach of Article 1.3 of the Charter and, if this is possible, in line with international law, whether the various specialised bodies within the UN system are allowed to promote and apply these contradictory policies. In order to avoid SAPs and the never ending external debt leading to hunger as the norm, let's listen carefully to what the walls painted by the people in the street have to say. Javier Mujica Petit CEDAL (Peru) |
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Analysis |
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>> Tres Cruces, a village in the Bolivian Altiplano, altitude 3400 metres, July 2000. A representative of a governmental programme for rural development by decentralisation is talking in Quechuan to peasants gathered on the village square. He is explaining to them that the reduction in external debt that the country is benefiting from is going to directly improve their living standards. He is not at all sure that these peasants, mainly illiterate, who chew coca leaves all day long, understand the subtleties of the Debt Initiative for Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC), but at least the will is there. In Bolivia, in the same way as in Tres Cruces, there is a significant strengthening in dialogue between the public and the government. Maybe this is the direct impact of the HIPC initiative: to emphasise the transparency of public action, good governance, to take into account the (true) interests of the poorest, etc. And as good things always come in pairs, the Bretton Woods institutions - the IMF and the World Bank - have, since November 1999, been wanting to link the HIPC initiative to the fight against poverty. The idea is to allocate resources freed up by debt reduction to fighting poverty as a first priority. Whenever a country applies for debt relief, they must draft a strategic framework document on fighting poverty (SFDFP). We can sum up this global agenda on debt / poverty as two principles: dignity and dialogue. The dignity of countries in the South, by cancelling the burden of debt and their underlying dependency on the donors. The dignity also of the citizens, by drawing attention to the fight against poverty and the billion people who are living on less than a dollar a day. And a dialogue because the paradigm of development aid is being seen more and more frequently in the dialogue between all the parties active in development. Beneficiary governments, donors and society are invited to the rounds of discussion to put an end to the "dictator" cliché of the international financial institutions, with the IMF at the lead. An initiative as alibi? But even if the intention is a good one, and speeches point towards this, the link between debt and poverty reduction is very ambitious, to the extent that we could doubt the true efficiency of the HIPC initiative and its corollary SFDFP. The capacity for parties involved to run both initiatives simultaneously is not assured, far from it. First of all, for those with a short memory, the very "social" U-turn the BWIs have done over the last two years seems very overrated. Put in the context of the WTO conference in Seattle and the Jubilee 2000 campaign to cancel debt, this change could be seen as a concession on the part of the BWIs to help us swallow the structural adjustment pill. Furthermore, splitting the roles of the two BWIs goes back to the old tactic of the carrot and stick. The World Bank takes on the role of "goody-goody", admitting its guilt over the disastrous management of the 1997 Asian Crisis, bending over backwards for society and recruiting staff from international NGOs. The IMF takes on the role of "goody-bady", a behind-the-scenes guarantor of the dogma of macro-economic stabiliser, towing the American Treasury's line. Evidently, some people have failed in this subtle tango. John Stiglitz, former World Bank Chief Economist, was the first one to question the primacy of the macro-economic stabilisation - and was replaced by the painless Stern. Recently, the editor of the Development Bank's 2000 Annual Report, Ravi Kanbur, suddenly resigned following pressure from the IMF and the American Treasury over the contents of one of the Report's chapters on market globilisation. The differences of opinion that could discredit the BWIs' mission statement are also of an external nature. Even though the Bank's staff has sensibly been renewed since the revolution in President Wolfensohn's palace, there is some elasticity in the air regarding the kind words that are said at international conferences and the footnotes of the letters of intention and the conditions of agreement. According to Wolfensohn himself, institutional change is difficult. When you are a senior international official in charge of 100 billion dollars of credit, you could be forgiven for being conservative in your decisions. Insufficient means Secondly, we should not expect committed amounts. The proposed alleviation, approximately 100 billion dollars, is not exactly a dizzying amount compared to the total external debt of the countries of the South, more than 1600 billion dollars. The procedures for grants are long and complex: out of the 41 eligible HIPCs, only five have been successful with their alleviation procedure. Furthermore, the process is spread over at least six years, which, seeing the urgency of the situation in some countries, could be seen as a slow way to act. Neither does the initiative address the causes of over-indebtedness. It is not accompanied by consideration of funds to reform the international financial markets and the States' financing mechanisms. In fact, there are no indications that once part of the debt has been soaked up, the countries will not fall back into the vicious circle of financing debt with debt. A report by Congress shows uneasiness regarding this, in terms of the neutralising effect of the link between debt reduction / fighting poverty. By allocating funds that were ear-marked for debt repayment to social programmes, there is precisely a risk of not reducing the need for external financing, penalising economic growth, and, ultimately, the fight against poverty. Financing by donors also has its problem. Apart from the IMF, the multilateral donors are far from having finalised their finances. To date (June 2000) the World Bank has collected 2.1 billion dollars of its share of 6.3 billion, the Inter-American Bank 180 million out of a total of 900 million, and the African Regional Bank only 320 million out of a total of 2.2 billion dollars On the part of the G7 countries, which provide practically a quarter of the alleviation, financing the operation could even be detrimental to public aid for development (which is already weak) by acting as a link. France and Japan, for example, are not strictly speaking cancelling the debt, but are financing its settlement 100%. Incidentally, this method allows them to integrate the cost of the initiative in calculating their respective GDPs. Last but not least, the countries of the South are not capable of absorbing such sophisticated development strategies. Like a young driver who is pressurised into taking part in the Paris-Dakar race, the governments of the poorest countries are being asked to be masters in public policies that are technically very complex and very expensive in terms of human resources. Naturally, the BWIs are quick to offer any technical assistance they may require. But this approach does not really fit in with the national will to appropriate, which the SFDFP claims. On its part, the public is facing a double challenge. Like its own government, it does not necessarily have the institutional capacity to carry out its participating role. And it is often a prisoner of a culture that either favours governments or systematically opposes it politically, and which, whichever way, is little in line with the consensual approach that the HIPC initiative and SFDFP demand. Pierre
Habbard Footnotes: 1.
See
Kanbur's
declarations
on
the
site
www.brettonwoodsproject.org |