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Algeria: Truth, justice, listening to the victims

SPECIAL SUPPLEMENT: PEACE IN COLOMBIA

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An FIDH international fact-finding mission was conducted in Algeria between 29th May and 6th June, 2000, at the invitation of President Bouteflika. The mission included Patrick Baudouin, lawyer, President of the FIDH, Driss El Yazami, deputy general secretary of the FIDH, vice-president of the Ligue française des droits de l'Homme, Siobhan Ni Chulachain, barrister, vice-chairperson of the Irish Council for Civil Liberties (ICCL), and Luis Guillermo Perez Casas, lawyer and officer of the Colectivo de Abogados (Lawyers' Collective) in Colombia.
Despite several requests in the interim, this was the first time that the FIDH was allowed to send such a mission since its last mission in April, 1997.

The fact-finding mission met representatives of the authorities, the judiciary, the political world, the media, as well as human rights organisations, lawyers, associations representing the families of missing persons, the families of victims of terrorism, as well as some of the victims themselves.

The mission visited Algiers, Blida, Tizi-Ouzou, Taourirt Moussa, Oran, Relizzane and Constantine.

The mission expressed profound compassion for and solidarity with all victims for the revolting suffering endured in entire regions of the country and behind an almost impenetrable wall of silence. The desire of the Algerian population to voice their experiences must be satisfied, as well as the need of the survivors and their families to testify on behalf of the victims.

Political violence continues, even though in urban areas terrorism appears to have been controlled, the same cannot be said for numerous regions of the country. Every day, civilians, soldiers and law enforcement officers are assassinated in atrocious conditions.

In this context, as the FIDH has emphasised on several occasions, the State has not only the right but also the duty to fight terrorism and to secure the safety of the Algerian population. Nevertheless, the State must ensure that this fight is carried out in a manner that complies with international human rights standards, which legally bind Algeria.

The mission deplores the fact that serious and systematic violations of human rights continue to be perpetrated by law enforcement officials involved in the fight against terrorism, including, in some cases, members of the so-called "GLDs". For example, their operations rarely result in arrests - most suspects are summarily executed. In some cases, the "self-defence groups" participate in these offensive operations, in blatant contradiction with their "strictly defensive" role.

The introduction by President Bouteflika of a law providing for national reconciliation (la loi sur la concorde civile), which was negotiated with a complete lack of transparency by the military powers and the military leaders of the Islamic Front (FIS), without input from the political leaders of that organisation, has obviously not resulted in an end to violence. On close analysis, this law (introduced on the 13th July, 1999) prevents de facto any prosecutions against members of armed groups suspected of having committed criminal offences. The probation committees established under this law, by their very lack of transparency and hasty work methods, consolidate criminal impunity. The mission expressed its support for the families of victims of terrorism in their demands that the authorities comply with their obligation to conduct in-depth and impartial inquiries. Likewise, the FIDH mission expressed its surprise that the list of members of the Armed Islamic Front (AIS) who benefited from the Presidential Amnesty (grâce amnistiante) of the 10th January, 2000 was never published, and that even the number of beneficiaries is uncertain.

The mission was particularly touched by the testimony of witnesses in various parts of the country, as to the crimes committed by the GLDs against civilians, particularly against relatives of those linked to armed Islamic groups. Despite the fact that the law provides that the authorisation of the Ministry of Interior is necessary in order to set up a GLD, the Algerian authorities refused to tell (even approximately) the FIDH mission how many GLDs have been legally established or potentially disarmed. Although many allegations of murder have been laid against the GLDs, the leaders of the groups implicated in these allegations remain armed and at liberty. The mission considers that the issue of GLD disarmament must be addressed as a matter of urgency.

Concerning the issue of forced disappearances (les disparus) - directly or indirectly attributable to the State - the mission has reason to believe that the extent of this phenomenon is vastly underestimated. Although the mission was not in a position to put forward a global figure, it noted that new cases are filed daily with lawyers and associations representing the families of the disappeared (SOS Disparus, created under the auspices of the Algerian League for the Defence of Human Rights (LADDH), the National Association of the Families of the Disappeared (ANFD), the National Association of the Families of the Disappeared in Constantine etc.). Nonetheless, the mission can affirm that apart from the secret detention centres already identified and still operational, numerous other public buildings have been used as detention and torture centres, such as in Oran, the barracks at Magenta, the CNS barracks at Dar Al Beida, the premises of the 2nd military, the military prison at Al Marsa; and in Constantine, the territorial research and investigation centre at Bellevue; the CMI barracks at Mansourah and the ONRB squadron barracks at Sidi Mabrouk.

More than ever, the families of the disappeared demand that the truth be told as to the fate of their relatives, particularly during their weekly demonstrations. The authorities persist in denying the undeniable. Since 1993, the National Observatory for Human Rights (ONDH), an official institution, has received thousands of cases, the Department of Justice has received over 3,000 cases and, since 1998 the Department of the Interior had officially received more than 4,600 cases in the 48 wilayas (administrative regions).

Most families implicate the authorities in the disappearances of their relatives. In almost all cases, they have witnesses to support their allegations. Sometimes, they can even provide the names of the alleged authors of the disappearances.

In spite of this, the authorities have not accepted responsibility in any of the cases. None of the testimony has been taken on board and no investigations have been concluded.

The mission concluded that the procedures in place for ascertaining the number of forced disappearances and the responses furnished to the families are not designed to shed light on this phenomenon. On the contrary, they are part of a system established by the State in an effort to avoid taking responsibility for the wide-scale criminal acts of its agents.

The mission also established that the criminal justice system remains under government control, due to the de facto lack of independence of the judges and to the continued existence of restrictive emergency provisions, which FIDH has previously denounced on several occasions (the Criminal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure which incorporate most of the anti-terrorist decree of September 1992 and the October 1992 decree on judicial status.) The mission seriously questioned whether, within the framework of the proposed reforms of the justice system, these provisions will be abrogated in conformity with international human rights standards.

The mission also noted that many associations and political parties (ANFD, WAFA…) are not recognised despite fulfilling the legal criteria, and that certain public meetings, particularly those relating to human rights, are still banned.

The State of Emergency declared in January 1992 remains in force, and continues to bear serious consequences for the exercise of human rights. The maintenance of emergency legislation, accompanied by practices firmly rooted in the police state, constrains political life and the freedom of expression of civil society. Thus, the apparent pluralism of Algerian society is no more than a facade.

10. The issue of the rehabilitation of victims, all victims, is paramount. Many victims are seriously traumatised, and struggle alone. Their legitimate fight for truth and justice cannot be satisfied by the mere provision of monetary compensation, particularly as such compensation is only available for victims of terrorism. Today, the victims are crying out more strongly than ever. No effective effort is being made to meet their demand for truth and justice, although this is key to a genuine transition, which is still expected.

Paris, June 12th, 2000.

SPECIAL SUPPLEMENT: PEACE IN COLOMBIA

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JUSTICE IS THE EXCEPTION, IMPUNITY THE RULE
This is the feeling one gets when analysing the results of the different strategies set up in the world to fight against impunity for those who commit violations of human rights. In Latin America the majority of the transitions to democracy have resulted in the setting up of formal democracies in which the structures of the state continue to support impunity in the name of a so-called national reconciliation. The path towards justice seems very twisted and difficult to stick to right to the end. Certain experiments like the creation of truth commissions at the end of an internal conflict have at least had the merit of lifting the veil on the darkest experiences of certain countries and bringing to light a chain of responsibilities. In Colombia civil society through the "nunca Mas" project, began this work of restoring the truth. This project enabled us to get information on more than 40,000 cases of serious violations of human rights, and to identify clearly the structures of the "dirty war" and both the actual perpetrators and the minds behind it. The end of the process of restitution must now go through a "socialisation" of truth: one must make public the truth which has now been uncovered and see that justice can be carried out.

The restoration of truth is also fundamental in the process of reparation for victims. The victims cannot obtain full reparation unless the wrong which was caused to them is officially recognised, and above all those who were responsible for the wrongs done to them are tried. Without the workings of the law, reparation will be imperfect, and the victims will be left with the bitter feeling of having let themselves be corrupted. Moreover individual reparation must be accompanied by a collective reparation which is equally indispensable for a national reconciliation. The triptych of truth, justice, reparation is at the base of reconciliation and the construction of the rule of law in countries which have been under dictatorship and a fratricidal conflict. There cannot be reconciliation based on forgetting or on a phony pardon (when those responsible for the violation pardon themselves). The pardon must come from the victims and the communities affected and should enable the building of a society free from the fear which is generated by impunity.

For 40 years Colombia has been torn apart by the "dirty war" which the armed forces, the guerilla groups, the paramilitary groups, the drug traffickers have all committed, and whose principal victims are the civilian populations. Impunity of the authors of serious violations of human rights which have been perpetrated contributes to keep the infernal cycle of violence going. The parties to the negotiations of the peace process, which has been recently re-activated, must show their determination to make the struggle against impunity a priority if they really want to act for the good of the people.

ALIRIO URIBE MUNOZ
Director of the Colombian Lawyers Association (Collectivo de Abogados)
Vice-President of the FIDH

The FARC
Set up in 1964, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) originated in what is known as the "Violencia" period (1948-1957) and conflicts concerning land. Having been persecuted by both the army and large landowners' private militias, some Communist Party maquis, along with despoiled peasants, set up peasant vigilante zones in the central cordillera. After having withstood every military offensive between 1962 and 1964, this movement came to an end during the invasion of the United States forces stationed in the Panama Canal area. This defeat of the rural resistance movement gave rise to the FARC guerillas, who currently figure among the core actors in the armed conflict, with no less than 20,000 men installed in more than 65 communes. Clashes between the guerilleros and the armed forces remained minimal until the mid-1980s, a period in which a war-stimulating factor - drug trafficking - expanded. This new development enabled the FARC, which was present in the coca-growing areas in the south of the country, to be paid with the earnings of growers, cocaine laboratories and drug traffickers.

The ELN
Inspired by the Cuban revolution, the National Liberation Army appeared in 1965. Now made up of 10,000 soldiers, it is the country's second-largest rebel force. Moreover, the government granted it belligerent status on 6 June last, thereby paving the way for the beginning of a peace dialogue. This status was first granted by the Pastrana government in 1998, but was withdrawn immediately afterwards when the Avianca flight was hijacked and more than a hundred parishioners from the church of Maria were abducted. These ELN 'miraculous draughts of fishes' or kidnappings are one of the rebel movement's economic mainstays, which are supplemented chiefly by sums of money extorted from large oil companies such as BP and Occidental in return for the ELN's promise not to engage in acts of terrorism against their plants.

On 7 January 1999, President Pastrana entered into formal negotiations with the FARC. As the FARC's demand for a 42,000km² demilitarised zone had been met a few months beforehand (November 1998), the talks could begin with a 12-point common agenda (including, among other things, agricultural reform, the workings of the legal system, drug trafficking and corruption, the reform of political institutions, the armed forces and international relations). Nevertheless, making progress in the negotiations has proved difficult and so far there have been no concrete results.

The talks entered into with the ELN to set up the "National Convention" (a programme put forward by the ELN to specify the peace agenda) suffered serious setbacks which stopped the negotiations from getting off the ground - namely, the government's refusal to grant a demilitarised zone in which to hold the National Convention, and mass abductions by the ELN. After several meetings outside the country, in which civil society acted as a go-between, direct dialogue could be established between the President of the Republic and the ELN leaders. President Pastrana's recent granting of a National Convention meeting zone to the ELN earned him much criticism - he was accused of having made too many concessions to the guerillas. In an interview with The Letter, Camillo Castellano, director of the Instituto latinoamericano de servicios legales alternativas (ILSA) looks at the peace process.

How are the negotiations between the Colombian government and the guerillas going?
Negotiations are currently heading in two different directions - the negotiations between the government and the FARC, and those being conducted with the ELN. It would be better for these two paths to meet and form one common area offering solutions to the bloody conflict which has ravaged the country for generations. This rapprochement has not been possible until now and the negotiations do not seem to be moving that way for the moment.

Dialogue with the FARC actually began several months ago, after President Pastrana's government granted it a demilitarised zone (1) - a prerequisite laid down by the FARC for entering into the peace talks. The negotiations are based on a 12-point agenda, with each point regrouping 10 or so subsidiary points. In theory, the discussions are supposed to proceed uninterrupted - the parties having agreed beforehand to break off discussion of any of the 12 points temporarily when no common ground can be found (2). Several theme-based round tables were set up to ensure a continuous dialogue. What is more, provision has been made for representatives of various sectors of civil society to participate in these round tables. On paper, this process seems very interesting. In reality, however, round tables reveal serious deficiencies. First of all, civil society has not yet had the opportunity either to establish itself or strengthen its position to the extent needed to exercise real influence over the current discussions. The people involved in the round tables are unfortunately not representative enough of Colombian society as a whole. For the moment, their commitment lacks direction and political strength, despite a very strong desire for peace, expressed time and again by various sectors of civil society. Moreover, the round tables are not binding in nature - a fact which makes this process extremely precarious. Up until now, neither the FARC nor the Colombian government has taken the conclusions of these forums' discussions into account. The talks between the government and the ELN are proceeding along the same lines but have not made as much progress. The ELN has been trying for some time to take on the role of mouthpiece for Colombian welfare organisations. So as to strengthen this role and establish a base for its negotiations with the authorities, the ELN is hoping to organise a National Convention, bringing together representatives of grass-roots organisations. A preliminary meeting is already in preparation, and should take place in a European country. 70 representatives of various sectors of society, including investors, farmers, welfare organisations, journalists and a number of international observers, will participate. However, the problems involved in setting up the National Convention's headquarters inside Colombia remain almost insurmountable, as the safety of these negotiations cannot be guaranteed in this country.

According to the international press, there seems to be much opposition to this plan. Some people believe that the decision to grant this second zone will lead to an increase in the number of internally displaced persons. What is your assessment of the situation?

It is true that the zone granted to the ELN by the government poses considerable problems. Firstly, this zone, which corresponds to the three municipalities of San Pablo, Centegallo and Yondon, extends over two separate regions (Bolivar and Antioquia) and does not constitute a whole. What is more, since the possibility of granting this zone to the ELN was first mentioned, the paramilitary groups have resumed their military offensives with the support of the army to guarantee control of certain sectors - thereby preventing the ELN and the State from concluding an agreement. This offensive has already forcibly displaced several hundred people and allowed the paramilitary groups to conquer some areas traditionally under ELN control. Those who have stayed put despite the presence of the paramilitary groups are now branded as supporters of these groups, and the ELN's return would result in their being displaced as well. What is more, the paramilitary groups have been able to summon up a wave of refusal across the entire Magdaleno Medio region in response to the government's offer. Which is not surprising, given that the local population has never been consulted on any aspect of the process whatsoever - not even the possible transfer of a sizeable territory to the ELN.

This negotiating process seems disjointed and is challenged by the paramilitary groups. Is there a strategy for countering the opposition of these armed far-right groups?

Unfortunately, the answer is no, as, even within the government, there is no firm agreement on the peace process. Moreover, some sector leaders, including all of the military, most of the Conservative Party and several members of the present government are going to great pains to hinder the negotiations' progress. For example, I am quite sure that the atrocious collier-bombe explosion was the work of an element within the armed forces. There are in fact a huge number of people in positions of power who are opposed to Pastrana's peace policy. The process as a whole is extremely precarious, as the current president has never sought to develop a politics of consensus either within his government or with civil society. The current discussions have involved only the FARC and ELN high commands and are not seeking to identify the real causes of the conflict. This programme has been developed with the same logic of political and social exclusion which constitutes one of the Colombian conflict's root causes.

Colombia and the Colombians need the negotiations to continue. These must favour an approach which has been agreed upon by the conflict's various actors, the international community and, most importantly, the various sectors of civil society. These negotiations must involve civil society and make it a representative which cannot be ignored. I am convinced that civil society will be able to find lasting solutions to the conflicts dividing our country if it is finally allowed to express itself and get organised.

Footnotes:
1. This zone consists of an area the size of Switzerland.
2. A week before this interview took place, a round table on the replacement of illegal crops, which should have played host to several international delegates, was suspended after a collier-bombe exploded decapitating a woman and killing a policeman. The authorities immediately put the blame for this atrocious act on the FARC, despite this organisation's public denials. After some investigation, the authorities were forced to acknowledge that responsibility for this explosion which shocked the country was still very unclear, and decided to resume negotiations.

The period known as violencia corresponds to a period in the history of Colombia which has marked the country deeply. It is characterised by years of sporadic armed confrontation, accompanied by widespread terror and violence.

The assassination of Jorge Eliecer Gaitan (leader of the left wing of the Liberal Party) in 1948 was the factor which ignited the quarrels between the Liberal Party and the Conservative Party, setting off a general state of insurrection and a civil war between these two traditional parties. Although the conflict was based on the same socio-economic interests which still today divide the country, including the land question, it resulted in the expropriation and redistribution of thousands of hectares, and thereby eliminated the majority of small and medium level peasants and reinforced the power of the landed oligarchy. A war which was initially between the armed peasants associated with the ruling class of the Liberal Party on the one hand and the Conservative Government of Laureano Gomez on the other hand, rapidly deteriorated because of a campaign of political persecution against the hypothetical threat of "international communism" led by the government with the support of the church and the army. In the campaigns this persecution was ensured by the creation of paramilitary groups known as "Los Chulavitas". Also during this period a guerilla movement started.

The consequences of this war were devastating. The figures are overwhelming: 300, 000 deaths and the massive forced removal of several hundred thousand people towards the towns and regions of Llanos Oriental, the Atlantic Coast and the Magdalena Medio. The first phase of La Violencia was interrupted by the coup d'etat of Gustavo Rojas in 1953. General Rojas promised to bring an end to the terror and push forward economic reconstruction; he offered a general and unconditional amnesty to all those who had taken to arms and recognised that they belonged to rebel groups. Even so the violence continued on both sides. On the 8th and 9th June 1954, thirteen university students were killed by the national army at the time of the first civilian demonstrations, which considerably weakened the dictator. The traditional parties tool advantage of this circumstance to set up a civil front which overthrew General Rojas three years later. On 20 July 1957, following the removal of the general, the leaders of the Liberal and Conservative parties set up the National Front, a political pact, agreeing to alternate running the state. During the following four governments, Liberals and Conservatives shared the government posts through a quota system, and took the post of head of state alternately. The exercise of power is still strictly reserved to these two traditional parties and any real political opposition is systematically eliminated.

One must emphasise that there are several versions of the Colombia Plan, and that its basis varies according to the person to whom it is being portrayed.
The version submitted to the European Union showed as the central plank of the Plan the negotiations with the guerillas, and it proposed to base society and the peace accords on territorial integrity, democracy, human rights and the struggle against drug trafficking. On the other hand the basis of the plan presented to the American Congress concentrated on the struggle against the production and trafficking in drugs. 70% of the 1,600 million dollars which the USA plan to devote to the financing of the Colombia Plan would be earmarked for fighting drugs, mainly by stepping up military involvement.

Poverty in Colombia

More than 55 % of the Colombian population live below the poverty line and 25 % live in extreme poverty. Those belonging to the poorest parts of society are exposed to particular forms of social violence. The country's poorest are more exposed to common law violence and are also exposed to a specific form of violence called 'limpiezia social' (social cleansing). This violence is exerted by death squads mostly belonging to the police force, who carry out summary executions of persons they consider to be 'rubbish', e.g., beggars, itinerant vendors, waste recyclers, prostitutes, youths from working-class neighbourhoods, etc..

CERD and Indigenous Populations

The UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) expressed its concern about the fact that 'the violence in Colombia was largely concentrated in those regions inhabited by aboriginal and Afro-Colombian populations' and 'that programmes for the development and exploitation of resources taking into account the rights of aboriginal and Afro-Colombian communities have been implemented without duly asking community representatives for their approval, nor have the social, economic and environmental impact of these activities been adequately taken into account.'

The main points of the 'Colombia Project' are:
- the fight against drugs,
- economic stabilisation
- promoting private-sector investment and foreign trade,
- humanitarian aid to the poorest parts of the population and displaced persons,
- strengthening the Rule of Law.

It should be mentioned that there are several versions of the 'Colombia Plan' and that its basic concept varies according to the body to which it is presented. The core of the proposal submitted to the European Union focuses on the negotiations with the guerilla and proposes funding for society as a whole and the peace agreements on territorial integrity, democracy, Human Rights and the fight against drug trafficking, whereas the proposal presented to the US Congress mainly focuses on the fight against drug production and drug trafficking. 70 % of the US government's support of US-$ 1,600 for the 'Colombia Project' will be used for the fight against drugs, mainly through enhanced militarisation.

The Colombian government has submitted a vast proposal for what is called 'The Colombia Project' to the European Union (EU) in the hope that it will receive funding. This is a project which is aimed at restoring peace in the country. EU member states gathered for a meeting in London on 19th June. Another meeting is due to be held in Madrid in July, together with the United States, Japan and Canada, to make a decision on the kind of support this project should receive. However, the project has a number of shortcomings and inconsistencies and does not seem to be apt to solve the problems that Colombian society is facing. To ensure that there truly will be lasting peace in Colombia, a number of measures set out below must be included in this programme.

Involving civil society in the peace process

Any progress towards peace in Colombia suggests that the process of negotiations between the government and the different guerilla forces should allow civil society to get involved. Never have unarmed civilians been genuinely involved in the negotiations for the peace process, which currently seems to have reached a deadlock, and unless this segment of society is involved in the negotiations, there will be no lasting peace.

The project will not show concrete and lasting results unless the Colombian population is given a chance to participate in the draft process and implementation of those projects that will receive funding. The proposal submitted by the Colombian government does stress the important role of civil society in the peace process as well as the implementation of social welfare programmes and development strategies, but it does not give details of any particular form of involvement or participation of civil society. This is quite obviously a major inconsistency which calls for more in-depth consideration. If the government is to win the approval of the project by civil society, it must make sure that this society is well-informed about its contents and that it is also given a chance to voice its opinion, which has not been adequately taken into account so far. The project is largely unknown to the general public. Hence, the government must run a large-scale national campaign to publicise the project and specify ways in which civil society can get involved in implementing the project. In addition, a major proportion of the project funding should be directly allocated to independent participants from civil society.

A project for peace or a project for war?

The project, which draws a comparison between the fight against drug trafficking and the fight against guerilla fighters, proposes the use of weapons to free the country from the guerillas. So this project, which is supposedly aimed at restoring lasting peace in the country, has, on the contrary, all the makings of leading to a war. In other words, one cannot seek to eliminate the guerilla forces while claiming that discussions with them are underway.

The project establishes a link between drug traffickers and guerilla fighters on the one hand, but there is no reference to the links between certain sections of the armed forces and paramilitary groups on the other hand. Hence, there is every reason to be worried that part of the funding granted to the armed forces might also 'trickle down' to the paramilitary groups who to a very large extent contribute to the violence in the country and are responsible for a vast proportion of human rights violations.

The fight against drug trafficking with inadequate means

The analysis which claims that drug trafficking explains the inadequacies of the Rule of Law is inaccurate. True, the practice of drug trafficking is one important factor among others which is detrimental to implementing the Rule of Law, but it is a result of the social inequality and extreme poverty across large sections of the Colombian society, as there is no serious or viable alternative for small peasant farmers. The respect for Human Rights and the principles of democracy is a crucial precondition for the Rule of Law, which implies an active policy aimed at reducing social inequalities, the fight against impunity and the improvement of access to health care and education. Only by making steps in this direction can there be hope that the Rule of Law will be restored. Only if meaningful proposals are included in these areas can the Colombian government maintain its legitimacy in public opinion.

As for the methods proposed for the fight against drugs, there are proposals for militarisation, fumigation, promoting alternative crops and creating alternative jobs.

It will not be possible to stop drug production through militarisation in the long run. Militarisation will also lead to an increase in human rights violations. The project mainly focuses on repression, although there should be greater scope for positive measures, such as promoting alternative crops. There are alternatives, particularly the gradual and lasting substitution of drug production with other production activities. Promoting alternative crops, together with a system which gives them access to regional markets as well as creating alternative jobs are promising measures which should receive funding on the scale of the objectives pursued. The implementation of these targets should be made explicit in the proposal.

In addition, it is inconsistent to combine fumigation on the one hand, whilst promoting alternative cultures on the other hand. Fumigation destroys all plantations indiscriminately and makes it impossible to put new plantations in place in the short run. Fumigation, which has been a common practice in Colombia for the last 25 years, has shown how ineffective it is to outlaw illegal crops and has a harmful impact on the environment. In addition, to ensure that farmers have no loss in income, these alternative crops require much larger surfaces than coca or poppy crops. Hence, larger plots of farmland must be provided. In addition, the land provided to farmers must not be too far away from markets and a real distribution system must be put in place to enable them to sell their products. As there are countless illegal plantations in the remoter parts of the country, prohibiting illegal crops can only be a blow in the face of a land reform.

It may be quite legitimate to ask oneself whether the use of weapons and armed forces of methods of repression, as proposed, are truly aimed at fighting against drugs. In truth, these measures, whether it is militarisation or fumigation, will result in farmers of illegal crops being forced to move elsewhere, whereas the economic stakes linked to the possession of land which is currently occupied by the guerilla forces and indigenous (and Afro-Colombian) populations are very important. It is on this land that the Colombian government is intending to promote such 'mega-projects' as the construction of pipelines, hydro-power plants, new transport links, e.g. a canal linking the two oceans or the 'Panamericana'. It is also in these regions which have become 'target regions' for such projects that massacres are currently at its highest.
These projects might cause environmental damage beyond repair and lead to the destruction of the resources, livelihoods and cultures of indigenous populations living in these territories. Hence, there must be guarantees to ensure the protection of the rights of these indigenous peoples and the territories they have inhabited for generations. The best way of fighting against drug production in Colombia would be to proceed to a land reform to enable farmers to settle on land which truly lends itself as farmland and with access to the markets of the region.

Promoting a long-term development strategy

Restoring peace is not only a question of eliminating armed conflict. Lasting peace can only be achieved by eliminating the true causes of conflict which is often rooted in economic and social problems. There are striking social inequalities in Colombia, with more than one third of the population living below the poverty line. Countless sections of society are economically and politically excluded.

True, there should be greater focus on the social aspects of the project. Even so, it is regrettable that the project should be constrained to providing humanitarian assistance to the poorest sections of society, failing to complement this approach with a real long-term development strategy. The proposed measures are merely aimed at reducing the harmful impact of the structural adjustment measures proposed by the project, which are also in line with the economic programme approved by the IMF.
The project should be more ambitious in the area of economic and social rights. It should include precise quantified or qualitative targets in the area of social welfare, even if these are only indicative (in terms of education, access to drinking water and health care, etc.).
Finally, the project should also contain proposals for the crucial issue of a land reform (re-distribution) and special programmes for displaced persons as well as those belonging to indigenous populations whose cultures and livelihoods are closely linked to the control they have over their ancestral territories. Specific attention to this issue would be desirable, all the more as these indigenous populations, by virtue of the country's Constitution, have certain rights linked to their ancestral territories, namely that the land of indigenous populations is inalienable. As a result of the violence and pressure these populations are subjected to, these rights that are enshrined in the Constitution have actually become devoid of their actual meaning. The Colombian government's economic programme must be accompanied by firm and genuine guarantees in order to prevent foreign investors from being granted concessions for the exploitation of natural resources, in defiance of the rights of the indigenous populations, and the Uwa and the Embera in particular, in accordance with Convention 169 of the OIT on indigenous and tribal populations.

Generally speaking, the project should more strongly focus on an economic framework policy aimed at promoting sustainable development and the fight against poverty, based on the respect for economic, social and cultural rights. The current proposal does not focus strongly enough on these rights, for which it contains only a proposal for temporary assistance. However, these are fundamental rights and by virtue of the international instruments it has signed, the Colombian government has agreed to pay respect for these rights. And the social welfare components, instead of merely being confined to providing assistance, should be aimed at strengthening civil society and social welfare movements.

Turning respect for Human Rights into a priority

The project also falls short in the area of Human Rights and justice. The Human Rights situation in Colombia has seriously deteriorated over the last twelve months, with massacres every day (official statistics: 402 cases of massacre in 1999), disappearances, and a persistant culture of impunity...Those who are committed to promoting the peace process or are involved in pressure groups to promote a policy of pacifism (union leaders, leaders of farmers' associations, intellectuals, professors and Human Rights defenders, political opponents, etc.) are all too often victims of murder, harassment, or even summary executions or forced disappearance, the main responsibility for which lies with the paramilitary groups. As a result, there is an ever widening rift between rich and poor, an even greater tendency towards the government using methods of warfare by suppressing any form of collective action and peaceful political opposition and recourse to violence becoming even more 'legitimate' as it becomes more and more accepted by society.
Despite this harsh situation, the Colombian government remains ignorant towards the measures it ought to be taking to remedy this situation. To break with the strategy of warfare, the Colombian government must guarantee the security of those who choose to voice their opinions and ideas, defend their collective interests and make peaceful demonstrations of their political opinions. In addition, the Colombian govenrment should also be more responsive to the large number of recommendations of the UN High Commission on Human Rights and NGOs, particularly the following:

- prosecution of all perpetrators of massacres, summary executions, torture and crimes against humanity;
- setting up a genuine strategy to investigate the support of the armed forces or agents of the security forces to the para-military groups in order to punish those who are found guilty and dismantle these para-military troops;
- transferring all cases of Human Rights violations committed by the armed forces from military tribunals to criminal courts;
- incrimination for forces disappearances, torture and genocide to be incorporated into Colombian law,
- abolishing the so-called 'special courts' (tribunals) and recourse to magistrates and anonymous witnesses,
-adopting measures to guarantee the protection of displaced persons, indigenous populations, Black minorities, leaders of social welfare movements, political opponents and Human Rights defenders;
- promoting respect for all international Human Rights instruments,

These reforms are vital pre-conditions for Colombia to become a state governed by democratic principles and the Rule of Law and for its citizens to regain confidence in their country's institutions. The Colombian government should seriously consider revising its proposal to ensure that lasting peace will become reality.

Footnotes:
1. According to Colombian NGOs, 73 % of Human Rights violations that occurred in 1999 are attributable to paramilitary groups.
2. The surface of cocaine plantations has increased from 40,000 ha. to more than 100,000 ha. between 1992 and 1998.
3. Convention entered into force on September 5, 1991, ratified by Colombia on August 7, 1991.
4. Colombia ratified the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in 1976. The Colombian government has thus committed itself to 'acting ... to the maximum of its available resources... in order to ensure that these rights can be fully exercised ......using any appropriate means.'

Statistics :

Violations of Human Rights. Some damning statistics.
402 massacres with 1836 victims in 1999 according to the Public Defender, the largest number of massacres in the last 10 years. The great majority of violations of human rights is attributed to paramilitary groups (73%), while 5% are the acts of armed forces and 22% can be imputed to guerrilla groups.
On average, 12 people a day are victims of social-political violence.
Between January and September 1999, 225,000 people were forced to leave their villages, bringing the total of internally displaced persons since 1985 to 1, 700, 000.
69 trade union members have been assassinated, 33 have disappeared and 676 have received death threats.

Displacements in South Bolivar.

On October 4th 1998 President Pastrana signed the agreements of the Magdalena Medio Regional Peace Forum, bringing to an end the dialogue with around 12,000 people who had been displaced by force. These agreements contained important commitments regarding the enforcement of displaced persons' rights. One year on, the situation in the South Bolivar region is more worrying than ever. Before October 16th, 3,500 peasants, of whom more than half were children, had left the villages of Simitri and San Pablo. During the whole year, the 38 communes affected by the Agreement were the theatre of massacres, disappearances, bombing raids, incursions by paramilitary forces, threats, and forced evacuations,..... without any reaction from the government. The paramilitary advance, the development of a military operation known as "Anaconda" and the clashes between the guerrillas and the paramilitary forces led to a serious deterioration in the situation in this region. On October 3Oth the paramilitary forces announced 'outright war' in South Bolivar in order to reconquer the area.

Despite the relaunching of peace negociations and the reassurance given by the Colombian authorities to the international community, the human rights situation in Colombia has continued to deteriorate. The statistics for last year are damning (see box). there haa been a significant increase in the number of massacres, forced disappearances and executions without trial. More people died in massacres in 1999 than for a decade. An estimated 40,000 people, including 2500 trade union members, are alleged to have been assassinated for political reasons during the last 13 years.

The complexity of the Colombian conflict and the large number of protagonists (FARC, ELN. paramilitary groups, armed forces, drug traffickers) might lead one to believe that victims of violence are usually the victims of military confrontations between the various armed groups. The reality is quite different: it is the civilian workers' movement which is the principal target of human rights violations in Colombia. Peasants, trade unionists, intellectuals, defenders of human rights. members of workers' movements, native populations and ail those who fight democratically for social justice and try to have their fundamental rights enforced are inevitably subject to vicious repression, indeed, the central power, shared since the period of "Violence" (1954) between the Conservative and Liberal parties excludes the general population from ail political participation and maintains this exclusion by force. Their objective: to prevent the sharing of natural resources and preserve the economic interests of the big land owners and financial groups.

With Brazil, Colombia is the country in ail Latin America where the highest concentration of landed estates is to be found. The 500 wealthiest landlords own 45% of all arable land in the country, whereas they only had 35% in 1984.

This growing concentration of estates is the result of a military strategy initially put into effect by the army but now increasingly subcontracted to paramilitary groups.
The statistics of the last 10 years clearly show that the percentage of violations committed by the army has decreased proportionately to the increase in crimes attributable to paramilitary groups. In 1999 these groups were responsible for 73% of the total violations of human rights in Colombia, whereas 5% were attributable to the army and 22% to guerrilla activity. However, certain sectors of the army maintain very close links with the paramilitary groups and directly support their terrorist actions. In this way, violations of human rights are being privatised' along with social services and public property. The accumulation of land is generally made possible by the forced displacement of entire communities, terrorised by incursion of paramilitary groups. Their barbarous tactics normally entail massacring a handful of community leaders whom they accuse of supporting guerrilla warfare. Then the abandoned lands can be taken over by the big landowners who have no intention of cultivating them but wish to sell them to facilitate the setting up of major mining, oil-producing or hydraulic projects. Between January and September 1999, 225,000 people were forced to abandon their land and homes in this way, raising the total of internally displaced persons since 1985 to around 2 million.

The region most affected by this violence corresponds to the administrative areas of Antioquia and Choco, situated in the north-west of the country. A bio-diversity both in animals and vegetation, a subsoil very rich in gold and other precious metals such as uranium and plutonium, where there is prospecting for other resources like diamonds and oil, are ail concentrated in this region, which is mainly populated by native peoples and blacks. And as if by coincidence, this region also seems to correspond to the area where the United States could be planning to construct a road canal linking the Atlantic and the Pacific. However, the officiai reason put forward to justify the wholesale deployment of 'advisers' and military equipment from Washington remains the fight against the Colombian traffic in narcotics.

Faced with this situation, the State of Colombia accepts no responsibility for the consequences: those displaced remain without any real protection, their safety, their return or resettling, nothing is guaranteed by any statutory body, despite the agreements made by the government in this matter in i 998. No action is undertaken to prevent massacres, summary executions and forced displacement, and this includes those occasions when the government is forewarned.

Moreover, ail violations of rights and liberties go unpunished as a matter of course, in spite of a considerable strengthening of the judicial apparatus since 1990. Actually this impunity is selective. It is reserved for state official, paramilitary groups and members of the armed forces. These last named see themselves, with a few exceptions, as being protected from ail legal proceedings in the civil courts since, in violation of the relevant international treaties, they are beyond the domain of military tribunals. For those net in uniform, impunity is generally assured on account of their political and economic power.

Nevertheless, small acts of delinquency, movements of social protest or struggle for union rights and the defence of human rights are systematically suppressed by the legal apparatus. What is more, a whole list of legal exceptions has been drawn up in order to criminalize those who disturb' the population. In tact, despite the latest reforms, regional justice (better known by the name 'faceless justice') still allows recourse to anonymous judges, a procedure which violates the right to a fair trial as well as international treaties on this subject. This two-tier phenomenon is also found in the penitentiary system which maintains most of the prison population in inhumane conditions, while drug traffickers have the right to house arrest in their enormous residences bought with drug money--a traffic which the government says it wishes to combat.

It goes without saying that social harmony in Colombia not only requires a cease-fire and an end to the conflict between the State and the rebel groups. Much thought is needed on the causes of the war, and a restructuring which would permit access to the political and economic power. And if that peace is to last, the law must finally play a fuII part and must prevent crimes being committed with impunity against the Colombian people.

Alexa Leblanc

Indigenous populations

Colombia is composed of 85 different ethnic groups and each of them upholds its customs, traditions and language. Some 48.8 per cent of Colombians are mixed-race. There are about 1.4 million Amer-Indians, such as the Arawaks (Sierra Nevada), the Emberas (250,000 - in the Choco district), the Guajiros (7,000), the Uupkas, the Koguis (Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta), the Paez (100,000 - in the Cauca district), the Guahibos (27,500), the Tukanos (or Wachupes, 13,000), the Guambianos (20,000, in the cauca district), the Sibundays, the Ingas, the Wayuus, the Cuebas, etc. The North of Colombia is where the Koguis live; they are decendants of the Tayronas Indians who have been victims of logging operations in the rainforest in the Sierra Nevada to free up land for cocaine and marijuana plantations. We should also mention the Chamis, the Llanos, the Guajoros, the Guyaberos, the U'was, among others.

The fundamental rights of the many indigenous peoples living in the country are recognized by the Colombian Constitution of 1991. In particular, a right that is all-important to the inhabitants themselves: to be allowed to live on the land of their ancestors and to be consulted about anything concerning the use of their natural resources.

To allow indigenous populations to live on these ancestral territories, the Colombian government has created 'reserves' which are 'inalienable, imprescriptible and non-seizable' according to article 63 of the Constitution, and according to Article 246 'the authorities of indigenous people shall have the right to exercise their jurisdictional functions within their territories, as long as they are not contrary to the Constitution and the law of the Republic'.
In addition, article 330 stipulates that 'the exploitation of natural resources in indigenous territories shall not cause a deterioration of the cultural, social and economic integrity of indigenous communities. The government, in its decisions pertaining to this exploitation, shall ensure the involvement of representatives of the communities concerned.'
This suggests that these indigenous populations have a decision-making power as far as the exploitation of their land is concerned. In addition, the Constitution provides for the right of these populations to take legal action in the case of violation of their rights. However, the Colombian government seems to ignore these provisions, especially when its interests are linked to those of large multinationals who wish to exploit the resources of these indigenous territories.

An unequal fight

As a result of this government policy, two local communities are left to fight an unequal battle against projects that are threatening both their cultures and their natural environment:
The U'wa community, which has about 10,000 people, and the Embera community who live near the river Sinu, near the Atlantic coast.

5,000 people of the U'wa community live in the Sierra Nevada del Cocuy in the North-East of Colombia. All their daily activities, whether social or cultural activities, are closely linked to their land which is their mother, with petroleum as its lifeblood. Hence, the petroleum exploitation project of the American Occidental Petroleum Company (OXY) is a direct threat to this Mother Earth who is the giver of life and of the people's livelihood, a direct threat to their culture and livelihood. In 1995, the U'wa people threatened to commit collective suicide if the project went ahead and if it received government approval.
The area affected by the exploitation of 208,934 ha. of land is located in the ancient territories of the U'wa people, but in an area which is not recognized as such by the state. According to the Ministry of Environment, the project known as 'Gibraltar Block' is located outside the U'wa reserve, but in truth, it is only a few yards from the reserve. In protest against the project and to defend their rights throughout their territory, 200 U'wa people kept the area around the Gibraltar Well occupied until 25th January this year when they were forceably removed by the armed forces. On 11th February, the armed forces and the police violently removed 450 indigenous people from an area located just over 2 miles from Gibraltar, an operation in which three children were killed, several injured and 11 disappeared.

The Embera Katio community who inhabits the territories on the banks of the river Sinu on the Atlantic coast is affected by a hydro-power plant construction project known as URRA which seriously threatens the natural environment of the river which only the Embera are able to maintain. This project has led to a sharp increase in violence, due to the pressure of paramilitary groups controlling this region and the murder of the principal opponents to the project which the government has never brought to light, as it has never carried out a real investigation into this matter. The barrage was constructed in 1996 without asking the Embera people. The Colombian government thus acted in breach of article 330 of the Constitution, but also in breach of Convention 169 of the TIO, of which the Colombian government is a signatory and according to which indigenous and tribal populations have the right to property on their ancestral territories.

Appeals - but are they far-reaching enough?

In order to defend their rights, the U'wa and Embera people, who now receive the backing of a number of organisations at home and abroad, have, each one individually, filed a complaint under the trust procedure. The complaint of the U'wa community led to a real legal battle. Decisions have been made in favour of them, only to be revoked soon after. On 15th May 2000, for instance, the High Court of Bogota revoked a decision of 4th April prohibiting OXY to pursue its activities in the area concerned, but the U'wa people will keep fighting to make sure their case gets heard by the judges eventually.

The complaint of the Embera community under the same procedure in 1998 was first rejected by the High Court in Cordova, then by the Supreme Court on appeal. The case then finally went to the Constitutional Court which, in November 1998, made a decision in favour of the Embera, so that the filling of the barrage was linked to negotiations with the indigenous community. These are going to be successful eventually, and unless the URRA 1 project is not cancelled, the Embera community will be given some compensation, such as damages, cancellation of stage 2 of the URRA project and an increase of their territories.
Nonetheless, it is very worrying that this is the way in which the Colombian government redefines its policy towards indigenous populations, i.e. purely according to certain economic 'constraints'.

In short, by adopting a new Constitution in 1991, Colombia has taken a major step forward towards conservation, the respect for the rights of indigenous peoples. But today, the government not only acts in breach of the Constitution, it also jeopardizes both the natural environment and the livelihoods of peoples with unique civilizations and ancient knowledge which they have passed down from generation to generation.

Emeric Renard

Forced disappearances: Jairo Bedoya Hoyos, Adviser of the Organisation of Indigenous Peoples of Antioquia.

Illegal detention: Eder Jaider Orcasita Amava, Vice-President of the National Association of Ayuda Amaya (Support to the Amaya), Bucaramanga branch.

Illegal confinement: Eivar Melendez, President of the Teachers' Union ('SIMANA').

Death threats and threats against the safety of : Santos Calderon, Director of the NGO 'Paìs Libre' ('Free Country') and Chief Editor of the paper 'El Tiempo'; Alirio Uribe Munoz, member of the Colectivo de Abogados and Vice-President of the FIDH, members and collaborators of various organisations working for the peace community of San José de Apartado.

Assassinations: Jesus Ramiro Zapata Hoyos, Coordinator of the Human Rights Committee of Segovia and President of the 'Semillas de Libertad' Group; Carmen Emilia Rivas, President of the National Association of Hospital Workers (Cartago branch).

In addition to those segments of society which have traditionally been been victims of repression (trade union leaders, peasant farmers, etc.), assaults are also currently being made against all those involved in peaceful demonstrations and even activists for the peace process.
Those who are the most at risk are people involved in helping displaced persons, as well as trade union leaders and all those who still maintain a presence in the regions where the instigators of the conflicts are present, and the 'personeros municipales' in particular, authorised to act as representives of the Public Ministry and the 'defender of the people' at village level and authorised to take down complaints about human rights violations.
Atrocities take the form of 'gradual' sequences, which we cannot tell for sure if they are deliberately programmed and coordinated; all we do know is that there seems to be a serious increase in acts of repression in the form of:
- press campaigns, various publications, public accusations, sometimes by senior officers or members of the country's home civil service accusing human rights defenders, union leaders and organisations accused of having links with guerilla movements.
- harassment and threats (by telephone, post, flyers, spying or other);
-criminal procedures against Human Rights defenders and union leaders in ad hoc tribunals.
-forced disappearances, torture, executions without trial,

These activities are largely attributable to para-military groups enjoying the tolerance, or even the complicity of large sections of the armed forces and government officials. TV programmes made by the propaganda division of the armed forces are broadcast at peak hours, presenting Human Rights defenders in situations where they appear to be directly involved in guerilla action.
Furthermore, there are no disciplinary sanctions against government officials (in most cases representatives of the armed forces) making public declarations stigmatising Human Rights defenders. Neither are there any political sanctions, nor is there a simple repudiation and the government's plans to carry out a review of armed forces intelligence reports containing accusations against human rights defenders, whether or not they have been subjected to criminal procedures, have remained an empty promise.
The most serious aggressions against Human Rights defenders still happen with such impunity as to suggest that there are judges who act as accomplices. Furthermore, the aggressions are facilitated by certain legal devices, particularly the broadened jurisdiction of military courts.

Although some lawsuits have been initiated, they do not go beyond the trial of a few henchmen or quoting Carlos Castano (leader of the para-military group of the united self-defence of Colombia) as the one who is intellectually responsible, but which is now no more than a sort of ritual. There are more than ten arrest warrants against Carlos Castano none of which has actually been carried out, although his whereabouts are publicly known.
Key witnesses have been murdered in areas declared as 'high security zones'. The apartment manager in the building where Jorge Ortega, Vice-President and Coordinator of the Human Rights Commission of CUT ('Centrale unitaire de travailleurs') was living, was, for instance, murdered in October 1998. The Vice-President himself was murdered within days of his imprisonment, before he could make any statement whatsoever.
The judicial authorities still frequently attribute these atrocities against human rights defenders to common law delinquants.
The murder of Everardo Puerta and Julio Gonzales, for instance, both members of the Committee of Solidarity for Political Prisoners (CSPP) is attributed to such common law delinquancy by the Public Ministery, although the truth is that they were murdered when a bus was stopped and they were the only ones who were murdered; all other passengers were left unharmed.

In view of this situation, physical protection measures (bulletproof jackets, armoured vehicles or doors, police escorts, etc.) by the Ministry of the Interior can only be effective to a limited extent or even come across as an alibi of a government which is developing a double-edged policy.

[Extract from "The Annual Report of the Observatory for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders, 1999"]

Mrs. Socorro Rincon Chinchilla is actively involved as a Human Rights defender in her country. She was imprisoned for 2 ½ years for her activities. In an interview with La Lettre, she talks about the incident.

Your were released after 2 ½ years of arbitrary confinement. How would you analyse the situation of Human Rights defenders in Colombia today?

In official statements, the Colombian government presents itself as supportive of Human Rights defenders. But unfortunately, there is a major gap between such statements and the reality. Human Rights defenders are victims of constant persecution. Some of us are victims of murder, forced disappearance or even forced into exile. Others, such as myself, are persecuted in criminal procedures and arrested for no obvious reasons, as we are considered a 'pain in the neck' by the government or by various government civil servants. This is due to the fact that we speak out, that we publicly condemn the crimes committed by the state. As a result, our work is very dangerous, it means that we put our own lives at stake every day. But in spite of these dangers, we cannot cease to defend thousands of victims of serious and widespread human rights violations resulting from the conflict and the political violence in the country.

Why do you believe you have been a victim of arbitrary detention for so long?

Before my imprisonment, I was working with CORPHU, the Corporation for the Protection of the People, an organisation which works in poor and deprived neighbourhoods, providing shelter for those who are victims of forced displacement. Our role was to refer the displaced to different aid organisations, such as humanitarian aid, the Red Cross or host families. We then started to refer those of the victims who were prepared to make witness statements of the violations they had suffered or observed, towards legal services, such as procuraduria.We soon realized that the majority of large-scale displacements were not a result of armed conflict between the guerillas and the armed forces, but rather the result of acts of barbarism against self-defence groups, such as UNAB, the National Union of Self-Defence of Bucaramanga. In addition, it turned out that this group received the backing of the armed forces and Brigade XX in particular. We thus decided to support the victims with their claims and legal complaints, and we publicly denounced the General of Brigade XX's involvement in a case of torture, as we have the evidence that one civilian victim, Sabana Torres, had been detained on the premises of this brigade, and a week later her tortured body was found. That happened in November 1996. My husband, Armando Valbuena Pallares, our colleague Yolanda Amaya Herrera and her husband Javier Orlando Marin, and I were all arrested less than twelve months later, on 24th October 1997, accused of being members of the guerilla.

After 2 ½ years imprisonment, we were all released, as there was obviously no evidence aainst us. Nevertheless, even after we had been released, the repression would not stop. My family were not allowed to come to pick me up at the prison exit. For security reasons, I was asked to come to the public defender's office, where I was told that some people had intended to kill us. Three days after being released, I decided to go to the market, and it was then that I noticed that we were being followed by a small truck. Since we had been released, we were thus forced to hide and change houses every other day. I cannot stay in touch with my family by telephone, for fear that they will find me. The worst, though, is the feeling that we were more protected inside the prison than outside.

The impunity of the judiciary is still commonplace in spite of efforts made by the public prosecutor's office to obtain results in cases of grave violations of human rights. Where progress has been recorded in regard to certain cases, numerous factors lessen the impact: the application of military law, the absence of a definite strategy against paramilitary groups and the non-existence of a systematic policy of exclusion of members of the security forces involved in grave violations of fundamental rights. To all this must be added serious threats to the personnel in the public prosecutor's office. Virgilio Hernandez, the director of the Human Rights Unit in the prosecutor's office, had to leave his post in July 1999 on account of the serious threats hanging over his life.

Attacks against members of the academic and intellectual communauties.

The attacks against the academic and intellectual sectors and the entry of paramilitaries into the universities are alarming signs of the worsening situation in Colombia. In 1999 a number of college professors and intellectuals were assassinated:
Hernan Henoa, a professor at Antioquia University, Dario Betancurt, a professor at the teacher training college, Jesus Antonio Bejarano, a professor at the national university, Jaime Garzon, a well-known satirical journalist, and two students. In December, there was a failed attempt to assassinate Eduardo Pizzaro, the director of the Institute of Political Studies and International Relations at the National University of Colombia.

The Colectivo de Abogados is a Colombian collective of lawyers which, despite death threats against its members, continues to reject the impunity of perpetrators of forced disappearances, summary executions and other barbarous crimes committed predominantly against the civilian population. The Colombian NGO's are endeavour-
ing to reduce the level impunity by filing complaints, collecting evidence or helping victims.
Although risking their lives, they do not hesitate to denounce the crimes of those who, by terrorising the rural civilian population, have driven out more than one and a half million internally displaced persons in the country. Anybody who denounces the unthinkable in Colombia automatically becomes a target for elimination.

Gaining strength by pooling experience.
It is in this context that the representatives of the organisations affiliated with the FIDH on the American continent, from Argentina to Salvador, described with great emotion--sparing the details, but with legal and historical explanations--the situation regarding impunity in their countries and the solutions contemplated or recommended.

There was a dual purpose: to exchange national and international experiences of the fight against impunity and to permit the civilian population of Colombia to consider solutions that would rescue them from the vicious circle of violence and impunity.
It was a question both of reviewing the devices of international justice, from the CPI to universal competence, but also to appeal to all other alternative forms of traditional justice, such as the creation of 'Truth and Reconciliation' Commissions or even the setting up of people's courts such as international tribunals of opinion.

Each of the participants had plenty of opportunity to speak in workshops where various legal devices for fighting against impunity were debated in depth. From Truth Commissions to the use of the concept of universal competence in national law courts, all forms of justice, the search for truth and for reconciliation were broached, not forgetting the subject of reparation for victims and the need to establish methods of prevention. Mr. Paul Van Zyl, the former executive secretary of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa demonstrated the complexities, the ambiguities and the fantastic successes of this particular model of the search for truth and justice. The Truth Commissions stir the memory as they try to describe the story of past crimes, in their concern to heal by exposure to the truth. However, such a system which, to guarantee amnesty for the guilty, requires that truth be told and forgiveness be proffered by the victims themselves, is not always easy or even possible. From the discussions it emerged that no perfect model of justice exists which suits all countries. The example of the Chilean experiences concerning proceedings instituted against Augusto Pinochet proved that the search for justice takes time but that one must never lose hope.

The remarkable participation of the representatives of the Nunca Mas project was also worthy of note. The work of this project is decisive in Colombia at the present time. 47,000 pieces of evidence from victims have been compiled and analysed to serve as a tool in possible future Truth Commission about Colombia.

Stormy debates about the CPI.
The problems that arose following the debates on the CPI were at the heart of the discussions. Even if the CPI constitutes one of the essential links in the fight against the impunity of perpetrators of international crime and, in this sense, represents an historic advance, it can neither be perfect nor the only form of justice available. The clauses of the Statute of the CPI most open to criticism are the fruits of unacceptable political compromise, such as the clause allowing the United States to deny the competence of the court to deal with war crimes, merely by objecting. However, the Statute came into existence when 120 States voted in favour, including a large number of the nations of the South.

Much time was given over to explaining and discussing the limits of the CPI. Indeed, it is unusual for an NGO forum to come to a vote on this subject. Nevertheless, for certain Colombian NGOs the CPI represents a means of constraint controlled by the West, in particular the United States. The argument about retroactive laws was also at the centre of the debates. The Columbian activists wanted to know how they could rely on a Court which, by invoking the principle of non-retroactivity, accepts as a matter of course the impunity of past crimes. The fact that the CPI is only competent to judge crimes committed after it came into force, led certain Columbian activists to purely and simply refuse to endorse the campaign in favour of ratifying that Court.

It must be said, however, that all the other organisations in the region are supporting the implementation of the international penal court unconditionally in their respective counties, and undertaking dynamic and extremely effective campaigns in favour of the ratification of its status.

The debate was productive in that the Colombian NGOs promised to conduct a fresh analysis of their position regarding the documents that had been handed out and the speeches made on this subject.

Above all the seminar was an act of generosity and a very brave gesture by those Colombians who are threatened, hounded and black-listed for their activities in favour of human rights. Two public forums, one on Colombia faced with her international obligations and the other on the CPI and its universal competence, allowed a glimpse into the inner circle, not only to the general public but also to the media.

The word family was used again and again to explain the feeling of brotherhood between the South American activists who helped to make this seminar a moving and valuable occasion, despite the gravity of the situations which they must face in their own countries.

Jeanne Sulzer

The adoption of a new military penal Code by Congress on 16 June 1999 seemed a significant move towards securing better enforcement of basic human basic rights, but the reality is a different thing altogether. Many of the measures set out in the Code undermine not only international requirements but also certain provisions of Colombia's Constitution.

The Code ignores the principle that military courts should only exercise competence for offences committed while carrying out a military function, and therefore some military courts may still be trying cases that are not related to military service. The only limits are in cases of genocide, torture and forced disappearance, while more frequent crimes such as summary execution or sex crimes are excluded from this list.

The Code also fails to respect the anti-torture Convention, which forbids invoking due obedience as justification for a crime. Indeed, it upholds 'acting in accordance with a legitimate order given by a competent authority, within legal guidelines' as justification.

Another worrying aspect is that the enforcement of the penal Code is by no means guaranteed. In its final section there is a clause stating that as conditions for its enforcement a year must pass from the date of its publication, and the statutory law on military penal justice must be in place. No bill on military penal justice has been forthcoming yet… while the process for adoption is more complex because it is a statutory text.

Specialised justice

Law no. 504, which came into force on 1 July 1999, does not abolish the 'regional justice' system. Regional courts were created by Decree 180, adopted in 1988, and are characterised by: generalisation of anonymous witnesses, giving evidence under cover of a secret code; general access to anonymous lawyers and judges; systematic custody arrangements during trials as a safety measure; the choice of accepting the charges and getting a shorter sentence; publicity-free trials; longer legal proceedings than normal. In addition penal and penitentiary benefits are granted to anonymous witnesses on discharge, and some public prosecutors' departments are guilty of totally illegal practices such as using stand-ins, paying witnesses, and recruiting professional witnesses. Regional justice is an instrument of repression against the social movement, where the international rules on the right to a fair trial are disregarded. Faceless judges were replaced in 1999 by specialist judges with very similar qualifications to those of their predecessors. This reform has only helped remedy a handful of the flaws in the system. The only changes have been resorting to public trials, spelling an end to anonymity for judges; rebellion and possession of arms for personal self defence alone have been transferred to competence. The law dictates that a sentence may only be passed on the basis of testimonies from several witnesses whose identity is protected. Studies carried out on several cases show that what really happens is quite a different matter…

On 30 November 1999 Congress passed a law making 'forced disappearances' a crime, and also recognising crimes such as genocide, abduction and torture. The positive aspects of this are that the definitions of these crimes conform to international requirements, that due obedience cited as justification for these crimes is disqualified, and that they come under the jurisdiction of specialised judges. And yet, some harmful changes were introduced in the final phase of the adoption of the law.

A clause on abduction was added, according to which certain abductions carried out by the security forces may not be considered as such, because there is a need to guarantee public safety, or because of essential military requirements. This leaves wide scope for interpretation concerning the legitimacy or arbitrariness of abductions, and makes it even more difficult to apply protection measures for affected individuals.

Furthermore, in the definition of torture the law states that suffering and injury caused during a legal sanction, be they normal or accidental, cannot be considered as torture. This measure opens up all sorts of possibilities for making accidental torture perfectly acceptable if it happens during a legal sanction, and goes against the anti-torture Convention.

So far the president has not yet approved this law, arguing that the two articles are anti- Constitutional.

Population: 40.8 million inhabitants
Adult literacy: 91%
Full-time school enrollment: 71%
Population with private access to drinking water: 15%
Population with private access to health services: 13%
Population living on 1 dollar per day: 7.4%
Unemployment rate: 23%
Occupation of lands: most densely populated in the whole of Latin America = the 500 main land owners occupy 45% of all arable land.

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